Authors

David R. Mares

Guest Scholar - Foreign Policy, Latin America Initiative

Harold Trinkunas

Senior Fellow and Director - Foreign Policy, Latin America Initiative

Charles W. Robinson Chair

But hosting the Olympics represented more than merely a desire to highlight Brazil’s (then) success at home. As we show in our new book “Aspirational Power,” it was also part of a longrunning Brazilian goal for their country to join the ranks of major powers. And during the past decade, Brazil thought it had finally arrived. Under the Lula administration, Brazil’s diplomatic presence expanded across Africa and the Caribbean and Brazilian diplomats took the helm of the World Trade Organization and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Brazil worked to transform the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) into more than a marketing label awarded by an investment bank, but rather into a club of emerging powers that worked together to reform the international order. And Brazil sought a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, a privilege currently held by only five countries (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States).

The Olympics were a particularly appropriate venue for Brazilian leaders to showcase what in 2007 looked like a remarkably successful story of emergence. Brazil is fortunate to live in (and have shaped) a peaceful neighborhood in which modest amounts of hard power are sufficient to secure national sovereignty. It has instead come to emphasize soft power as the foundation of its international influence. Soft power is the ability to attract support: Other governments and peoples come to support your country’s international policies because they admire you and want to emulate you. Successfully hosting the world’s largest celebration of peaceful athletic competition was a perfect fit with how Brazil would like to be perceived by the world and with how Brazil would prefer the international order to function.

Relaunching Brazil’s aspirations on the global stage

As the 2016 Rio Olympics begin, it is true that the factors that powered Brazil’s emergence a decade ago have faded. The end of the commodity boom has not only undermined Brazil’s emergence, but also has undercut the rise of other members of the BRICS whose cooperation Brazil had counted on. Brazil’s domestic crisis has undermined its soft power internationally by eroding the attraction of Brazil’s model. And the vast corruption scandal associated with Petrobras tarnished its political and economic elites and institutions.

Even in this difficult time, Brazil needs to engage with, rather than retreat from, the world in order to succeed.

Even in this difficult time, Brazil needs to engage with, rather than retreat from, the world in order to succeed. This means integrating into global value chains rather than remaining the most closed of the large economies. This means focusing on both trade facilitation and on freer trade with the other major world economies. It means putting Brazil’s domestic values—democracy, humanism, the peaceful resolution of conflicts—at the center of its international diplomacy, partnering with emerging democracies such as India and South Africa rather than the world’s autocracies. This does not mean turning its back on the important relationship it has with China, but there is also no reason to preferentially align with such a country on a wide array of global issues simply because both countries are major trading partners.

As Brazil recovers, it should think creatively of how to once again expand the use of its successful development assistance model abroad, as it has already done in Africa. And it would benefit from using its hard power, its military forces, to generate additional soft power by expanding its role in leading key international peacekeeping operations around the world, as it has in Haiti.

This is an ambitious international agenda for Brazil, in line with the aspirations that shaped its original bid to host the Olympics in 2007. This is an agenda that the world’s great democracies, such as the United States, should welcome. But it will also benefit Brazilians. If their country accomplishes all this, it will be much more deeply embedded in the global rule making process that shapes the functioning of the international order, and it will be much harder for the major powers to ignore Brazil’s interests as they collectively bargain over the future. This will in turn help Brazil contribute to a positive global order that supports prosperity and democratic stability at home.

      

 

 

“This next year will be quite critical. Not only is the problem of scarcity extremely serious in Venezuela—and we’re seeing this reflected in social unrest and people looking for ways to address their basic needs—but Venezuela also has very important international debt payments coming up in the second half of the year that may possibly lead it to the situation of contemplating a default, with very unpredictable results. We also have the timing of the recall referendum. So there are a number of different aspects coming to a head, any which one of could become a crucial turning point in the country’s forward path.” – Harold Trinkunas

In this episode of “Intersections,” Harold Trinkunas, senior fellow and director of the Latin America Initiative, and Dany Bahar, fellow in Global Economy and Development, discuss Venezuela’s political and economic crisis, and how it is the result not just of dropping oil prices, but of years of economic mismanagement.

• Dim prospects for dialogue in Venezuela
• Should Venezuela seek international assistance? Ways out of the economic and humanitarian crisis
• More research on Venezuela from Brookings

With thanks to audio engineer and producer Zack Kulzer, Mark Hoelscher, Carisa Nietsche, Sara Abdel-Rahim, Jacob Saliba, Fred Dews and Richard Fawal.

Questions? Comments? Email us at intersections@brookings.edu

      

 

 

Lloyd Axworthy, a former foreign minister of Canada, unpacked these complex and interconnected issues at the second annual Madeleine K. Albright Lecture on Global Justice. Highlighting Secretary Albright’s many contributions to advancing the concept of the Responsibility to Protect and the role of democratic institutions in assuring peace, Axworthy knit together seemingly disparate challenges facing the world today and offered a framework for addressing them couched firmly in the respect for basic human rights.

