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2022 ND 86
No. 20220080
Alan Baker (argued) and Cash H. Aaland (on brief), Fargo, ND, for petitioners.
Christopher M. McShane, West Fargo, ND, for respondent Cass County Water
Resource District.
Sauvageau, et al. v. Bailey, et al.
No. 20220080
Crothers, Justice.
[¶1] Brenda and Gene Sauvageau petition this Court to exercise our original
jurisdiction and issue a writ of supervision directing the district court to stop
the Cass County Joint Water Resource District from using quick take eminent
domain to acquire their property. The Sauvageaus claim the District is
prohibited from using quick take eminent domain to acquire a permanent right
of way easement over their entire property. We conclude the quick take process
is not available because the District is taking more than a right of way in the
Sauvageaus’ property. We grant the Sauvageaus’ petition, direct the district
court to vacate its order denying the Sauvageaus’ motion to dismiss the
District’s complaint and remand for further proceedings.
[¶2] The Sauvageaus own 7.8 acres of property in Cass County. In 2019, the
Sauvageaus learned the Fargo-Moorhead Diversion flood control project would
flood their property. In December 2020 the fair market value of the fee simple
interest of the Sauvageaus’ property was appraised at $460,000. On February
1, 2021, the District offered the Sauvageaus $460,000 to purchase the property
in fee simple. On April 14, 2021, the District offered the Sauvageaus $460,000
to purchase a right of way easement over their property. The Sauvageaus
declined the District’s offers.
[¶3] In October 2021, the District sued the Sauvageaus, seeking to use the
quick take eminent domain power under N.D.C.C. ch. 61-16.1 to acquire a
permanent right of way easement covering all of the Sauvageaus’ property. The
District claimed a permanent right of way easement over the Sauvageaus’
property was necessary for the Fargo-Moorhead Diversion flood control project.
On November 11, 2021, the District sent the Sauvageaus a letter notifying
them “they will be required to vacate their home [on] March 15, 2022.”
[¶4] The Sauvageaus moved to dismiss the District’s complaint, claiming the
District could not use quick take because it sought to take more than an
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easement. The Sauvageaus also moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting
the District from evicting them from their property on March 15, 2022. The
Sauvageaus argued the District lacked authority to take their property
through quick take eminent domain and an injunction was necessary to
prevent the destruction of their home and other buildings on the property.
[¶5] The district court denied the Sauvageaus’ motion to dismiss, concluding
the District had authority to acquire the Sauvageaus’ property through quick
take eminent domain. The court also denied the motion for a preliminary
injunction, concluding the Sauvageaus did not demonstrate a likelihood they
would prevail on the merits of their claim that the District was precluded from
using quick take to acquire their property.
[¶6] On March 7, 2022, the Sauvageaus petitioned this Court to exercise our
supervisory jurisdiction. On March 14, 2022, we entered an order preventing
the District “from evicting or otherwise preventing Gene and Brenda
Sauvageau from the quiet enjoyment of their home.”
II
[¶7] The Sauvageaus have petitioned this Court to exercise our supervisory
jurisdiction.
Wilkinson v. Bd. of Univ., 2020 ND 179, ¶ 17, 947 N.W.2d 910 (quoting
Nygaard v. Taylor, 2017 ND 206, ¶ 11, 900 N.W.2d 833).
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[¶8] This case presents a significant issue regarding the District’s use of its
quick take eminent domain powers under N.D.C.C. § 61-16.1-09(2)(b). The
District’s attempt to use quick take under N.D.C.C. § 61-16.1-09(2)(b) relates
to matters of important public interest and our case law provides little
guidance on the issue.
[¶9] Article I, § 16, N.D. Const., states “[p]rivate property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use without just compensation having been first made
to, or paid into court for the owner.” A jury decides the amount of compensation
due for the taking, unless a jury is waived. Id. Section 16 also authorizes the
state to acquire a right of way by quick take. Quick take allows the state to
“take possession upon making an offer to purchase and by depositing the
amount of such offer with the clerk of the district court of the county wherein
the right of way is located.” Id. The owner of the right of way may have a jury
decide the quick take damages. Id. Quick take offers an owner less protection
because the condemnor can take possession of the property before trial on the
amount of just compensation due. Johnson v. Wells Cty. Water Res. Bd., 410
N.W.2d 525, 529 (N.D. 1987).
