“Turkey has a unique standing in history in many ways. One I would emphasize is where it sits geographically in the world as a crossroads between East and West, north and south, many different cultures and languages and systems of governance…. In its early years as an independent nation and under Kemal Ataturk you saw this very strong heavy emphasis for a secular state that would be more oriented towards the West. That is really what dominated the development of modern Turkey for so many years. What we are seeing now is an effort by religious voices that say, ‘We have a place in politics too,’ in an effort, as I saw it, to set a better balance in religious expressions and political life.” – Ted Piccone

In this episode of “Intersections,” Kemal Kirişci, TÜSİAD senior fellow and director of the Center on the United States and Europe’s Turkey Project, and Ted Piccone, senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program, examine Turkey’s history of democracy and military coups, its relationship with the Middle East and the European Union, and the Gülenist movement’s relationship with the Turkish government. They also discuss the future development of the country’s governance under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Additional materials:

• Coup attempt in Turkey
• The geopolitics of Turkey’s failed coup
• Erdoğan’s real opportunity after the failed coup in Turkey
• Five Rising Democracies and the Fate of the International Liberal Order

With thanks to audio producer Mark Hoelscher, Carisa Nietsche, Sara Abdel-Rahim, Fred Dews, and Richard Fawal.

Subscribe to the Intersections on iTunes, and send feedback email to intersections@brookings.edu.

      

 

 

Friday’s attempted military coup in Turkey demonstrates that yet another U.S. partner in the Middle East seems to be descending into domestic unrest. The spectacle was, for many observers, reminiscent of another recent July uprising in a key American ally: the 2013 military takeover in Egypt. There, as in Turkey, a powerful military in a country with a history of coups rebelled against a democratically elected Islamist government.

Egyptians and Turks alike will naturally reject such comparisons and emphasize the unique nature of their respective situations—not least that the coup in Egypt succeeded and the one in Turkey failed. They have a point. The differences in the local political context are more important than the superficial similarities.

But from an American perspective, there is a key similarity: These coups were a disaster for U.S. policy in both cases, and would have been regardless of how they turned out.

In each case, the U.S. government’s immediate response to fast-moving situations was to issue bland statements urging calm and condemning violence. Regardless, it gets blamed for not acting forcefully enough, and often accused of directly instigating the violence. In the end, a relationship with the government that emerges is strained, both by such accusations and by the ensuing crackdown and human rights abuses that usually follow both successful and unsuccessful coups.

How does the United States end up in this no-win situation so frequently? Why is domestic unrest in faraway countries like Egypt and Turkey such a problem for the United States?

The essential problem is that the United States cannot just do foreign policy business with its partners. Because of America’s own values and domestic politics, it needs to get involved in their domestic political struggles. It needs to promote democracy and civil society in its partners and to take positions on controversial domestic issues such as the proper functioning of democratic institutions and the protection of human rights or media freedom.

This means that when domestic politics explodes, the United States is often caught in the middle.

Partnership isn’t enough

Both Egypt and Turkey are “key security partners” of the United States. This means the U.S. government needs these countries to deal with critical security issues.

Turkey is a NATO ally that sits at the crossroads of practically every geopolitical issue in the Middle East. It is particularly critical for the fight against ISIS. The United States and its anti-ISIS coalition partners supply their partners on the ground in Syria through Turkish territory and use the military base at Incirlik in Turkey to launch airstrikes against ISIS. The foreign fighters that replenish ISIS’s ranks have also often come into Syria via Turkey.

Egypt is also seen as an important partner for counterterrorism. It is struggling to cope with jihadist groups, some of them linked to ISIS, in the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt also provides the United States military with privileged access to the strategic Suez Canal, helps keep the peace with Israel, and helps ensure that weapons that might be used to attack Israel don’t get to Hamas through Egypt’s border with Gaza.

One could argue about whether these are truly important security interests for the United States. But the key point is that successive American governments since, in the case of Turkey in the 1950s and in the case of Egypt in the 1970s, have accepted that they are.

They have accordingly sought to build an effective partnership with both countries. The United States is committed, through NATO, to defend Turkey in case of aggression. And the United States provides Egypt with more than $1.3 billion a year in military assistance and $150 million a year in economic assistance, making it the second-largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid in the world (after Israel).