A key pillar of this framework is responsible sovereignty and its offspring, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)—a now politically fraught concept originally proposed by Francis Deng as a means of providing international protection for internally displaced persons. Axworthy noted the parallels between persons displaced by the Balkans conflict and today’s reality where 65 million people are displaced worldwide. Secretary Albright has made a critical contribution to strengthening R2P as a guide for anticipating and responding to the threat of atrocities, emphasizing R2P’s role as a protective action and not just a humanitarian response. As Axworthy noted, actors in Africa and Southeast Asia are increasingly applying the concept to local conditions.

Given the contentious fallout, however, from the Libya intervention and its perceived metamorphosis into a campaign for regime change, Axworthy emphasized that R2P is primarily a principle of prevention, rather than military intervention. Smart phones and other information and communications technologies are critical new tools for identifying and documenting problems in their earliest stages so they might be addressed by the proper stakeholders before they result in violence. Axworthy suggested that these early warning tools offer a new framework for the international community’s conception of what interventions should look like. This sort of atrocity prevention which engages local communities is yet another one of Secretary Albright’s legacies.

As Axworthy noted, one of the oldest documented human rights—which has precedent in Greek and Hebrew systems of governance—is the right of sanctuary. Though it hasn’t been raised in the complex debates surrounding migration and the refugee crisis, the concept of sanctuary is the simplest distillation of the imperative facing governments. “A right is something you defend because it can happen to you.” Anyone could find themselves a refugee; governments should behave accordingly when fashioning migration policies.

“A right is something you defend because it can happen to you.” Anyone could find themselves a refugee; governments should behave accordingly when fashioning migration policies.

In that vein, Axworthy recalled the fluid coalitions of like-minded stakeholders who worked together on such issues as the elimination of land mines. Those stakeholder groups—nation states, the International Committee of the Red Cross, international civil society coalitions, writers and academics, and popular leaders like Princess Diana—understood how threats in seemingly distant locales could affect them and worked to develop a popular intervention. It is this core belief—that human rights must be protected for the benefit of all—which must be fostered more broadly in the international community and underpin policy approaches to successfully address the migration crisis. “The risk inherent in the migration crisis could be corrosive and could create a series of explosions which could tear our infrastructure and rules apart,” Axworthy strongly asserted. The risk is real. Relevant stakeholders must do more to influence public opinion and generate political will in other ways in support of effectively addressing the migration crisis with respect for human rights.

At the same time, governments cannot act independently of popular will and still be considered legitimate. Sovereignty rests on the will of the people as expressed through regular and genuine elections of representatives who are obliged to protect the human rights of the entire population. Maintaining a close connection to the people with open lines of communication about policies and priorities is critical to avoiding having large swathes of the public feeling alienated and vulnerable to divisive political rhetoric. Britain seems to have failed in this regard as evidenced by the outcome of the recent referendum on membership in the European Union; the United States is on a similar path leading up to the November presidential elections between presumptive nominees Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. Too often governments are not listening to their people, Axworthy asserted. We are seeing this play out in many arenas, not least in the global backsliding in the quality of democracy and respect for human rights.

“The risk inherent in the migration crisis could be corrosive and could create a series of explosions which could tear our infrastructure and rules apart.”

There is a constellation of potential solutions to the challenges of our day that don’t fit into the standard conception of global governance, Axworthy summarized. Just as the concept of sovereignty has evolved over time to incorporate responsibilities to protect the security and human rights of populations, so too must our concept of governance. Our greatest contemporary challenge—the migration crisis as driven by conflict, constrained resources, and the impact of climate change—lacks a clear governance framework. But we can build on Secretary Albright’s example as a refugee who became a leader on atrocity prevention, protection of threatened populations, and support for democratic institutions, to forge a more just, secure, and peaceful future.

The Madeleine K. Albright Global Justice Lecture hosted in The Hague and the Justice Stephen Breyer Lecture on International Law hosted in Washington, D.C. are products of a partnership between the Brookings Institution and The Hague Institute for Global Justice to explore contemporary challenges in global affairs at the nexus of justice and security. The annual Madeleine K. Albright Lecture was inaugurated in The Hague in 2015 and continued in 2016. The annual Justice Stephen Breyer Lecture was inaugurated in Washington, D.C. in 2014 and continued in 2015 and 2016. 

      

 

 

Brazil’s aspirations for greatness

Brazil has long aspired to grandeza (greatness) both at home and abroad. As its first ambassador to Washington, Joaquim Nabuco (1905-1910) once said, “Brazil has always been conscious of its size, and it has been governed by a prophetic sense with regard to its future.” As we document in our new book, Brazil has reached for major power status at least four times in the past 100 years: participating as a co-belligerent with the Allies in World War One and seeking a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations thereafter; joining the Allies in World War II and aspiring to a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1945; mastering nuclear technology beginning in the 1970s, including launching a covert military program (now terminated) to build a nuclear explosive device; and most recently, beginning with the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2011), seeking to become a leader in multilateral institutions, including actively campaigning for a permanent seat on the UNSC.

