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v. OPINION
ORANGE COUNTY
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
a public corporation,
Defendant-counter-claimant-
Appellee.
SUMMARY **
Civil Rights/Takings
*
The Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
**
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
S. CAL. EDISON CO. V. ORANGE COUNTY TRANSP. AUTH. 3
COUNSEL
OPINION
II
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,
provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for public
use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend V; see
Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
247 (1897). Ordinarily, government action that “physically
appropriates” property is treated as “a per se taking”
requiring just compensation. Cedar Point Nursery, 594 U.S.
at 149.
But before deciding whether the government has taken a
property interest, we first must determine whether any
property interest exists. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
Mahogany Meadows Ave. Tr., 979 F.3d 1209, 1214 (9th Cir.
2020) (“The State cannot take what the owner never had.”);
see also Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 963–64 (9th Cir.
2011). “Because the Constitution protects rather than creates
property interests, the existence of a property interest is
determined by reference to ‘existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law.’”
Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164
(1998) (quoting Board of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972)); accord Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560
U.S. 702, 707 (2010) (“Generally speaking, state law defines
property interests.”). Our inquiry is not limited to state law,
however, or else “a State could ‘sidestep the Takings Clause
by disavowing traditional property interests’ in assets it
wishes to appropriate.” Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S.
631, 638 (2023) (quoting Phillips, 524 U.S. at 167). So, we
must look as well to “‘traditional property law principles,’
plus historical practice and [the Supreme] Court’s
precedents.” Id. (quoting Phillips, 524 U.S. at 167).
S. CAL. EDISON CO. V. ORANGE COUNTY TRANSP. AUTH. 9
III
Separate from any argument under the Takings Clause,
the Utilities also contend that the California Public Utilities
Code places the costs of relocation on OCTA. We disagree.
Unlike the takings claim, over which we have federal-
question jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the state-law
claim is not independently subject to federal jurisdiction.
Rather, the district court exercised supplemental jurisdiction
over that claim because it is part of the “same case or
controversy” as the federal claim. See id. § 1367(a).
Ordinarily, “if the federal claims are dismissed before
trial . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Here, we have affirmed the
dismissal of the Utilities’ federal claim. But whether to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims
after federal claims are dismissed is a matter of discretion,
not subject-matter jurisdiction. See Acri v. Varian Assocs.,
Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). We must
accordingly decide whether to retain state-law claims
according to “our normal rules of appellate procedure.”
Kohler v. Inter-Tel Techs., 244 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir.
2001) (quoting Government Emps. Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133
F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
The parties in this case might have argued that the district
court should dismiss the supplemental state-law claim under
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) in the event that it dismissed the federal
claim. But neither party so argued, either in the district court
or before us. We decline to excuse the parties’ forfeiture by
sua sponte disclaiming supplemental jurisdiction over the
state-law claim. See Kohler, 244 F.3d at 1171; Doe by Fein
v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
S. CAL. EDISON CO. V. ORANGE COUNTY TRANSP. AUTH. 19
that OCTA “may not ‘sue and be sued’ in the name of [the
Orange County Transit District],” so section 40161 cannot,
by its nature, apply to OCTA. But that provision could apply
to OCTA if the “the authority” were substituted for “the
district.” That is the exact substitution that the Utilities ask
us to apply to section 40162.
The Transit Act includes a range of provisions that could,
conceivably, apply to OCTA, such as a grant of power to
enter into contracts, Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 41065, conflict-
of-interest rules, id. § 40166, and a grant of eminent-domain
authority, id. § 40175. If the last sentence of section 130241
adds anything, it must allow OCTA to determine, in its
discretion, which provisions of the Transit Act—all of which
are potentially applicable to OCTA—should in fact apply.
OCTA has not chosen to subject itself to section 40162, so
the Utilities’ arguments about the duties imposed by that
section are unavailing.
IV
Finally, OCTA asks that we order an award of pre- and
post-judgment interest. We decline to do so. Although its
counterclaim asserted an entitlement to pre-judgment
interest, OCTA did not mention interest in its motion for
summary judgment. The district court did not award pre-
judgment interest, and OCTA did not seek reconsideration
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 59(e). See
Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 177 (1989)
(explaining that a “postjudgment motion for discretionary
prejudgment interest is a Rule 59(e) motion”). More
importantly for our purposes, OCTA has not cross-appealed
the denial of pre-judgment interest, and we “may not alter a
judgment to benefit a nonappealing party.” Lopez v.
Garland, 60 F.4th 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting
22 S. CAL. EDISON CO. V. ORANGE COUNTY TRANSP. AUTH.