But the United States can’t just give these guarantees and this money without taking on some moral responsibility for what goes on in these countries. Debates over these countries in U.S. domestic politics reflects this sense of moral responsibility.

If the Egyptian military overthrows a democratically elected government, U.S. Congressmembers will quite naturally ask why the United States is giving nearly $1.5 billion a year to a government that shoots peaceful protesters in the street. If the Turkish government suppresses media freedom or arrests judges, U.S. human rights groups will similarly question why the United States accepts such actions by a NATO ally.

Hoping to escape from this dilemma, the U.S. government has long sought to promote the Western values of democracy and human rights in its security partners.

But particularly in the Middle East, this has rarely worked. The United States doesn’t really know how to democratize these societies, and in any case, it values its security relationship with the government too much to exert sustained pressure.

So even as the Egyptian military overthrew the democratically elected government, the United States continued to give it military aid. Even as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has moved in an increasingly authoritarian direction, the United States has stepped up its security cooperation with Turkey over ISIS.

The result is a hypocrisy that is evident and annoying to both the government and its opposition. Every effort to pressure governments on human rights elicits furious reactions and denials. And when, despite the rhetoric about human rights from U.S. officials, nothing really improves, the population grows cynical about U.S. motives.

So every effort to build up civil society organizations spawns a million conspiracy theories about U.S. involvement in domestic politics.

The crucible of a coup

Military coups or revolutions in U.S. partners always bring these tensions out into the open. They force the United States to confront in extremely fraught circumstances whether it most prizes its security relationship or its commitment to democratic values.

Usually, it can’t decide. The immediate reaction tends to be both muddled and seen through a lens of decades of built-up distrust of the United States. The conspiracy theorists find ample evidence for every preconceived notion.

The reaction to the Turkish coup has been a textbook example of this dynamic. The U.S. government condemned the coup, but it took several hours. The Turkish government interpreted this as hedging and evidence of ill will.

President Erdoğan has blamed the coup on Fethullah Gülen, a Muslim cleric in self-imposed exile in the United States, and wants the U.S. government to extradite him to Turkey.

When Secretary of State John Kerry said the United States would need solid evidence to extradite him, a Turkish government minister accused the United States of instigating the coup itself. As Kerry warned Turkey about the large number of arrests, the Turkish government temporarily restricted use of the Incirlik base and arrested its Turkish commander on suspicion of involvement in the coup. The conspiracy theorists went wild:

Ibrahim Karagul, Chief editor of pro-AKP daily: “The USA is behind this coup. I’m saying it clearly that the USA attempted to kill Erdogan.”

— Turkey Untold (@TurkeyUntold) July 19, 2016

If the United States wanted to break out of the vicious cycle, it would either have to end its security partnership with Turkey or accept that that partnership means accepting Turkish authoritarianism. But if experience is any guide, the United States will not take either of those paths.

As in Egypt, the U.S. relationship with Turkey will probably survive these events, albeit in diminished form. After a period of distancing, both sides will accept that they need each other for their mutual security problems too much to allow a complete breakdown.

But at the same time, the distrust of the United States within the government and the hatred of the United States within the population will grow. The U.S.-Turkey relationship will fail to evolve into a true alliance of trust and thus be of limited use in defeating ISIS or ending the civil war with the Kurds in Turkey.

In the meantime, Turkey’s roiled domestic politics will continue as Erdoğan attempts to cleanse Turkish politics of his opponents. The next coup or revolution may be the last that the strained U.S.-Turkish alliance can withstand.

      

 

 

On July 14, the Brookings Project on International Order and Strategy (IOS) hosted an event tied to the recent publication of Nonresident Senior Fellow Daniel Drezner’s new paper, “Five Known Unknowns about the Next Generation Global Political Economy.” The event was an opportunity to discuss the future of the global economic order given rising populism and discontent with globalization. Panelists included Nonresident Senior Fellow Daniel Drezner, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University; Caroline Atkinson, head of Google’s global public policy team and former White House deputy national security advisor for international economics; and David Wessel, director of the Brookings Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy.

Thomas Wright, director of IOS, provided brief opening remarks and moderated the discussion.

      

 

 

Lloyd Axworthy, a former foreign minister of Canada, unpacked these complex and interconnected issues at the second annual Madeleine K. Albright Lecture on Global Justice. Highlighting Secretary Albright’s many contributions to advancing the concept of the Responsibility to Protect and the role of democratic institutions in assuring peace, Axworthy knit together seemingly disparate challenges facing the world today and offered a framework for addressing them couched firmly in the respect for basic human rights.

