More on Singapore and public sector talent development

From an anonymous correspondent, I will not indent:

“As a Singaporean, I appreciated your recent post on Singapore and the self-perpetuating nature of its establishment. I wanted to raise three points that may be of interest to you, which seem to also be under-discussed outside of Singapore.

The first is the Singaporean system of scholarships. You write in the post that “In Singapore, civil service jobs are extremely important. They are well paid and attract a very high quality of elite, and they are a major means of networking…” This is partly true, but the salary of civil servants at the entry level and most middle management positions is generally lower (by a small by noticeable amount) than that of comparative private sector employment, for the level of education etc. The real tool by which the government secures manpower for the civil service is a system of government scholarships. Singapore provides scholarships to high-school-equivalent students to fund their university education (either in Singapore or overseas), in exchange for which the student is bonded to work for the government for a period of 4 – 6 years after graduation. For talented low-income students, this is naturally an appealing option, and is win-win from the government’s point of view. What Singapore has successfully done, however, is create a set of social norms in which taking such a scholarship is seen as prestigious, and not something merely done out of need, such that many middle-class or even quite wealthy students take up the scholarship despite not needing it to fund their education. The incentive for them is the fast-tracking of scholars (relative to those employed through normal means) into higher positions within the civil service, a practice which is essentially an open secret. You could also think of this as a modern re-creation of the Chinese imperial exam system, without the bad parts, and I do think the cultural connection is not unimportant.

Singapore is often seen as a model for other developing countries for any number of the policies it adopts. But I think one truly underrated high impact policy is this scholarship system. It largely solves the problem governments in many countries face of keeping talent in the public sector, while redressing some degree of inequality (of course, the scale is limited). To a government, the cost of funding the higher education of a couple hundred students a year (Singapore’s birth cohort is small, after all) is relatively insignificant, even at the most expensive American colleges. I’ve always thought of this policy as one of the single lowest-cost, highest-impact things that other developing countries can borrow from Singapore: a marginal revolution, if you like.

The second point is on how the civil service is enmeshed with the elected government. The PAP often draws its candidates from the civil service, and because of its electoral dominance, it largely has the power to decide on the career pathways of its MPs and ministers. Unlike the UK, therefore, where ministerial promotions are largely dependent on political opportunity, the PAP does do quite a bit of planning about who its ministerial team a few years down the line is going to consist of, and often draws civil servants to fit into that system. If we look at the current Cabinet, for example:

Lawrence Wong (deputy PM and heir presumptive)
Heng Swee Keat (deputy PM)
Ong Ye Kung (Minister for Health)
Desmond Lee (Minister for National Development; probably closest to the US Department of the Interior in its scope)
Josephine Teo (Minister for Communications and Information)
S. Iswaran (previously Minster for Transport, though now under investigation for corruption)
Chee Hong Tat (acting Minister for Transport)
Gan Kim Yong (Minister for Trade and Industry)

[They] were all ex-civil servants before standing for election, and many more backbenchers and junior MPs could be added to that list. This contributes significantly to the links between the PAP and the establishment structure as a whole, because it means that MPs when coming into power have often been steeped in “the system” for many years before formally standing for election, and the process of selecting and promoting MPs is much more controlled than the relatively freer systems in liberal democracies.

The last point is about the army. It is not uncommon for ex-soldiers to serve in government in other countries, the US being a prime example, but while in the US this is largely a random process of ex-soldiers themselves choosing to run, in Singapore it’s a much more deliberate effort. First, the SAF (Singapore Armed Forces) awards scholarships too, in a manner similar to the general civil service. In a classically Singaporean way, the scholarships are aggressively tiered, ranging from the most prestigious SAF Scholarship (only around 5 of which are awarded each year) to the SAF Academic Award which funds only local university studies. The degree of scholarship one receives in the army thus determines one’s career progression. The Chiefs of Defence Force (in charge of the SAF as a whole) have all been SAF scholarship recipients, as have almost all of the Chiefs of Army, Navy & Air Force. The relevance of this to your post is the fact that recipients of the more prestigious scholarships are often then cycled out of the army into either the civil service or politics. In Cabinet:

Chan Chun Sing (Minister for Education)
Teo Chee Hean (Coordinating Minister for National Security)
Lee Hsien Loong (PM)

[They] all started their careers in the SAF, and this list could likewise be extended by considering junior MPs. Likewise, many of the heads of the civil service in the various ministries are ex-SAF soldiers, as are the heads of many government agencies like the Public Utilities Board (managing water and electricity) and Singapore Press Holdings, which publishes the establishment newspapers.

Taken together, these three features are I think what contribute to the sense of the “establishment” being a kind of self-contained system that you allude to in your post. In general, young people are attracted to either the civil service or military after leaving high school, and are bonded to the government in exchange for university funding. Although some leave after the bond period, many stay on due to the promise of career progression in both organisations. Eventually, some then become cycled out into the elected government, and the process repeats. This process has, I think, become very attractive to the government because it allows them to exert much more control over the selecting and nurturing of talent, than the more freewheeling British or American systems.”

TC again: Bravo!