Marginal Revolution

Mental health sentences to ponder

Tyler Cowen — Sat, 11 Jul 2026 18:13:49 +0000

Christoph Henking and Ben Baumberg Geiger found that while there has been a steep rise in the share of young Britons reporting a mental illness, the share of people who say a mental health problem limits their day-to-day functioning has barely budged.

…when asked if they would consider someone experiencing typical fluctuations in mood (described as broad happiness but occasional moments of worry, frustration or loss of confidence) as having a mental illness, more than half of young Americans say yes, up from just a fifth 15 years ago. Older people’s views show no such change.

Here is more from John Burn-Murdoch at the FT. I would second his numerous caveats, and you should not consider this at all conclusive. But the alternative perspective is not conclusive either.

The post Mental health sentences to ponder appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.

Saturday assorted links

Tyler Cowen — Sat, 11 Jul 2026 16:23:17 +0000

1. The tiny economist on my shoulder.

2. Beethoven in Indian classical raga.

3. Too many books? (NYT)

4. Roon on slop.

5. MIE. Taylor Swift.

6. Rolling Stones fact of the day.

7. More balloons!

8. Seb Krier.

The post Saturday assorted links appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.

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Winston Marshall podcasts with me on AI

Tyler Cowen — Sat, 11 Jul 2026 07:20:40 +0000

He is from the star musical group Mumford & Sons, but is also an excellent podcaster. Here is the episode, recorded before the Fable ban was lifted:

Of course I do sneak in some music analogies, including a mention of Dock Boggs.

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Progress against dementia

Tyler Cowen — Sat, 11 Jul 2026 04:29:44 +0000

Mr Stallard has been working for a decade to corroborate this revelation. His findings have, if anything, become even more striking. Last year he and some colleagues published research in the Journal of the American Medical Association showing that, whereas 40 years ago three in every ten Americans aged 85-89 had dementia, by 2024 just one in ten had it (see chart 1). What is more, America is not the only beneficiary of this trend. Between 1988 and 2015 the share of older people being diagnosed with dementia fell by 13% a decade across six countries in North America and Europe, according to a study of almost 50,000 people by Frank Wolters of the Erasmus Medical Centre in Rotterdam, and colleagues.

Some smaller studies have also found big declines. Data from the Framingham Heart Study, which has tracked three generations in an American town, show an average drop in new dementia cases of 20% per decade over almost 40 years between the late 1970s and early 2010s. Those who were entering their dotage when Daft Punk’s “Get Lucky” was topping the charts (2013) were 44% less likely to have dementia than those who were doing so when Sting was urging Roxanne to switch off her red light (1978).

Whereas most earlier studies had simply pooled elderly people and then applied a statistical adjustment for age, Mr Stallard looked at narrow bands of ages to compare different cohorts of people over 50 years. By examining the changes between each successive cohort, he calculates that dementia rates have been declining by 2.5-3% for each calendar-year cohort.

Here is more from Jonathan Rosenthal at The Economist. You can think of this as the new instantiation of the Flynn Effect…

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Friday assorted links

Tyler Cowen — Fri, 10 Jul 2026 16:02:09 +0000

1. On Jewish culture.

2. How much have the top last names changed since 1790?

3. Bernanke appointed to the Long-Term Benefit Trust of Anthropic.

4. The India 1991 Fellowship is going great.

5. UK Dynamism Fund.

6. Peter Gray on phones and social media.

7. The new Richard Hanania book is out.

8. Warsh Fed task force leaders.

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Andrew Hall is on a roll

Tyler Cowen — Fri, 10 Jul 2026 10:21:58 +0000

He is one of the new(ish) thinkers on the rise, here is his latest piece. Excerpt:

For most of the past decade, anti-billionaire language was a niche product. Democratic emails invoked billionaires in the mid-single digits through 2017 and 2018, spiked briefly to around 14 percent during the Warren and Sanders primary surge in 2019, and then settled back down—through the entire Biden presidency, the billionaire appeared in roughly one of every twenty to twenty-five Democratic fundraising emails, barely more than in Republican ones.

Then came January 2025. In the weeks after an inauguration that seated tech CEOs in the front row and the dizzying drama of Elon Musk’s ill-fated DOGE experiment, billionaire mentions in Democratic emails quadrupled, peaking above 20 percent of all emails sent and holding around 15 percent ever since. Anti-billionaire fundraising tactics are now a mainstay of Democratic messaging.