A decade ago, many Brazilians believed that this time their country was poised to secure its position as a major power. As the seventh largest economy in the world with the 10th largest defense budget and significant soft power, Brazilian leaders such as Lula saw their country as being “in the mix” of major powers who, while not able to make the international order alone, could very well shape its evolution through uncertain times together with other major powers. Certainly, they no longer saw Brazil as one of the middle or small powers, the “order takers” in the international system.

Brazil saw a new opportunity to emerge as a major power in the advent of a relatively stable and peaceful post-Cold War geopolitical order, the decade-long commodity boom that supercharged its economy after 2002, and the rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Between 2002 and 2013, Brazil’s virtuous trifecta—democratic consolidation, rapid economic growth, and reduced inequality—was a boon to its soft power. This combination was highly attractive to many in the developing world, contributing to Brazil’s claim to leadership on the international stage as a bridge between the global South and the great powers. International peace and stability particularly favored Brazil’s predilection for deploying soft power rather than hard power. And in the BRICS, Brazil saw an opportunity to work together with other emerging powers critical of the present international order to advance its agenda for reformed global institutions.

Rethinking Brazil’s approach to global influence

Brazil’s bridge-building strategy was effective in advancing its national interests in multilateral forums, most recently on global internet governance and global climate change. But the BRICS dimension of Brazil’s strategy detracted from its ability to influence the world’s great democracies. The BRICS identity associated Brazil with authoritarian powers—China and Russia—that were viewed by the United States and its allies, at best, as unhelpful critics and, at worst, as deliberate saboteurs of the present order. This undermined Brazil’s credibility with Washington and other leading democracies, and hindered its ability to advance its preferred policies on everything from nonproliferation to the reform of global economic institutions to the debate on humanitarian intervention. In retrospect, working more closely with other emerging democracies that seek reform of the international order, such as through the India-Brazil-South Africa association known as IBSA, would have more clearly signaled Brazil’s constructive intentions while still preserving its critical posture.

Today, the opportunities that powered Brazil’s most recent rise—post-Cold War geopolitical stability and a massive commodity boom—are receding, replaced by a more fractious and dangerous international system. Despite troubles at home, it is not too early for Brazil’s leaders to think anew about how to strengthen national capabilities and deploy them strategically to address this new environment. This includes fortifying domestic institutions, both to address the present crisis but also to restore the luster of Brazil’s soft power. It means bolstering Brazil’s hard power capabilities once the economy improves and deploying them in ways that contribute to its soft power, for example by taking on additional responsibility for leading critical international peacekeeping operations as it has in Haiti. It means thinking carefully about how to signal to the democratic great powers Brazil’s commitment to a strengthened liberal international order, even as it holds onto its own principles and works towards reform of multilateral institutions. And eventually, as Brazil completes its recovery, it means contributing more substantially to the costs of maintaining its preferred global order. A Brazil that achieves all this will be well positioned to have a positive global impact, continuing to be a strong (if sometimes critical) partner for the United States in shaping the international order.

      

 

 

So Brazil clearly has troubles. But this list has almost become old news. Yes, Brazil is going through a tough time, but they’re working on it, and many are cautiously optimistic that the country will eventually stabilize, Blondie-style: one way or another.

But this week somehow managed to further scandalize a country that’s in no mood for any more bad news:

• Death of Juma the jaguar: The Rio Olympic Games took another hit this week after a Brazilian jaguar was killed hours after appearing (in chains) in an Olympic torch lighting ceremony. Animal lovers took to social media to express outrage at the killing of Juma the jaguar, who was sadly killed after she escaped from her enclosure in the military zoo where she was being held and moved toward a soldier. The public’s response was so strong that the Rio 2016 Organizing Committee published an apology on its Facebook page. 

• Operation Zealots tax evasion scandal: The Financial Times brought “Brazil’s other corruption investigation,” Operacão Zelotes (Operation Zealots), back into the news this week. Although overshadowed by the Lavo Jato (“Carwash”) investigation, Operacão Zelotes exposes widespread tax evasion by over 70 major Brazilian companies, banks, and multinational companies who allegedly bribed members of Brazil’s Administrative Council of Appeals to reduce or avoid tax payments. It’s estimated that the scandal may have cost the Brazilian state over $5 billion in tax revenue.

• Brazil named deadliest country for environmental defenders in 2015: According to the Global Witness report “On Dangerous Ground” released earlier this week, 185 environmental activists were killed in Brazil in 2015. Brazil has consistently topped the list since 2002, partially due to its population size and percentage of rainforest within its borders—however 2015 was Brazil’s deadliest year yet, with 50 environmental defenders murdered last year alone. Of the top ten countries on the list, seven are in Latin America: Brazil Colombia, Peru, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico.

At a time when Brazil could really use some good news, this week was a rough blow. However, this convergence of crises also presents an excellent opportunity for Brazilians to engage in a little bit of self-reflection: what are Brazil’s core values, and what national identity do Brazilians want to project to the world? Opportunities for major national overhaul don’t come around every day, so Brazil shouldn’t waste it.  