A key pillar of this framework is responsible sovereignty and its offspring, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)—a now politically fraught concept originally proposed by Francis Deng as a means of providing international protection for internally displaced persons. Axworthy noted the parallels between persons displaced by the Balkans conflict and today’s reality where 65 million people are displaced worldwide. Secretary Albright has made a critical contribution to strengthening R2P as a guide for anticipating and responding to the threat of atrocities, emphasizing R2P’s role as a protective action and not just a humanitarian response. As Axworthy noted, actors in Africa and Southeast Asia are increasingly applying the concept to local conditions.

Given the contentious fallout, however, from the Libya intervention and its perceived metamorphosis into a campaign for regime change, Axworthy emphasized that R2P is primarily a principle of prevention, rather than military intervention. Smart phones and other information and communications technologies are critical new tools for identifying and documenting problems in their earliest stages so they might be addressed by the proper stakeholders before they result in violence. Axworthy suggested that these early warning tools offer a new framework for the international community’s conception of what interventions should look like. This sort of atrocity prevention which engages local communities is yet another one of Secretary Albright’s legacies.

Authors

Ted Piccone

Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Latin America Initiative, Project on International Order and Strategy

A

Ashley Miller

Asistente de investigación sénior

As Axworthy noted, one of the oldest documented human rights—which has precedent in Greek and Hebrew systems of governance—is the right of sanctuary. Though it hasn’t been raised in the complex debates surrounding migration and the refugee crisis, the concept of sanctuary is the simplest distillation of the imperative facing governments. “A right is something you defend because it can happen to you.” Anyone could find themselves a refugee; governments should behave accordingly when fashioning migration policies.

“A right is something you defend because it can happen to you.” Anyone could find themselves a refugee; governments should behave accordingly when fashioning migration policies.

In that vein, Axworthy recalled the fluid coalitions of like-minded stakeholders who worked together on such issues as the elimination of land mines. Those stakeholder groups—nation states, the International Committee of the Red Cross, international civil society coalitions, writers and academics, and popular leaders like Princess Diana—understood how threats in seemingly distant locales could affect them and worked to develop a popular intervention. It is this core belief—that human rights must be protected for the benefit of all—which must be fostered more broadly in the international community and underpin policy approaches to successfully address the migration crisis. “The risk inherent in the migration crisis could be corrosive and could create a series of explosions which could tear our infrastructure and rules apart,” Axworthy strongly asserted. The risk is real. Relevant stakeholders must do more to influence public opinion and generate political will in other ways in support of effectively addressing the migration crisis with respect for human rights.

At the same time, governments cannot act independently of popular will and still be considered legitimate. Sovereignty rests on the will of the people as expressed through regular and genuine elections of representatives who are obliged to protect the human rights of the entire population. Maintaining a close connection to the people with open lines of communication about policies and priorities is critical to avoiding having large swathes of the public feeling alienated and vulnerable to divisive political rhetoric. Britain seems to have failed in this regard as evidenced by the outcome of the recent referendum on membership in the European Union; the United States is on a similar path leading up to the November presidential elections between presumptive nominees Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. Too often governments are not listening to their people, Axworthy asserted. We are seeing this play out in many arenas, not least in the global backsliding in the quality of democracy and respect for human rights.

“The risk inherent in the migration crisis could be corrosive and could create a series of explosions which could tear our infrastructure and rules apart.”

There is a constellation of potential solutions to the challenges of our day that don’t fit into the standard conception of global governance, Axworthy summarized. Just as the concept of sovereignty has evolved over time to incorporate responsibilities to protect the security and human rights of populations, so too must our concept of governance. Our greatest contemporary challenge—the migration crisis as driven by conflict, constrained resources, and the impact of climate change—lacks a clear governance framework. But we can build on Secretary Albright’s example as a refugee who became a leader on atrocity prevention, protection of threatened populations, and support for democratic institutions, to forge a more just, secure, and peaceful future.

