On November 7, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings hosted a final forum analyzing the election’s outcomes and how these results could affect the policy agenda of the next administration and Congress. Panelists discussed the approach of the second Obama term, the political makeup of the new 113th Congress and the prospect for policy breakthroughs on key social, fiscal and foreign policy issues.

      

 

 

Editor’s Note: This blog post was updated on October 9, 2012.

On October 8, 2012, presidential candidate Mitt Romney delivered a speech on U.S. foreign policy at the Virginia Military Institute. Brookings experts examine the foreign policy platform laid out by Governor Romney in the VMI speech. Suzanne Maloney assesses Romney’s remarks on Iran and advises how the Obama administration should respond to his speech. Shadi Hamid takes a closer look at a common narrative that emerged during the remarks claiming that the Obama administration has abdicated America’s leadership role in the Middle East. Justin Vaïsse examines the assertive stance Romney took during his speech. Bruce Riedel focuses on Romney’s statements regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict, al Qaeda, and Afghanistan. Michael O’Hanlon lays out his views on the most compelling elements of the speech and how it might help bring the foreign policy debate to the forefront in the closing weeks of the presidential election. Clara O’Donnell explores what a Republican win in November would mean for Europe.

Mitt Romney’s Unsettling Track Record on Iran
Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy

Predictably, Iran figured prominently in Mitt Romney’s address on Monday detailing his foreign policy positions. The issue of how to handle the threats posed by Iran has proven a reliable feature of American campaign debates for more than three decades. This reflects Washington’s deeply-held concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and support for terrorism, as well as the sense that Iran’s cartoonish clerics and messianic bombast provide a convenient foil for American politicians from both parties to exude a brawny patriotism and appeal to pro-Israeli audiences.

Gratuitous swagger on Iran has long been a part of the Romney repertoire. He has likened the Islamic Republic with the Soviet Union’s “evil empire,” tossing in an analogy to Nazi Germany for good measure. Romney has suggested that his own election is the only means of preventing Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and has disparaged the Obama Administration’s diplomatic efforts on Iran as “a symbol of weakness and impotence.” None of this provides serious policy alternatives, nor does it truly reveal how a Romney administration might actually approach the intractable issue of Iran.

After all, despite all the tough talk, the track record of both U.S. political parties on Iran is far more complicated. A quick review of the historical record would show that Democratic administrations have been responsible for each of the most significant intensifications of sanctions on Iran. Meanwhile, Republican administrations have tried to ply cooperation from Tehran with weapons sales – Ronald Reagan – and have not only sought talks with Iran but actually engaged in them – George W. Bush, whose administration’s dialogue with Iranian diplomats in 2001-2003 stands as the single most successful use of diplomatic engagement with Iran since the end of the hostage crisis.

But while his posturing on Iran was not in and of itself new, Romney’s speech at the Virginia Military Institute on Monday appeared to tweak his standard message on Iran, which until now has focused on the Iranian nuclear standoff. In Monday’s speech, however, he opened up a new line of critique of the Obama administration, focused on the President’s hands-off approach to the brief but intense protest movement that emerged after the dubious 2009 reelection of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. “And yet when millions of Iranians took to the streets in June of 2009; when they demanded freedom from a cruel regime that threatens the world; when they cried out, are you with us or are you with them, the American president was silent,” Romney asserted.

The argument that Obama betrayed Iran’s struggling democracy movement was a throwaway line, apparently intended to link Romney’s argument on Iran to his broader critique of the current administration’s handling of the Arab spring. But it raises an important issue, one that Romney will surely revisit in future foreign policy speeches and in the upcoming debate. The accusation that Obama mishandled the 2009 protests is particularly problematic for the President, whose partisans and advisers often seem discomforted by the administration’s restraint back in 2009. Especially in the light of the subsequent revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, many Iranians and even some Obama backers question whether Washington was on the right side of history in keeping its distance from the first salvos of Iran’s “Green Movement.”

But the administration’s self-recriminations and Romney’s casual critiques are both wrong. There is simply no evidence that more forceful American advocacy could have tipped the balance in favor of Iranian protestors in 2009. The Iranian Green Movement did not falter because of Obama’s actions or lack thereof, but rather because of the divisions within its leadership, the lack of a coherent strategy, and the Iranian regime’s willingness to use force, as well as the Iranian public’s corresponding unwillingness to continue coming to the streets in the face of that force. All these factors distinguish what happened in Iran in 2009 from the subsequent triumphs in Tahrir Square and elsewhere in the Arab world.