      

 

 

Of course, everyone favors dialogue as the preferred option to solving Venezuela’s political and economic crisis. The alternative to dialogue is already upon us: growing reports of looting, social unrest, and government repression in this increasingly hungry and violence-wracked nation. And a deadlocked political system in which the executive branch wields its control over the Supreme Court like a club to beat down any dissent and limit any efforts by the opposition-controlled Congress to legislate. 

But there are good reasons to be skeptical that dialogue will work at this time. First and foremost, the Venezuelan government has very rarely sustained or followed through on previous dialogue attempts during other governability crises, even as recently as 2014. The opposition’s Mesa de Unidad Democrática (MUD) is also wary of engaging in a dialogue because it could be used by the government to “buy time” to delay the recall referendum the MUD requested. After all, polls suggest that if presidential elections were to happen this year, the opposition would probably win and remove President Maduro from power. A change in government—the first best outcome for the opposition—or alternatively forming a unity government, likely would not happen through dialogue. This is because some members of the current Venezuelan regime cannot afford to share power for fear of losing impunity and facing accountability for crimes they have committed, ranging from human rights abuses to corruption. 

Time also runs against the Venezuelan people, as the country faces the worst humanitarian crisis in its modern history. This crisis is rooted in almost two decades of irresponsible policies, which led to scarcity of food, basic goods, and medicine as the price of oil—Venezuela’s largest and almost only export—declined. In the absence of enough foreign currency to import raw materials and finished products, a much-diminished domestic private sector—after a decade of tight controls and expropriations—is unable to satisfy local demand. Given Venezuela’s isolation from global financial markets due to high sovereign risk levels, the solution to this crisis would require a large rescue package and debt restructuring efforts in coordination with bilateral, multilateral, and international funding sources, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The current regime, however, seems reluctant to reach out to these non-conventional sources of funding, since it would imply accepting their policies, bankrupting what otherwise could be a rich and prosperous country.

An economic adjustment plan might raise deep concerns on the Venezuelan streets, as international bailouts typically involve severe austerity measures that bring back bad memories of structural adjustment plans in the region during the 1980s and 1990s. But in fact, severe austerity measures have already been put in place, de facto, by the Venezuelan regime: Imports have fallen by more than half this year, greatly reducing consumption levels, and strong energy rationing is already in place. Accessing foreign funding as part of a recovery plan is critical, since it would allow restoring imports to a level that would relieve the ongoing humanitarian crisis. This, in turn, would help to stabilize the economy by slowing down monetary expansion, returning inflation to manageable levels.

A man walks past empty shelves at a supermarket in Caracas, Venezuela, May 16, 2016. Photo credit: Reuters/Marco Bello.

Few good options

In the absence of dialogue, then, what are the scenarios for Venezuela looking forward? Certainly, President Maduro’s inner circle would like nothing more than to stay in power, hoping that rebounding oil prices and the prospects of renegotiating a loans-for-oil arrangement with China will provide the regime with some breathing room. While trying to manage the crisis, the government will likely keep maneuvering to delay any recall referendum until after January 10, 2017, the halfway mark of President Maduro’s term. Under Venezuela’s constitution, a successful recall held after that date would put the vice president in power for the rest of Maduro’s term. A regime led by a Chavista successor would assure impunity until the next presidential election in 2019—or so those in government think.

For the opposition and its supporters in the international community, a recall referendum this year offers the best way forward for Venezuela, one that is firmly grounded in and legitimized by the country’s own constitution. They argue that only new elections can create the conditions for implementing sane, reasonable, and credible economic policies. 

[A]uthoritarian regimes will not make concessions unless the alternative, the status quo, is even more costly.

But from what we know of past efforts to restore democracy across the region, authoritarian regimes will not make concessions unless the alternative, the status quo, is even more costly. And President Maduro still acts as if he has lower-cost alternatives in the form of potential new credit lines from China (either new loans or more favorable terms on existing debt) or even a further contraction in imports and consumption in Venezuela (further deepening an already profound humanitarian crisis). He may also hope that the recent modest rise in oil prices will be sustained, offering the regime some breathing room. We also know from the past that—absent the complete collapse of the authoritarian regime—another condition for a successful restoration of democracy is that a critical mass on both sides of the political spectrum reach a minimum common understanding of the rules of the game, including a vision for a future in which neither side faces an existential threat to their core interests. This seems implausible in today’s Venezuela. There seem to be no moderates on the government side that have voice or influence over political outcomes in Venezuela, which is the main obstacle to successful dialogue. The radicals in charge of Venezuela’s government have a vested interest in shutting down space for serious negotiations. 

Unfortunately, if present trends continue, Venezuela is likely to become increasingly ungovernable, with more frequent violent protests in the streets. If civilian unrest increases and the police and Guardia Nacional (national gendarmerie) are overwhelmed, the Army may be forced to choose between obeying orders to engage in repression (something that has negative historical and institutional associations for the military, since it participated in putting down violent urban unrest during the 1989 “Caracazo”) and staying the barracks. Either way, military officers, who already play a key role in ministries and state industries, social missions and food distribution networks, and state, local, and communal government, will be drawn directly into national politics. In a region that has worked so hard to limit the role of the military, this would be a regrettable outcome. In the worst case scenario, the military might even engineer a transfer of power to a new leadership that is better able to protect its institutional interests.

