Powell: The Fed is Independent but for that Reason Must be Limited

An excellent and forceful speech by Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell. He defends the Fed’s independence but clearly and directly argues that the only way that deal can be credible is if the Fed stays out of big political issues.

…the case for monetary policy independence lies in the benefits of insulating monetary policy decisions from short-term political considerations.¹ Price stability is the bedrock of a healthy economy and provides the public with immeasurable benefits over time. But restoring price stability when inflation is high can require measures that are not popular in the short term as we raise interest rates to slow the economy. The absence of direct political control over our decisions allows us to take these necessary measures without considering short-term political factors. I believe that the benefits of independent monetary policy in the U.S. context are well understood and broadly accepted.²

…It is essential that we stick to our statutory goals and authorities, and that we resist the temptation to broaden our scope to address other important social issues of the day.⁴ Taking on new goals, however worthy, without a clear statutory mandate would undermine the case for our independence.

…Addressing climate change seems likely to require policies that would have significant distributional and other effects on companies, industries, regions, and nations. Decisions about policies to directly address climate change should be made by the elected branches of government and thus reflect the public’s will as expressed through elections.

At the same time, in my view, the Fed does have narrow, but important, responsibilities regarding climate-related financial risks. These responsibilities are tightly linked to our responsibilities for bank supervision.⁶ The public reasonably expects supervisors to require that banks understand, and appropriately manage, their material risks, including the financial risks of climate change.

But without explicit congressional legislation, it would be inappropriate for us to use our monetary policy or supervisory tools to promote a greener economy or to achieve other climate-based goals.⁷ We are not, and will not be, a “climate policymaker.”