The Madeleine K. Albright Global Justice Lecture hosted in The Hague and the Justice Stephen Breyer Lecture on International Law hosted in Washington, D.C. are products of a partnership between the Brookings Institution and The Hague Institute for Global Justice to explore contemporary challenges in global affairs at the nexus of justice and security. The annual Madeleine K. Albright Lecture was inaugurated in The Hague in 2015 and continued in 2016. The annual Justice Stephen Breyer Lecture was inaugurated in Washington, D.C. in 2014 and continued in 2015 and 2016. 

      

 

 

Brazil’s aspirations for greatness

Brazil has long aspired to grandeza (greatness) both at home and abroad. As its first ambassador to Washington, Joaquim Nabuco (1905-1910) once said, “Brazil has always been conscious of its size, and it has been governed by a prophetic sense with regard to its future.” As we document in our new book, Brazil has reached for major power status at least four times in the past 100 years: participating as a co-belligerent with the Allies in World War One and seeking a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations thereafter; joining the Allies in World War II and aspiring to a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1945; mastering nuclear technology beginning in the 1970s, including launching a covert military program (now terminated) to build a nuclear explosive device; and most recently, beginning with the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2011), seeking to become a leader in multilateral institutions, including actively campaigning for a permanent seat on the UNSC.

A decade ago, many Brazilians believed that this time their country was poised to secure its position as a major power. As the seventh largest economy in the world with the 10th largest defense budget and significant soft power, Brazilian leaders such as Lula saw their country as being “in the mix” of major powers who, while not able to make the international order alone, could very well shape its evolution through uncertain times together with other major powers. Certainly, they no longer saw Brazil as one of the middle or small powers, the “order takers” in the international system.

Brazil saw a new opportunity to emerge as a major power in the advent of a relatively stable and peaceful post-Cold War geopolitical order, the decade-long commodity boom that supercharged its economy after 2002, and the rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Between 2002 and 2013, Brazil’s virtuous trifecta—democratic consolidation, rapid economic growth, and reduced inequality—was a boon to its soft power. This combination was highly attractive to many in the developing world, contributing to Brazil’s claim to leadership on the international stage as a bridge between the global South and the great powers. International peace and stability particularly favored Brazil’s predilection for deploying soft power rather than hard power. And in the BRICS, Brazil saw an opportunity to work together with other emerging powers critical of the present international order to advance its agenda for reformed global institutions.

Rethinking Brazil’s approach to global influence

Brazil’s bridge-building strategy was effective in advancing its national interests in multilateral forums, most recently on global internet governance and global climate change. But the BRICS dimension of Brazil’s strategy detracted from its ability to influence the world’s great democracies. The BRICS identity associated Brazil with authoritarian powers—China and Russia—that were viewed by the United States and its allies, at best, as unhelpful critics and, at worst, as deliberate saboteurs of the present order. This undermined Brazil’s credibility with Washington and other leading democracies, and hindered its ability to advance its preferred policies on everything from nonproliferation to the reform of global economic institutions to the debate on humanitarian intervention. In retrospect, working more closely with other emerging democracies that seek reform of the international order, such as through the India-Brazil-South Africa association known as IBSA, would have more clearly signaled Brazil’s constructive intentions while still preserving its critical posture.

Today, the opportunities that powered Brazil’s most recent rise—post-Cold War geopolitical stability and a massive commodity boom—are receding, replaced by a more fractious and dangerous international system. Despite troubles at home, it is not too early for Brazil’s leaders to think anew about how to strengthen national capabilities and deploy them strategically to address this new environment. This includes fortifying domestic institutions, both to address the present crisis but also to restore the luster of Brazil’s soft power. It means bolstering Brazil’s hard power capabilities once the economy improves and deploying them in ways that contribute to its soft power, for example by taking on additional responsibility for leading critical international peacekeeping operations as it has in Haiti. It means thinking carefully about how to signal to the democratic great powers Brazil’s commitment to a strengthened liberal international order, even as it holds onto its own principles and works towards reform of multilateral institutions. And eventually, as Brazil completes its recovery, it means contributing more substantially to the costs of maintaining its preferred global order. A Brazil that achieves all this will be well positioned to have a positive global impact, continuing to be a strong (if sometimes critical) partner for the United States in shaping the international order.

      

 

 

Fear of political contagion is why many European leaders want to take a tough line in Brexit negotiations and make an example of Britain. As Elmar Brok, member and chairman of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee told The Economist, “Out is out. We have to prevent copycats now.” Political contagion has emerged as an incredibly powerful and important idea that is poised to shape Europe’s future. Unfortunately, it has been repeated as mantra and has not been subjected to careful scrutiny.