Demonstrators clash with riot police officers during a protest called by university students against Venezuela’s government in Caracas, Venezuela, June 9, 2016. Photo credit: Reuters/Carlos Garcia Rawlins.

Pressure by other means

What can the international community and the United States do to promote peace and democracy in Venezuela? The U.S. offer to engage in bilateral dialogue may not lead to substantive outcomes, but it short-circuits the confrontational dynamic that Venezuela so often attempts to foster in multilateral forums. Other parallel efforts may also not produce immediate results, but they need to be available so that moderates in Venezuela have options for dialogue once enough people in the present regime see restoring democracy as a less costly option than maintaining the status quo. This should lead international supporters of democracy in Venezuela to look for fresh opportunities to raise the cost of the authoritarian status quo for the Maduro regime, as well as for other governments in the region that would rather look the other way. For this reason, the vote on invoking the Democratic Charter at the OAS is important regardless of the outcome. After ignoring the crisis in Venezuela for all too long, the region’s presidents deserve to be put on the spot and explain—both at home and abroad—why they continue to countenance growing authoritarianism in Venezuela. 

There seem to be no moderates on the government side that have voice or influence over political outcomes in Venezuela.

Beyond diplomatic and political efforts, there should be a concerted effort to ensure that Venezuela’s access to fresh international capital is based on a realistic plan to restore economic stability. This means talking seriously with the Chinese about the situation in Venezuela. Chinese policy banks have already provided at least $60 billion in loans to Venezuela in return for future oil shipments (some of which may have been repaid already). Due to Venezuela’s inability to increase production enough to offset the drop in the price of oil, Chinese officials are in discussions about rescheduling Venezuela’s current loan payments. This could potentially provide the Maduro administration the fiscal space to double down on the status quo. 

But interestingly, there is some evidence that China is preoccupied with the prospects of the present regime and is pursuing dialogue with Venezuela’s opposition about the future of China-Venezuela relations. China’s new-found concern may provide an opportunity for the U.S. government to explore expanding the range of international stakeholders in a solution to Venezuela’s crisis. After all, it is in China’s interest for Venezuela’s economy to resume functioning (if only so China can be paid back), and it is in the U.S. interest that Chinese loans contribute to solving Venezuela’s crisis rather than allowing a desperate regime to hang on to the status quo. While the United States and China may have disagreements, both would benefit from improved governance and rule of law in Venezuela, as would Venezuela itself. 

      

 

 

The famous but also apocryphal newspaper headline that supposedly ran, “Fog in the channel; Continent cut off” is not only a central tenet of what “Britishness” is supposed to look like. It also reflects a sense of British insularity and perennial ambivalence about the ties that have bound the nation throughout history with the rest of Europe. But when Britons go to the polls on June 23 to decide whether to leave the European Union, the result could be that like in the case of the famous headline, it is Britain that actually becomes dangerously isolated.

The referendum, on what has become known as Brexit, presents a number of risks for the U.K., Europe, and the rest of the world. Polls released last week show that about 44 percent of voters are in favor of staying in the EU, and 42 percent are opposed. Most British voters are thinking predominantly about domestic issues, and the impact that broader European policies—such as on migration, the euro, and market regulations—have on their own well-being.

But it’s not just the U.K. that’s channeling euro-skepticism. In a Pew survey conducted in 10 EU countries, a median of 51 percent of respondents had a favorable view of the EU. In the latest Eurobarometer survey, which covered all 28 EU member states, 45 percent of respondents said they think that the EU is going in the wrong direction, compared with only 23 percent who think the opposite. Unfortunately, the “remain” campaign in the U.K. hasn’t been very effective. Its advocates have tended to focus on the transactional nature of the decision and on what’s at stake (e.g. how Brexit would affect exports or housing prices), rather than on the compelling story, vision, and narrative of an internationalist, open, cosmopolitan Britain. It’s therefore not surprising that Britons are almost split down the middle on whether or not to stay within the EU fold.

The vote comes at a time of worldwide uncertainty, with the global economy at a potential inflection point and dangerous, populist demagogues gaining traction and strength in the United States and across Europe. These political figures are challenging the very nature of alliances and the value of immigration, as well as the fundamental notion that it behooves us all to live in an international rules-based system. Brexit would be like manna from heaven for an isolationist and nationalist like presumptive Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations would be on the ropes without London’s participation, for one. And after spending 43 years in the EU, the U.K. would need to renegotiate its financial, economic, commercial, and social accords with the rest of Europe—as well as countries with which the EU has free trade agreements. And although the U.K. participates in the so-called group of Five Eyes (the five English-speaking countries that cooperate closely on intelligence), Brexit would affect its role in transatlantic security cooperation and combating terrorism. Moreover, it is expected that a vote for Brexit would likely set off another pro-independence, pro-European wave in Scotland, thus fragmenting the kingdom further and continuing to exacerbate EU vulnerability. The dark forces of history—European nationalism, fragmentation, demagoguery, and xenophobia—could simply skyrocket. Needless to say, the decision on Brexit will have profound implications for British foreign policy and its role in the international arena: punching above its weight will no longer be tenable.