Yes, billionaire derangement syndrome is now a thing. As a side note, I was told that Andrew is the son of the great economist Robert E. Hall of Stanford.

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Redux of my Homer’s Odyssey essay

Tyler Cowen — Fri, 10 Jul 2026 06:59:51 +0000

On EconLib, you will find all three parts here, in reverse order.

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My Conversation with the excellent Joel Mokyr

Tyler Cowen — Fri, 10 Jul 2026 04:44:33 +0000

Here is the audio, video, and transcript. Here is part of the episode summary:

Tyler and Joel discuss European corporations vs. Chinese clans, why the Catholic Church became obsessed with cousin-marriage, how persistent cultural trends really are, why Chinese cities became so populous relative to Europe, why it took so long for European living standards to surpass China’s, why sinified invaders kept getting swallowed by the dynasties they conquered, how geography kept Europe fragmented and China unified, where India fits into the story, why the Romans never made spectacles, why British soldiers stood two inches taller than the French, what powered the sudden rise of 19th-century German science, how disruptive winning a Nobel is, and much more.

Unlike many Conversations, in this one I could excerpt just about any section with equal interest. Here is one bit:

COWEN: Why does it take so long for the wealthiest parts of Western Europe to surpass Chinese living standards? Say that’s happened by 1700 or 1720, that’s many centuries after this medieval divergence. If it takes so many centuries, is the medieval divergence really the relevant factor? Why is it such a slow process?

MOKYR: Yes, I think it is. I think it’s a main factor. I think the idea of looking at standard of living, one thing, I’m very skeptical about how standards of living are actually measured. I know that this is what Pomeranz and other people have, and Jack Goldstone and other people have argued that the living standards in China were comparable to the West as late as 1750. I’m not 100 percent sure that that is true. Certainly, for my money, what really defines the divergence is that, technologically, the gap between the two countries starts to become visible at the time of the Renaissance, in terms of a whole bunch of things that you see growing in Europe and stagnant in China.

Now, keep in mind, of course, that part of the European growth is due to the fact that they borrowed ideas from China. Then the Industrial Revolution consists, to some extent, of imports institution by Europeans trying to mimic the goods that they were importing from China—not just from China, from India as well. Pottery is a good example. One of the things they really wanted from China was Chinaware. That’s why it’s called Chinaware. It took them a while to be able to match the Chinese capability in the ceramic industry, but they do so eventually. Then they stop importing this stuff from China. The same is true for, say, cotton and other products that we’re getting from the East.

European living standards, I think, should be measured, in part, by the fact that when the Europeans start their voyages across the globe in the late 15th and early 16th century, they are able to bring in a whole bunch of new crops and new techniques from other areas which they merely adopt. You’ll see Europeans very soon growing tobacco and potatoes and corn and other things like that. They are the agents of global change. Not only that they change their own diets, they change the Chinese diets because the Europeans bring from the New World things like peanuts and sweet potatoes and things like that. They change the Chinese diets, but the Chinese themselves are not agents here.

They are accepting the stuff that the Europeans did to some extent, and they’re rejecting others, but it’s the Europeans who are the agents of change here. They are the entrepreneurs. They are the people who bring about the changes, Tyler. My sense is that typifies the difference between Europeans and the Chinese. Europeans are more aggressive. They are more outward-looking. In the end, what you see by the 1830s and 1840s, you see that the technological gap is huge, in some ways much larger than the living standards gap. Even in the 19th century, in terms of food, the Chinese were capable of producing enough food. The number of famines in China is probably not a lot worse than in Europe.

When you see what happens during the First Opium War, one English ship is blowing all of this sort of mighty empire to pieces, and the Chinese have to accept this terribly humiliating peace, you can sort of see how the technological gap has grown between the two. For me, that is much more telling than the living standards. The other thing that I should like to point out is that, when you look at Europe in the 16th and 17th century, you can see that the capability of expanding the set of useful knowledge, including science, is just growing very rapidly. Whether there is a scientific revolution or not is a debate that I want to get into.

Certainly, by 1700, Europe is on the verge of really changing our understanding of how creation works. That’s not just Newton and Galileo. There’s a whole body of work that is emerging. There’s really nothing parallel like that in China. China is a very sophisticated society in many ways. The literacy rates are high. They have a well-funded and well-organized system of education, but they don’t really continue their earlier forays into science and into new technology.