How Brexit impacts the eurozone and the EU

Let’s begin with what Britain can be compared to. There are 28 members of the EU. Nineteen are members of the eurozone and nine (including Britain) are not. Exiting the EU is a fundamentally different, and more dangerous, proposition for eurozone members than EU states with their own currency. A eurozone member cannot leave the EU without leaving the euro and leaving the euro is almost impossible for all countries except for a couple of countries that could expect their own currency to appreciate.

As many leading economists have shown, for the vast majority of eurozone members (including France), exiting the euro would create the mother of all bank runs, devastate savings, and likely trigger a major financial collapse. This is why Cyprus and Greece both decided to stay in the euro despite having strong incentives to leave. Nobody has figured out how to unwind the euro without tremendous economic risk—a risk that dwarfs anything the British people face today.

The bottom line is that there is little risk of contagion from Brexit to eurozone member states because currency union provides an additional firewall, for good or ill.

The bottom line is that there is little risk of contagion from Brexit to eurozone member states because currency union provides an additional firewall, for good or ill. Populist parties can call for a referendum but even if they were to win power, which is very unlikely in most member states, they would face insurmountable barriers as to how to execute an exit, just as Syriza did in Greece when they went eyeball to eyeball with Germany in the summer of 2015 and lost. And they know it. The Five Star Movement in Italy is probably the populist party with the highest likelihood of winning power in the next few years. It used to support a referendum on the euro but actually changed its position within hours of Brexit to calling for working for change from within the system.

If one takes away the 19 members of the eurozone, this leaves eight other countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, and Romania. Hungary has a nationalist government already but it opposes exit from the EU. Poland has a deeply Euroskeptic government in the Law and Justice Party but it too is opposed, not least because of the hundreds of thousands of Polish workers who are resident elsewhere in the EU. A poll in Sweden days after Brexit showed an overwhelming majority in favor of EU membership. The other nations listed are absent from the regular list of countries where contagion might spread to.

Where the real risk of contagion lies

For the sake of argument, let’s assume that the U.K. can secure a deal like Norway’s. Would that spark contagion throughout the EU? Hardly. After all, the Norwegian model was not much of a deterrent to nations wanting to join the EU in the first place.

Real contagion stems from the lack of growth in Europe and the perception that EU…economic orthodoxy is making things worse, not better.

There is a risk of contagion, but it is not from the spectacle of Britain successively leaving without harsh penalties. Real contagion stems from the lack of growth in Europe and the perception that EU, especially German, economic orthodoxy is making things worse, not better. If the EU cannot address this problem, populist and nationalist parties will continue to gain ground. The risk that other countries will emulate the British example pales in comparison to these dangers.

It is understandable that the EU will protect its own interests in a negotiation with Britain. No one should expect a sweetheart deal. Any negotiation—even if it meets the Norwegian standard—will result in an arrangement that is worse than what Britain has now. That it itself should dissuade others from following suit. The strategic question facing Europe’s leaders is whether other EU member states look beyond their own interests to impose extra costs designed to have a deterrent effect on others. Such a step would be a profound mistake. It is directed at a risk that is exaggerated and it would poison relations between the EU and Britain. It would destroy any prospect of a second referendum and a reversal of Brexit because it would inflame nationalist passions. And, it would have a devastating economic impact, which really would be contagious and would do much more to empower populists than the example of Brexit ever could.

      

 

 

Britain made its choice. Now, the rest of the EU must decide: Does it punish Britain to deter other member states from following suit, or does it try to accommodate British interests as much as possible? Indications from European capitals prior to the vote suggested they were inclined toward punishment. Today, EU leaders called for a speedy U.K. exit with no major concessions. This would be an egregious mistake. There are two parts to the negotiation process—exiting (the Article 50 process) and agreeing on new relations on trade and other areas. The first can be accomplished quickly, but the second could take considerably longer. Concluding the first without the second would deepen Europe’s crisis, worsen the economic fallout, and could badly damage relations with Britain for generations. Hard as it is, the EU should adopt a generous approach and try to make Brexit as smooth as possible, which includes ensuring good relations with Britain after it leaves, even if it takes considerably longer than two years. 