John Donne memorably wrote in the 17th century that “no man is an island.” Isolationism is not an option in the 21st century either; no country can shield itself from the effects of the global interconnectedness, whether climate change, transnational organized crime, cyber threats, or movements of migrants and refugees. Those who claim they can turn back the clock to some golden age do not understand the nature of globalization today, nor the serious economic and geopolitical consequences that come with trying to roll it back. As a Mexican who grew up and attended school in Wales as a young boy, I ask the British to resist the siren calls of those who propose—impossibly—to return to a past of “splendid isolation.”

      

 

 

There were no surprises. Danilo Medina, of the governing Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD), was re-elected by a large margin, and all indications are that he was also able to conserve his party’s majority in both houses of Congress. We say “all indications are” because the election was beset by irregularities (well-documented by the OAS observer mission); and these irregularities have triggered a serious post-electoral crisis that has yet to be fully resolved.

Medina’s re-election confirms the infallibility of the rule (in place in Latin America since 1978) that every president who reforms the Constitution to keep himself in power has achieved his objective. The only exception was Hipólito Mejía, former president of the Dominican Republic, who amended the Constitution in 2002 to seek a second term, but then failed to get re-elected. This defeat opened the door for the return of Leonel Fernández (also of the PLD), who had already governed from 1996 to 2000, and who won the 2004 election and then (benefitting from Mejía’s reform) got himself re-elected in 2008. Once in office, Fernández reformed the Constitution in 2010 (moving from allowing consecutive re-election to allowing unlimited re-election but with alternating rather than consecutive terms). President Medina amended the Constitution once again, in 2015, on an expeditious basis (within 15 days) to re-enact consecutive re-election and to run again in the elections just held on 15 May. No other country in Latin America has amended the constitutional provision on re-election so many times in such a short period, four times in 21 years. 

Continuity of the PLD for the fourth consecutive term 

With this clear-cut triumph by Medina (he garnered 61.74 per cent of the votes, leading the second-place challenger Luis Abinader, of the recently-formed Partido Revolucionario Moderno (PRM), by more than 25 points), the PLD has now won the presidency for the fourth time in a row, with a total (at the end of this new term) of 16 years in power without interruption. Never before under democratic rules of the game had the same party won four times in a row in the Dominican Republic. 

If we exclude the special cases of the PRI in Mexico (prior to 2000) and the Partido Colorado (in Paraguay), from 1978 to date only four parties or coalitions have won four consecutive presidential contests in the region: Chavismo in Venezuela, which has been in power for 17 years (now in the midst of a profound crisis that could lead to Maduro’s early exit); Brazil’s Workers’ Party (PT), which so far (we’ll see what comes of the trial of Rousseff by the Senate that is about to get under way) has been in power for 13 years; ARENA in El Salvador (which governed without interruption from 1989 to 2009 with presidents Cristiani, Sol, Flores, and Saca); and the Concertación in Chile (from 1990 to 2010, with presidents Aylwin, Frey, Lagos, and Bachelet in her first term). 

Reasons for the victory

What are the reasons that explain Medina’s landslide victory after three consecutive terms of the PLD in office?

In my opinion, a combination of personal, political, and socioeconomic reasons explain this outcome. As to the personal reason, one should highlight the great popularity of President Medina. With approval ratings greater than 70 per cent, he enjoys high levels of popular support, much more than any other Latin American president.

In terms of the political reasons, one should note the advantage that any Latin American president has when seeking consecutive re-election: the enormous concentration of power by the PLD in all areas of the State, accentuated political clientelism, and above all, an opposition that has not figured out a strategy for removing the PLD from power. Mention should also be made of the marked lack of fairness in the electoral contest and the abusive use of state resources in favor of the governing party.

The third important reason that explains Medina’s easy re-election is to be found in the economy. With 7 per cent growth and inflation at 2.5 per cent, the Dominican Republic is one of the two best-performing economies in the region (the other is Panama). This growth stands in stark contrast to a Latin America which (according to World Bank projections) will see negative growth of -0.6 per cent this year. It is also more than 2 percentage points greater than the average growth rate for the countries of Central America.

Challenges

Yet Medina’s second term, despite the strong support he received at the polls, is not problem-free. On the contrary, he faces major challenges, including having the results of the 15 May elections accepted by the opposition so that his legitimacy and, above all, that of the PLD legislators and mayors, will not be called into question.

Improving the quality of democracy is another major challenge. The Dominican Republic is part of the group of countries (according to The Economist) that has a flawed democracy, characterized by marked institutional weakness and high levels of citizen insecurity and corruption. 

Moreover, profound and urgent changes are needed in the political–electoral system aimed at improving the quality and integrity of the electoral process to avoid having to suffer similar problems in future elections. 

