The natural response is to think that because the share going to labor has fallen and the share going to capital has risen that there has been a transfer of income from labor to capital. That is possible but it is not the only interpretation and it does not follow mechanically from the share data.

I have also plotted total compensation to labor (in real terms) in the graph above and far from shrinking it is higher than ever and growing. Moreover the right axis is logged so you can also see that outside of recessions the growth rate of labor compensation looks quite steady (similar slope over time). (Labor compensation per member of the labor force is noisier but looks similar).

The recessions in 2008 and 2020 are worth noting because these are periods when the labor share was high and locally at a maximum! The reason, of course, is that GDI was shrinking in these periods more than labor compensation. In other words, capital takes a bigger hit than labor in a recession. This is a good reminder that a high share of GDI is not what workers most care about–a high absolute level of GDI is more important for the bottom line.

In short, the data are consistent—not proof of, but consistent with—a story in which capital has become more productive, raising output. More productive capital also raises the demand for labor, so while more of the new output goes to capital in the first instance, the pie is growing and labor’s absolute compensation has grown with it. Yes, if the shares had stayed constant and output had grown just as much, labor compensation would have been higher still. And if my grandmother had wheels, she would have been a bicycle.

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So it was not humanoid automata that former the new armies but synthetic insects (synsects) — ceramic microcrustacea, titanium annelids, and flying pseudo-hymenoptera with nerve centers made of arsenic compounds and with stingers of heavy, fissionable elements…The flying synsect combined plane, pilot, and missile in one miniature whole.  but the operating unit was the microarmy, which possessed superior combat effectiveness only as a whole (just as a colony of bees was an independent, surviving unit while a single bee was nothing).

…The nonliving, synthetic “locust” was incomparably more lethal, since it was made that way by its designers.  It possessed a preprogrammed autonomy, so that communication with a command center was unnecessary.

…the microarmy was one giant flowing or flying aggregate of self-assembling elements.  It started out dispersed, approaching its objective from many different directions, as strategy or tactics demanded, in order to concentrate into a preprogrammed whole on the battlefield.  For this fighting material did not leave the factory in final shape, read for use, like tanks or guns loaded on a railroad flatcar; the mechanisms were microproductive blocks designed to fuse together into a war machine at the designated place.  For this reason, such armies were called “self-bonding.”

…Amid a swarm of self-guided, programmed microarms, a man in uniform was as helpless as a Roman legionary with sword and shield against a hail of bullets.  In the face of special types of biotropic microarms capable of destroying everything that lived, human beings had no choice but to abandone the battlefield, for they would be killed in seconds…

A microarmy could easily penetrate all systems of defense and go deep into enemy territory.  It had no more trouble accomplishing this than did rain or snow.  Meanwhile, high-powered nuclear weapons were proving more and more useless on the battlefield.

Lem is always worth reading.

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Write your own exam question and answer it, for microeconomics. Not a math question, but a high level PhD level question. You will be graded on the quality, interest, and creativity of the question as much as by your answer.

The answer.  Here is Ethan Mollick on Mythos.

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Can artificial intelligence (AI) refute economic theory? I document experiments in which I asked several AI models (Gemini, Refine, Claude, and ChatGPT) to check the correctness of four published papers in economic theory, each containing an error that I helped identify or correct. ChatGPT Pro performed best, occasionally constructing counterexamples and corrected proofs, while other models fared worse. However, no model located a true error without substantial human guidance, and data contamination complicates interpretation. I argue that a competent human paired with a frontier model can outperform current peer review, but AI cannot yet refute economic theory on its own.

That is from a new piece by Alexis Akira Toda.

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2. Those new service sector jobs (NYT).

3. Britain launches AI Economics Institute.

4. House Committee makes effort to speed up clinical trials.

5. Those new manufacturing sector jobs.

6. More comments on phones and fertility.

7. Gordon Wood, RIP (NYT), his books are great.

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I really loved this article. A one-time increase in per capita growth from 2% to 2.1% for a single year, then dropping back to 2%, would permanently raises the level of GDP per capita – and because that small gain recurs and compounds every year afterward across the population, it would add up to roughly a trillion dollars in cumulative value. https://abundanceandgrowth.org/p/a-little-progress-is-worth-a-trillion

When people talk about pausing AI development, I can’t help but think about the enormous cumulative value that would get lost over time, the higher rates of absolute poverty that would persist across the world, and the needless deaths from delayed medical advances. There may be worlds where some version of this is something to consider, but the evidentiary bar for delaying technological development should obviously be pretty high.

Here is the link.

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Country and Western music, in their Brazilian incarnations, are very popular.

It does not feel like the next Pelé will be coming from Brazil.

Sao Paulo as a city is much improved.  The murder rate has plummeted, and the nice neighborhoods are very nice and are growing in size.  The business community is strong, interesting architecture abounds, and there is a real arts scene.  It is arguably Latin America’s number one city, with only Mexico City as a rival.  It has, along with Mexico City, evolved into a “must know” global city, though it is rarely treated that way by outsiders.  In the three days I spent there, going around to many places, I did not see a single person who was evidently a foreign tourist.  That is crazy, but also a sign there is good value here.