To the next British prime minister: Slow the process down

The Leave campaign won a majority, but 48 percent of the electorate is frightened and distraught about the future, not least because of the divisive and nationalist nature of its campaign. Today’s economic fallout will deepen the sense of crisis. The next prime minister, who is likely to be from the Leave campaign, should slow the process of Brexit down. He or she should insist on negotiating the exit (the Article 50 mechanism) and Britain’s future relations with the rest of the EU in parallel; respect the interests of other EU members instead of just demanding that the will of British voters be accommodated; and be open to associate membership or a special relationship with the EU if that’s where the negotiations lead. 

To the Remain campaign: Push for a second Brexit referendum 

The Leave campaign made a series of promises about what life would be like outside the EU. It now has a mandate to negotiate with the rest of the EU to achieve those goals. Unfortunately, many of those promises were fanciful and are unlikely to materialize, even if the EU is cooperative in negotiations. Once the dust settles, the Remain campaign should press for a second referendum on the terms of departure. Therefore they should support a parallel process whereby negotiations on Article 50 and future relations conclude simultaneously. The Leave campaign will resist a second referendum, but they will lack moral authority given their support for the popular vote. If it is right and proper for the people to have a say on EU membership, shouldn’t they also have a say on the outcome of the negotiations to determine whether they are what the Leave campaign promised? Indeed, this February Boris Johnson suggested he could support a second referendum before reversing himself. If he’s prime minister, maybe he can be persuaded to take up the idea again. 

To Scotland: Hold off on a second independence referendum 

It is widely believed that Scotland will now try to separate from the United Kingdom. But it is not a simple process. The Scots need the British government to agree to a new independence referendum. The Conservative Party now has a leadership election and the candidates are likely to rule this out. The Scottish Nationalists will protest and campaign for a new vote, leading to a tense stand-off and a constitutional crisis. But an independent Scotland would find it difficult to succeed if the rest of the U.K. lacked a trade deal with the EU. Scotland would be best advised to wait to see what deal the British government can negotiate. It should join the Remain campaign in pressing for a second Brexit vote. Then, and only then, should it demand a second independence referendum. 

To Ireland: Act as a mediator between Britain and the rest of Europe 

After the U.K., Ireland is the EU member state harmed the most by Brexit. Brexit jeopardizes the peace process in Northern Ireland and could badly damage the Irish economy. Ireland should position itself as an honest broker between Britain and the rest of the EU. The Irish Taoiseach should forge a close relationship with the new British prime minister and work tirelessly to achieving a comprehensive agreement that minimizes the damage of Brexit and allows for close trading relations between Britain and the EU. 

To the United States: Be active in Brexit negotiations 

The United States has had a long-standing strategic interest in a strong and united Europe. That suffered a major setback yesterday. Now, Washington has a role to play. It should work to reduce EU anger with Britain and to persuade EU member states to make the process as smooth as possible. It should also try to persuade the British government to take a constructive and reasonable approach in the negotiations. It should insist on a parallel negotiating process of exit and future relations. And it should make clear that a strong EU remains in America’s long term interests. 

      

 

 

What follows is political uncertainty followed by constitutional and legal uncertainty. Scottish and Northern Irish politicians took the airwaves calling for new referenda on their relationship with the U.K. By late morning, David Cameron had also announced that he would resign by the time of the Conservative Party conference in October. It’s hard to see how he could have made any other decision, having been principally responsible for the bizarre spectacle of launching a referendum the public wasn’t demanding on a proposition with which he did not agree. But it adds to the uncertainty, as now the U.K. will have to wait several weeks to know who will be prime minister, and what his or her approach will be to navigating the exit. 

Notwithstanding the mood, London isn’t burning. Some of the financial losses will be recovered. Boris Johnson, a Conservative leader of the Leave movement, publicly reiterated his argument that there’s no need to rush to the exit. Still, a dramatic day in Britain, a momentous day in Europe and, one fears, a portent in the broader debate about the West’s relationship to a globalized and open world. 

      

 

 

On June 28, the Hague Institute for Global Justice, in partnership with the Brookings Insitution and Municipality of the Hague, will host the second annual Madeleine K. Albright Global Justice Lecture to be delivered this year by former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada Lloyd Axworthy. Axworthy will address a range of contemporary global justice issues with which Secretary Albright is closely associated, including the rule of law, the responsibility to protect, and the role of women in global peace, security, and justice.

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