In the electoral sphere, the OAS report recommends that it is important to separate voting for members of the lower house from voting for senators. It is also important to provide for fairer electoral competition. This requires adequate regulation of the use of state resources (to keep the party in power from enjoying unfair advantages), strengthening the levels of transparency, oversight, control of political financing (establishing, among other measures, ceilings for campaign spending and limits on private financing), as well as assuring more equal access to the media. 

As regards the political system, the priority includes introducing thorough changes in the party system aimed at modernizing the parties, institutionalizing them and improving their levels of internal democracy. Another priority is ensuring effective gender parity in politics. 

These political–electoral changes need to be supplemented by adequate modernization and strengthening of the electoral organs (JCE – Central Elections Board and the TSE – Superior Electoral Tribunal), ensuring that they are made up of very qualified professionals of renowned prestige, who are totally independent of the political parties. In the area of the economy, despite the current positive macroeconomic outlook, the situation is far from ideal. 40 per cent of the population lives in poverty due to the economy’s serious difficulty generating quality employment (due to its growth model). To this we must add the need to solve the main limitation that the economy has faced for some time, i.e., scarce energy and high energy prices. 

In my opinion, this fourth consecutive victory consolidates the PLD as the predominant party in the Dominican political system (with the risk of becoming a hegemonic party). The PRD, which until recently was the main opposition party under the now-deceased Peña Gómez, weakened by its constant internal strife and divisions, ended up allying with the PLD in this election and won just over 5 per cent of the votes. The other major historical party, the PRSC, of deceased former president Joaquín Balaguer (which allied with the PRM in this election) also obtained few votes; its numbers similar to the PRD’s. The big question is what will happen in the coming years with the recently formed PRM and the leadership of Abinader, in particular, if both he and the party will be able to become consolidated as the main opposition force. 

One will also have to see whether Medina and the PLD have the capacity to steer clear of the attrition and crisis that generally affects “long governments” under a single party or coalition in the region, especially during the curse of the second consecutive term. Of the four “long governments” mentioned above, two, the PT in Brazil and chavismo in Venezuela, are currently experiencing serious crises that could lead to an early end of the terms of presidents Dilma Rousseff and Nicolás Maduro. 

In summary, during his second term Medina should implement an ambitious agenda of reforms. In politics, the priority includes modernizing and strengthening democratic institutions, adopting a law on political parties, and transforming the judiciary and the police to fight insecurity and corruption head on. In economic and social policy, the focus should be on maintaining high growth rates but correcting the serious prevailing inequalities and distortions with the objective of creating quality jobs and thereby reducing the high levels of poverty.

This piece was originally published by International IDEA. 

      

 

 

There were no surprises. Danilo Medina, of the governing Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD), was re-elected by a large margin, and all indications are that he was also able to conserve his party’s majority in both houses of Congress. We say “all indications are” because the election was beset by irregularities (well-documented by the OAS observer mission); and these irregularities have triggered a serious post-electoral crisis that has yet to be fully resolved.

Medina’s re-election confirms the infallibility of the rule (in place in Latin America since 1978) that every president who reforms the Constitution to keep himself in power has achieved his objective. The only exception was Hipólito Mejía, former president of the Dominican Republic, who amended the Constitution in 2002 to seek a second term, but then failed to get re-elected. This defeat opened the door for the return of Leonel Fernández (also of the PLD), who had already governed from 1996 to 2000, and who won the 2004 election and then (benefitting from Mejía’s reform) got himself re-elected in 2008. Once in office, Fernández reformed the Constitution in 2010 (moving from allowing consecutive re-election to allowing unlimited re-election but with alternating rather than consecutive terms). President Medina amended the Constitution once again, in 2015, on an expeditious basis (within 15 days) to re-enact consecutive re-election and to run again in the elections just held on 15 May. No other country in Latin America has amended the constitutional provision on re-election so many times in such a short period, four times in 21 years.

Continuity of the PLD for the fourth consecutive term

With this clear-cut triumph by Medina (he garnered 61.74 per cent of the votes, leading the second-place challenger Luis Abinader, of the recently-formed Partido Revolucionario Moderno (PRM), by more than 25 points), the PLD has now won the presidency for the fourth time in a row, with a total (at the end of this new term) of 16 years in power without interruption. Never before under democratic rules of the game had the same party won four times in a row in the Dominican Republic.

If we exclude the special cases of the PRI in Mexico (prior to 2000) and the Partido Colorado (in Paraguay), from 1978 to date only four parties or coalitions have won four consecutive presidential contests in the region: Chavismo in Venezuela, which has been in power for 17 years (now in the midst of a profound crisis that could lead to Maduro’s early exit); Brazil’s Workers’ Party (PT), which so far (we’ll see what comes of the trial of Rousseff by the Senate that is about to get under way) has been in power for 13 years; ARENA in El Salvador (which governed without interruption from 1989 to 2009 with presidents Cristiani, Sol, Flores, and Saca); and the Concertación in Chile (from 1990 to 2010, with presidents Aylwin, Frey, Lagos, and Bachelet in her first term). 