Sao Paulo has food to die for.  It is top tier for Brazilian (of course), meat/steak, Japanese, and Italian, and pretty good in many other offerings as well.  I had a wonderful fifteen-course omikase for $110 at a Michelin star restaurant.  The establishment, Kan Suke, has only eight seats, but I could get a table by inquiring only an hour in advance.

For Italian food it is probably the second best country in the world?  For meats it might be number one, at least if you are willing to put aside the small country of Uruguay.  For beans it is top two, and the fruits are excellent as well.  Chocolate ice cream and gelato abound.  All constraints considered, I would rather spend a week dining out here than in London or Paris or Rome, or for that matter New York City.

People are very friendly, surprising few speak decent English, and Brazilian warmth still abounds.

I was very pleased with my stay at Hotel Unique, due to its architecture and also a perfect location.

Observers should be more optimistic about the Brazilian economy.  Yes it is overregulated and the government is locked into far too much spending.  But hyperinflation is now a distant memory, a reasonable fiscal consolidation occurred in the 1990s, and the country has plenty of its own energy.  Keep in mind that for emerging economies, years of negative growth are a major problem.  Brazil now has sidestepped most (not all!) of those risks.  Slow, steady growth should be able to get them somewhere, albeit at a langorous pace.

My biggest worry about Brazil is demographics and shrinking population.  In recent times TFR has been in the 1.3 to 1.4 range, hardly satisfactory.  A shrinking population is bad per se, and also it will hurt many regions of the country due to imperfect market integration, both nationally and globally.  More importantly, the country does not have an obvious and easy option for pulling in a higher number of desirable immigrants, at least not relative to its size.  There is Venezuela and Bolivia, but the former of those may go away as a major source of people.

Will Brazilian fertility tick back up?  Will Brazil re-attain its status as a highly influential culture on the world scene, as it was in the 1960s through early 1990s?  Unclear.  But if the question is “should you go visit?”, the answer is a definite yes.

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2. Claims about soil (speculative).  Here is GPT Pro analysis.

3. Stepping up.

4. An interactive feature for AI and economic growth.

5. The strange allure of the single-sentence novel.  From Totei.

6. Where is the Indian diaspora population?

7. The Pope in Spain cites Salamanca and liberty.

8. “We’re hiring two Research Fellows to study the future of scientific discovery.“

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Is Marxian economics the only economic lens one can apply to literature? What would a Hayekian literary criticism look like? The place to start is the great Paul Cantor’s pioneering essay on Thomas Mann’s “Disorder and Early Sorrow,” a slight-seeming story set in Weimar Germany during the hyperinflation. Cantor shows that when one reads the novella through Hayek and Mises rather than Marx, the story opens up.

Start with inflationary psychology and its ramifications. Inflation shortens time horizons. When money loses value by the hour, saving is foolish and the rational move is to spend as fast as you earn—Mises’s “flight into real goods.” Prudence, discipline, and respect for the past become maladaptive. Speed, improvisation, risk-taking, and a certain youthful irresponsibility become survival traits.

Thus, Cantor/Mann tell us that inflation changes psychology and inverts the authority of age over youth. The old are set in their ways and often living on fixed incomes that inflation has wiped out; they cannot adapt. The young have known nothing but instability and go with the inflationary flow effortlessly. So the conservative virtues that once commanded respect are in decline while youthful recklessness starts to look like competence. Thus, Mann’s world has “gone mad in the worship of youth”: the children call their father by his first name, the teenagers are “the big folk,” and Professor Cornelius literally crouches down to his children’s height as the hierarchy collapses around him.

Money is a society’s primary measure of value, so Cantor/Mann argue that when you shake a people’s faith in their money, you shake their other faiths. Thus Cantor ties the conviction-less skepticism of Cornelius—and the broader Weimar nihilism and disequilibrium that helped feed the rise of Nazism—to monetary disequilibrium.

In short, inflation converts economic disorder into moral, social, psychological, and finally ontological disorder. Prices become unstable, then values, then identities, then reality. The modern feeling of absurdity and inauthenticity that critics reflexively pin on capitalism, Cantor/Mann argue is due to government-created inflation and paper money.

A Marxist could read the same story and find the inevitable contradictions of capitalism. Cantor reads it and finds the consequences of the state debasing the currency. Both are economic readings of literature. Only one of them has the economics correct.

Cantor is the place to begin but a Hayekian literary criticism could go much further. Atavism, the impossibility of social justice, products of human action but not of human design, spontaneous order, the fatal conceit, subjectivism, the sensory order–there is a lot of Hayekian ideas that literary interpretation could draw upon.

A Hayekian criticism would ask questions like how do characters acquire and process knowledge? Which institutions transmit information successfully, and which corrupt it? How do money, law, language, and custom function as social coordination mechanisms? Why do some attempts at rational redesign end in disaster? Read War and Peace as a critique of the great-man theory of history, Brazil and The Lives of Others as the fatal conceit degenerating into ignorance, fear, and absurdity. The Wire as a Hayekian epic of spontaneous order that demonstrates the illusion of social justice. Cantor’s essay on Mann shows the method, the broader project remains underdeveloped.