[¶10] Taking private property for public use involves a conflict between public
interests and private property rights. The public interest in this case involves
construction of flood controls, as reflected in N.D.C.C. § 61-16.1-01:
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III
[¶11] The Sauvageaus concede the District has authority to take their property
through eminent domain. However, the Sauvageaus claim the District must
acquire their property in fee simple under the eminent domain provisions of
N.D.C.C. ch. 32-15 rather than a permanent right of way easement by quick
take under N.D.C.C. § 61-16.1-09(2)(b).
[¶12] Chapter 32-15, N.D.C.C., governs eminent domain. Under N.D. Const.
art. I, § 16 and N.D.C.C. § 32-15-01(2), private property may not be taken for
public use without just compensation. The interests in land subject to taking
by eminent domain include fee simple, easements, and the right of entry.
N.D.C.C. § 32-15-03. A fee simple interest may be taken “for reservoirs and
dams and permanent flooding occasioned thereby.” N.D.C.C. § 32-15-03(1). A
governmental entity taking property by eminent domain may take possession
of the property after entry of judgment. N.D.C.C. § 32-15-29.
[¶13] Article I, § 16, N.D. Const., authorizes quick take for the acquisition of a
right of way:
“The general objective of § 16 was to . . . make quick take available to the state,
its departments, agencies and political subdivisions.” Johnson, 410 N.W.2d at
528. Section 16 provides the state or a political subdivision “may take property
via quick take if the Legislature sees fit to so provide.” Id. Quick take offers
less protection to property owners than possession after judgment under
N.D.C.C. § 32-15-29. Id. at 529.
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[¶14] The legislature granted the District eminent domain powers to acquire
private property for flood control projects. N.D.C.C. § 61-16.1-09(2). Under
N.D.C.C. § 61-16.1-09(2)(a), the District may use eminent domain to acquire
property in fee simple by complying with the requirements of N.D.C.C. ch. 32-
15.
[¶15] The legislature also granted the District the power to acquire an
easement for a right of way for flood control projects by quick take eminent
domain as authorized by N.D. Const. art. I, § 16. N.D.C.C. § 61-16.1-09(2)(b).
Before acquiring an easement for a right of way by quick take, a water resource
district must attempt to purchase the easement by engaging in informal and
formal negotiations. N.D.C.C. § 61-16.1-09(2)(b)(1).
[¶16] This Court has addressed the acquisition of a right of way by quick take
for highway purposes. In Tormaschy v. Hjelle, 210 N.W.2d 100, 101 (N.D.
1973), the State sought to acquire a 2.44 acre parcel of land for a rest area
sewage lagoon near Interstate 94. This Court held the term “right of way” as
used in the constitutional quick take provision “was meant to include not only
that strip of land necessary for driving lanes, but also other land necessary for
the construction of accommodations reasonably necessary to make driving
safe, comfortable, and helpful.” Id. at 103.
[¶17] In Minot Sand & Gravel Company v. Hjelle, 231 N.W.2d 716, 720 (N.D.
1975), the State used quick take to acquire a fee simple interest in strips of
land abutting and adjacent to a section line easement for purposes of widening
the road. The owner, who was involved in the commercial aggregate business,
claimed the State also became the fee simple owner of the land within the
section line easement. Id. at 721. This Court concluded the State acquired fee
simple in the land described in the instrument, which did not include the
property within the section line easement. Id. at 722. This Court also held that
although the State did not acquire the section line easement, its taking of the
adjacent land “may have deprived the owner of many, if not all, benefits and
uses of the property in the section line easement, particularly as to the
aggregate lying beneath the section line easement.” Id. We stated “the
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damages sustained by the landowner could be the equivalent of the State
taking a fee simple of the section line easement.” Id.
[¶18] This Court discussed quick take by a water resource board in Johnson v.