Reasons for the victory

What are the reasons that explain Medina’s landslide victory after three consecutive terms of the PLD in office?

In my opinion, a combination of personal, political, and socioeconomic reasons explain this outcome. As to the personal reason, one should highlight the great popularity of President Medina. With approval ratings greater than 70 per cent, he enjoys high levels of popular support, much more than any other Latin American president.

In terms of the political reasons, one should note the advantage that any Latin American president has when seeking consecutive re-election: the enormous concentration of power by the PLD in all areas of the State, accentuated political clientelism, and above all, an opposition that has not figured out a strategy for removing the PLD from power. Mention should also be made of the marked lack of fairness in the electoral contest and the abusive use of state resources in favor of the governing party.

The third important reason that explains Medina’s easy re-election is to be found in the economy. With 7 per cent growth and inflation at 2.5 per cent, the Dominican Republic is one of the two best-performing economies in the region (the other is Panama). This growth stands in stark contrast to a Latin America which (according to World Bank projections) will see negative growth of -0.6 per cent this year. It is also more than 2 percentage points greater than the average growth rate for the countries of Central America.

Challenges

Yet Medina’s second term, despite the strong support he received at the polls, is not problem-free. On the contrary, he faces major challenges, including having the results of the 15 May elections accepted by the opposition so that his legitimacy and, above all, that of the PLD legislators and mayors, will not be called into question.

Improving the quality of democracy is another major challenge. The Dominican Republic is part of the group of countries (according to The Economist) that has a flawed democracy, characterized by marked institutional weakness and high levels of citizen insecurity and corruption.

Moreover, profound and urgent changes are needed in the political–electoral system aimed at improving the quality and integrity of the electoral process to avoid having to suffer similar problems in future elections.

In the electoral sphere, the OAS report recommends that it is important to separate voting for members of the lower house from voting for senators. It is also important to provide for fairer electoral competition. This requires adequate regulation of the use of state resources (to keep the party in power from enjoying unfair advantages), strengthening the levels of transparency, oversight, control of political financing (establishing, among other measures, ceilings for campaign spending and limits on private financing), as well as assuring more equal access to the media.

As regards the political system, the priority includes introducing thorough changes in the party system aimed at modernizing the parties, institutionalizing them and improving their levels of internal democracy. Another priority is ensuring effective gender parity in politics.

These political–electoral changes need to be supplemented by adequate modernization and strengthening of the electoral organs (JCE – Central Elections Board and the TSE – Superior Electoral Tribunal), ensuring that they are made up of very qualified professionals of renowned prestige, who are totally independent of the political parties. In the area of the economy, despite the current positive macroeconomic outlook, the situation is far from ideal. 40 per cent of the population lives in poverty due to the economy’s serious difficulty generating quality employment (due to its growth model). To this we must add the need to solve the main limitation that the economy has faced for some time, i.e., scarce energy and high energy prices.

In my opinion, this fourth consecutive victory consolidates the PLD as the predominant party in the Dominican political system (with the risk of becoming a hegemonic party). The PRD, which until recently was the main opposition party under the now-deceased Peña Gómez, weakened by its constant internal strife and divisions, ended up allying with the PLD in this election and won just over 5 per cent of the votes. The other major historical party, the PRSC, of deceased former president Joaquín Balaguer (which allied with the PRM in this election) also obtained few votes; its numbers similar to the PRD’s. The big question is what will happen in the coming years with the recently formed PRM and the leadership of Abinader, in particular, if both he and the party will be able to become consolidated as the main opposition force.

One will also have to see whether Medina and the PLD have the capacity to steer clear of the attrition and crisis that generally affects “long governments” under a single party or coalition in the region, especially during the curse of the second consecutive term. Of the four “long governments” mentioned above, two, the PT in Brazil and chavismo in Venezuela, are currently experiencing serious crises that could lead to an early end of the terms of presidents Dilma Rousseff and Nicolás Maduro.

In summary, during his second term Medina should implement an ambitious agenda of reforms. In politics, the priority includes modernizing and strengthening democratic institutions, adopting a law on political parties, and transforming the judiciary and the police to fight insecurity and corruption head on. In economic and social policy, the focus should be on maintaining high growth rates but correcting the serious prevailing inequalities and distortions with the objective of creating quality jobs and thereby reducing the high levels of poverty.

This piece was originally published by International IDEA. 

      

 

 

While the spread of democracy over the last three decades has inspired hope for an international liberal order, recent shifting power balances and democratic backsliding are shaking this foundation. In his new book, Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Ted Piccone discusses how five pivotal countries—India, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and Indonesia—could play a critical role as examples and supporters of liberal ideas and practices. 

Mr. Piccone, Hardeep Singh Puri, former Ambassador of India to the U.N. and Secretary General of the Independent Commission on Multilateralism, and Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Ambassador of Brazil to the U.N. and former Minister of External Relations, discuss the ways in which these countries stand out for their embrace of globalization and liberal norms on their own terms—and how, in a multipolar world, they may impact our shared future.