Somebody actually went out and looked at Joseph Needham’s many volumes on Chinese technology and science, or Science and Civilisation [in China], as he called it, and he discovered something—which I guess we all knew, but they put numbers on it—almost nothing that Needham pointed out as an innovation happens after 1400. There’s complete stagnation setting in and some of the things that they knew how to make in earlier times, like the sophisticated clocks that they built in the 11th century, they disappear. For me, that’s more telling than how many calories of carbohydrates were consumed on average, if we could ever calculate that correctly.

Interesting throughout, and of course self-recommending. I very much enjoyed Joel’s recent book Two Paths to Prosperity: Culture and Institutions in Europe and China, 1000–2000, with Greif and Tabellini.

The post My Conversation with the excellent Joel Mokyr appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.

That was then, this is now

Tyler Cowen — Thu, 09 Jul 2026 19:10:36 +0000

One of the cool things about European football is that it provides good evidence that high-income, high-ability individuals move in response to tax rates…

That is from Jeremy Horpendahl, citing research by…Emanuel Saez.

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Thursday assorted links

Tyler Cowen — Thu, 09 Jul 2026 16:12:35 +0000

1. Facts about Bryan Caplan. I can vouch for many of these.

2. How exactly did movies become so much less sumptuous?

3. Twenty lessons about China.

4. Silvana Renreyro will be the new IMF chief economist.

5. Simon Baron-Cohen improves his views on autism.

6. Obamacare premia due for second straight double-digit jump.

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Land Reclamation!

Alex Tabarrok — Thu, 09 Jul 2026 11:18:32 +0000

“Buy land,” they said, “they aren’t making any more.” But in fact, we used to make a lot of land. Half the land area of Boston, a quarter of Manhattan, and 15% of San Francisco were raised from the sea before 1970. Tyler has already pointed to Zigmund Forrest and Max Tabarrok’s piece on land reclamation in Works in Progress. Check it out, it’s an excellent piece.

But also don’t miss Connor Tabarrok’s historical overview of land reclamation featuring the ancient Iraqi city of Ur, Alexander the Great’s siege of Tyre, and the amazing flood tanks built under the city of Tokyo! Connor, a civil engineer by trade, points out that most land reclamation isn’t done to build cities with land fill but rather to create farmland through drainage:

In the lower 48 states, the US Fish and Wildlife Service estimates that wetlands covered 221 million acres in the 1780s and 104 million by the 1980s. That is roughly 117 million acres drained in two centuries, a loss rate the report puts at 60 acres an hour, sustained for 200 years. For comparison, the total urban footprint of the United States is around 70 million acres. America has drained substantially more wetland than it has built city, and nearly all of that drained land became farmland.

… The Dutch invented the modern polder and have spent eight centuries pushing back the North Sea, and the result is one of the densest, richest countries in Europe. Yet around two-thirds of the country’s dry land is farmland. Flevoland, the newest province, is 1,410 square kilometers reclaimed from the Zuiderzee in the 1950s and 60s, and it was laid out as an agricultural basin, not a city. The country with the most reclaimed land per person uses it to grow potatoes, graze dairy cattle, and ranks as the world’s second-largest agricultural exporter.

The other reason that we drained land historically was to get rid of mosquito-driven malaria and to improve sewage.

In the mid-1800s the land south and west of the Washington Monument was the Potomac Flats, a tidal marsh that collected the city’s sewage and exposed it to the sun twice a day. The stench reached the White House. In 1882 Congress appropriated $400,000 and the Army Corps of Engineers, under Major Peter Hains, began dredging the river’s shipping channels and pumping the mud onto the flats. The work created more than 600 acres of new ground and a Tidal Basin engineered to flush the Washington Channel with each tide. The Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials stand on that fill. So do the cherry trees, planted in 1912 on land that had been open water within living memory.

Much more of interest at the whole thing.

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The tomb of Duns Scotus

Tyler Cowen — Thu, 09 Jul 2026 07:04:00 +0000

Köln!

We spent a few days in the city, and once again I marveled at the splendors of the Cathedral. If it had its original stained glass, it would count as one of the very best churches ever. It still stands in the top tier as it is. Plus the Ludwig and Wallraf museums are excellent, making the city worthy of a visit.