Wells County Water Resource Board, 410 N.W.2d 525. In Johnson, at 526, a
water resource board sought to acquire flowage easements by quick take under
N.D. Const. art. I, § 16. This Court concluded art. I, § 16 was not self-executing,
and the legislature had not yet authorized quick take for a water resource
board. Id. at 528-29. Johnson was decided before the legislature enacted the
quick take provisions of N.D.C.C. § 61-16.1-09(2). 1989 N.D. Sess. Laws ch.
746, § 2.
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obstacles from the Property; and the right to perform any other
work necessary and incident to the construction, cleaning,
inspection, reconstruction, modification, operation, management,
maintenance, repair, or improvement of the Diversion Project,
together with all necessary and reasonable rights of ingress and
egress to and from the Property.’”
The court concluded the Sauvageaus’ argument that the District’s taking left
them with no value in the property went to the issue of damages because the
District had authority to take a right of way easement.
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property at $460,000. The appraisers hired by the District valued the property
“based on the fee simple interest.” The appraisal report discussed the District’s
acquisition of a permanent right of way easement:
[¶23] The District’s complaint includes numerous purposes for which the
Sauvageaus’ property will be used. Some specific uses include “inundating the
Property with water,” “excavating, piling, storing, depositing, spoiling,
spreading, and removing excavated dirt, soil, clay, silt, and other materials,”
and “removing trees, underbrush, obstructions, and any other vegetation,
structures, or obstacles from the Property,” including the Sauvageaus’ home
and other structures. The appraisal valued the Sauvageaus’ reverter interest
in the property at $0. At oral argument the District’s attorney stated the
Sauvageaus could use their property for bird watching or hunting but only to
the extent their use did not conflict with the District’s use.
[¶24] In Cass County Joint Water Resource District v. Aaland, 2021 ND 57,
¶ 13, 956 N.W.2d 395, we discussed “the harm presented by a permanent
physical occupation” of one’s property:
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“Property rights in a physical thing have been described as
the rights to possess, use and dispose of it. To the extent that the
government permanently occupies physical property, it effectively
destroys each of these rights. First, the owner has no right to
possess the occupied space himself, and also has no power to
exclude the occupier from possession and use of the space. The
power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most
treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights. Second,
the permanent physical occupation of property forever denies the
owner any power to control the use of the property; he not only
cannot exclude others, but can make no nonpossessory use of the
property. . . . Finally, even though the owner may retain the bare
legal right to dispose of the occupied space by transfer or sale, the
permanent occupation of that space by a stranger will ordinarily
empty the right of any value, since the purchaser will also be
unable to make any use of the property.
(quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-36
(1982)).
[¶25] The Sauvageaus also submitted evidence establishing the public road to
their property will be closed. A property owner is entitled to reasonable and
convenient access to his or her property considering all of the uses to which the
property is needed or likely to be needed. Sauvageau v. Hjelle, 213 N.W.2d 381,
390-91 (N.D. 1973) (citing Chandler v. Hjelle, 126 N.W.2d 141 (N.D. 1964)).
[¶26] On the basis of the pleadings and the facts in the record, as a matter of
law the District is taking much more than an easement or right of way in the
Sauvageaus’ property. The District is not acquiring a strip or a parcel of the
Sauvageaus’ property for a right of way. The District intends to close the public
road, remove all structures from the property, engage in disturbance of the
surface and subsurface, and inundate the property with water. The District is
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taking the entire property for full value while leaving the Sauvageaus with
only a reverter interest with no value.
[¶27] The District’s taking here goes beyond the scope of N.D.C.C. § 61-16.1-
09(2)(b) for acquiring a right of way easement by quick take. Under N.D.C.C.
§ 61-16.1-09(2)(a), the District is required to use the eminent domain
procedures of N.D.C.C. ch. 32-15 when acquiring a greater interest in property.
By labeling the interest in the Sauvageaus’ property as a “permanent right of
way easement,” the District is attempting to evade the requirements and
property owner protections of N.D.C.C. § 61-16.1-09(2)(a).
IV
[¶28] We grant the Sauvageaus’ petition, direct the district court to vacate its
order denying the Sauvageaus’ motion to dismiss the District’s complaint and
remand for further proceedings. We decline to address the Sauvageaus’
remaining arguments.
[¶30] The Honorable James S. Hill, D.J., sitting in place of McEvers, J.,
disqualified.
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