Hat tip: Hollis Robbins for discussion.

Addendum: Don’t forget my earlier WSJ piece, Capitalism: Hollywood’s Miscast Villain which gives an economic, one might even say Marxist, explanation for why film directors in particular disdain capitalists.

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The U.S. general fertility rate has fallen by 22% since 2007, a sustained decline not readily explained by economic conditions, contraceptive use, housing or childcare costs, or other commonly cited factors. We assess the potential role of a different shock: the diffusion of the smartphone. The U.S. rollout of the iPhone, the first modern smartphone, provides a natural experiment: from June 2007 through February 2011, the device was sold only on AT&T, allowing us to identify its effect from variation in AT&T’s mobile broadband coverage. Entropy-balanced Poisson and synthetic difference-in-differences event studies imply that access to the iPhone reduced births by 4.5–8.0% at ages 15–19 and 3.2–6.6% at ages 20–24, with statistically significant but smaller declines among older cohorts. Placebo analyses applied to Verizon and Sprint’s pre-2011 coverage footprint are null. Taken together, these cohort effects imply that the diffusion of the iPhone deepened the decline in births among women under 30 while suppressing the rise in births among older women. Overall, the diffusion of the iPhone explains 33–52% of the decline in the general fertility rate among women aged 15–44. National-survey evidence on time use and sexual behavior is consistent with the iPhone reducing in-person interactions, increasing pornography use, and reducing sexual frequency.

That is from Caitlin K. Myers & Ezekiel Hooper.  An interesting and difficult to discuss question is how much we actually want teen fertility rates to decline, and to what extent we should consider such declines a good thing.

Note also that as this study is set up it does not discriminate against the ” the iPhone effect on fertility is mainly a thing of timing” hypothesis.  And a Paul Novosad comment.

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I loved your talk about AI and wanted to bounce an idea off you.

I think AI may be bad for corporate profit margins.

A lot of companies make money because their customers can’t be bothered to monitor them more closely, or to insource something. Customers let the company make some money in exchange for doing a decent-enough job and making the problem go away.

Bank of America has $2 trillion of deposits, not a penny of which is optimized. Most enterprise software vendors could be switched out far more often, or displaced by home-built software, but it’s too much of a pain. I could run a 12-party RFP for an Uber ride or a pair of socks, but I don’t.

In a sense, many professionals are an extension of the same idea. I could research my own real estate law, or my own insurance, whether business or personal, but I don’t because it would be too hard.

Google Search might be the biggest example. It makes money because advertisers know they need to be at the top of the results to be found. But my agent will happily search all the results across multiple search engines.

AI agents should change all this. By acting as incredibly rational and vigilant sourcing agents, CFOs, and experts for their users, they will take rents previously collected by these toll-takers and redistribute them to consumers.

And I don’t think the AI stack itself necessarily makes much profit. Commodity and open-weight models are hot on the heels of the major model companies, and competition in GPUs should intensify. Indeed, making a GPU is in some ways similar to making software, so perhaps it can commoditize substantially. Chip manufacturing may remain high-margin, but there are now plenty of entrants drawn in by the shortage who could make TSMC’s market more competitive over time.

Some companies will win. Low-cost providers may gain share as customers switch more often. Richer consumers may consume more high-end goods. Companies with genuinely advantaged business models and limited competition will be able to become more efficient. But my overriding sense is that the equilibrium outcome is lower margins for companies.

Of course, people will build new businesses, and maybe they will use AI to generate very high margins in ways I haven’t considered. That would prove me wrong.

But if this lower-margin hypothesis is true, the knock-on effects are probably positive for AI adoption, since it will make the models more popular with consumers.

And if your view is that AI drives GDP growth to be only 5–10% higher over the next decade, it’s possible that a 100–200 bp decline in corporate margins from roughly 12% would mean companies in aggregate don’t see much benefit — or in fact lose — even as consumers are better off.

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2. Redux of a 2009 essay by me on poverty and a documentary film.

3. Shruti on AI and copyright law.

4. Will the number of lawyers go up or down?

5. One view on where Somalia stands right now.

6. Alan Riding, RIP (NYT).  His Distant Neighbors remains a great book on Mexico.

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This paper estimates the regional economic impact of high-skill immigration restrictions by analyzing the 2017 “Buy American, Hire American” (BAHA) policy as a quasi-experimental policy shock. By significantly tightening H-1B visa adjudication, BAHA caused new employment petition denial rates to double from 7% to 17%, while STEM-specific rejections tripled to 31%. Using a difference-indifferences framework, this study finds that states highly dependent on H-1B talent experienced a statistically significant 2.8% relative decline in value-added output. This implied a productivity loss totaling roughly $218 billion across the most affected regions. While concurrent tax cuts and deregulation likely offset the impact on employment and wages, the loss of specialized STEM expertise adversely impacted total factor productivity. These findings suggest that policies based on conventional employment metrics may overlook the “hidden damage” to productivity and innovation that drives the broader economy, thereby underestimating the true economic cost of immigration restrictions.

That is by Caroline Y. Su of McLean High School.  Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.

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