But, and yes there is a but. My first visit to the city was I think in 1984, and I have been maybe five times since. When I walk through the pedestrian zone, the stores there seem far stupider than in earlier times. They seem to reflect a lower level of intelligence from the populace and the city’s numerous visitors. One feels there is not much chance of stumbling upon something interesting or very high quality, not compared to earlier times. And I think MR readers will know I am no paragon of nostalgia per se.

Now that might be an illusion. Perhaps the smart stuff has moved to mail order, to online, and to the outer rims of the city. Perhaps. But is it not dispiriting when one of the best cities in one of the smartest countries in the world, over the decades, starts appearing stupider? If someone told me I had to live in center city Köln, circa 2026 that would simply feel like aesthetic hell.

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Single-payer health care systems are looking worse all the time

Tyler Cowen — Thu, 09 Jul 2026 05:07:34 +0000

That is the theme of my latest Free Press piece, here is one excerpt from it:

Government-run systems often (not always) do a perfectly fine job setting a broken arm or administering a long-standing, well-known medication. They do much less well when it comes to developing, financing, and delivering a new immunological approach to fighting cancer, personalized to your individual genome at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars. In our rapidly arriving biomedical future, innovation capacity will matter above all else. And though they may not see it today, the people with the most life ahead of them will reap nearly all of the benefits of a dynamic system, or suffer the consequences of a paralytic one.

Thirty years ago, it was often debated whether the Canadian or British healthcare systems were better than what we have in the U.S. After all, they offered a kind of guaranteed access to health services. The details could differ, but often the healthcare had no upfront price or only a low user fee. In America, in contrast, healthcare was more expensive, there were many millions of uninsured people, and dealing with sometimes rapacious insurers and hospitals could involve significant emotional trauma.

But over time the British and Canadian systems look worse and worse. The queues and rationing have increased, as giving healthcare away for free makes it hard to satisfy demands in a timely manner. In Canada, for instance, the median wait time has risen from 9.3 weeks in the early 1990s to 28.6 weeks today. In the British National Health Service, only 65.3 percent of patients start treatment within 18 weeks.

Worse yet, both of those systems are undercapitalized. In Britain, healthcare is badly understaffed and underfunded. Yet the country already has high taxes, high debt, and slow economic growth, so it is not clear where the new money will come from to recapitalize the system.

And this sentence:

This entire dynamic will be intensified as the pace of medical innovation picks up.

Your life may depend on it.

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Just wondering what the correct model of Iran is here

Tyler Cowen — Wed, 08 Jul 2026 17:58:31 +0000

Prior to the war, I linked to a tweet from Matt Yglesias which explained why Matt opposed the war, and I expressed my agreement with his stance. While I feel plenty has gone on which I do not observe, I can report that the course of the war did not change my initial assessment.

Then I read many, many commentators saying how good the final deal was for Iran, and what a major loss it was for Trump. I was never sure I understood all of the parameters of the full deal, but still I did not hold any directly contrary opinion to that.

And now I see Iran is attacking ships in the Strait again, talking openly and brazenly about building nuclear weapons, and making plans to have tolls/fees on the Strait. To be clear, only the first of those surprises me, the latter two do not.

But given their reckless behavior in what is supposedly a wonderful war outcome for them, what is the correct way to model what they would have done had Trump and Netanyahu not attacked? And what is the correct way to model our optimal response to that? The terrible things that are happening now, do they not reflect an underlying equilibrium that would have emerged anyway within a few years’ time, or do we hold some hypothesis here of extreme path-dependence, suggesting the Iranian government would have been less bellicose on more or less a permanent basis? To cite one particular example of a possible equilibrium, if drones permanently alter the balance of power in the region, the ways in which their current position is now more aggressive might have emerged in any case. Or if the military have the strength to be the natural successors to the mullahs, might that not have happened over time anyway?

I do not see many war critics engaging with these questions openly and explicitly. It seems to me that the war critics implicitly are relying on a model of extreme path-dependence for Iran’s behavior. Had Trump not attacked, they might have stayed in a more peaceful groove for some while to come. That model might be true, but I do not feel I know enough about Iranian politics to make that judgment. Why are the others so convinced that model is true? Are they such well-informed experts? Is it that they have the properly sunny sense of the underlying Iranian disposition? Inquiring minds wish to know.

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