More to the point, Romney’s grandstanding on Iran’s long-held democratic aspirations does not offer a credible answer to the basic question that will face the next administration in dealing with Iran: is it possible to change not simply the most dangerous policies of the current Iranian government, but the nature and character of that government itself? After all, it is hard to imagine that a durable resolution to the nuclear crisis can be achieved without constructing a viable modus vivendi with Tehran, something that would appear to be unlikely given the paranoia and resentment of the current Iranian leadership. Given the long memories of the American role in the 1953 coup that unseated Iran’s elected prime minister, and the fresher memories of the disastrous U.S. experience in picking winners in Iraq, regime change is an appropriately dirty word for American policymakers in contemplating options toward Tehran. And yet there ought to be a serious conversation about how Washington and the world can cultivate a better future for Iran and encourage the emergence of responsible, representative leaders in that country.

Here, Mitt Romney’s track record is particularly unsettling. His advisors include advocates for the Mojahideen-e Khalq, a discredited, cult-like exile group that has been reluctantly removed from the U.S. government’s list of foreign terrorist organizations after a well-greased lobbying campaign. Other advisors distinguished themselves as proponents of Ahmad Chalabi and the prospect of an American ‘cakewalk’ in Iraq prior to the 2003 invasion. Romney himself boasts about his decision while governor to deny state police protection to former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami during a 2006 speech at Harvard University, apparently failing to appreciate that Khatami was responsible for efforts to strengthen Iran’s electoral institutions and curtail its worst abuses, as well as for a two-year suspension of its uranium enrichment program.

Given the ambivalence among his own team about the approach to Iran’s 2009 protest movement, Obama may be tempted to duck any challenge from Romney on this issue. He should not – rather, the President should use any Romney moralizing to challenge the governor for specific policy proposals that would advance a democratic future in Iran. It would be a welcome relief to hear both candidates offer serious ideas rather than more empty slogans on Iran.

Romney Asked the Right Questions About U.S. Policy in the Middle East
Shadi Hamid, Director of Research, Brookings Doha Center, and Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy

With his Middle East speech on Monday, Mitt Romney – after much fumbling – seems to have finally found a distinct and somewhat coherent foreign policy message. Many of Romney’s critics quickly dismissed the speech. “There’s absolutely nothing in this speech,” said James Lindsay of the Council on Foreign Relations, while former secretary of state Madeleine Albright called Romney “very shallow.” Romney may not have provided the right answers, but he asked many of the right questions. In his remarks, a common narrative emerged – that the Obama administration, in its desire to reduce its footprint in the Middle East, has abdicated America’s leadership role in the region. Oddly enough, this perception is not a Republican fiction but is increasingly widespread within the Middle East itself. Obama, the argument goes, is a weak president who can be pushed around, with little consequence.

To what extent, though, is perceived American “decline” a function of specific policies choices or is it a more general issue of the projection of U.S. power, and how that power is perceived by our friends and enemies in the region? Romney seems to be arguing that the latter, however hard to measure, counts for a lot. Indeed, the debate over “leading” versus “leading from behind,” as tired as it might sound, reflects real differences in philosophy between the candidates.

In Syria, such differences have obvious and practical implications on the ground. Romney argued, with good reason, that “the President has failed to lead in Syria.” He pledged to prioritize the coordination and arming of rebel forces (although he did not specify how directly the U.S. would be involved). In contrast, the Obama administration has actively discouraged Saudi Arabia and Qatar from arming the rebels, as Robert Worth recently reported in the New York Times. Khalid al-Attiyah, Qatar’s state minister for foreign affairs, stressed the importance of getting more advanced weapons to the opposition. “But first we need the backing of the United States,” he said, in a rare, public criticism of the Obama administration. In Turkey, the feeling is closer to one of betrayal, as Turkish officials find themselves alone, on the brink of war with their Syrian neighbors, and an international community that seems uninterested in doing much about it. That is to say nothing of Syrian rebels themselves who have been calling for either arms or outright military intervention since last year. A year is a long time to wait, and they may be turning against the United States. As a member of Kafr Takharim’s revolutionary council said: “We read in the media that we are receiving things. But we haven’t seen it. We only received speeches from the West.” When Romney quoted a Syrian woman saying “we will not forget that that you forgot about us,” he was conveying a real, palpable sense that, in the eyes of a growing number of Arabs and Turks, the United States and Europe have abandoned the Syrian people. The memory of that betrayal, if it continues, is likely to have real consequences for the United States and its allies.

A second notable contrast was on aid conditionality. Romney said he would “make further reforms to our foreign assistance to create incentives for good governance, free enterprise, and greater trade, in the Middle East.” Regarding Egypt in particular, he spoke of including “clear conditions on our aid.” Nearly two years into the Arab uprisings, the Obama administration has failed to tie any existing or new aid to explicit benchmarks on political reform and democratization. U.S. military aid to Egypt continued to flow despite egregious anti-democratic behavior on the part of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, including waging war on civil society, dissolving a democratically elected parliament, reinstating martial law, and unilaterally stripping the presidency of many of its powers. Meanwhile, the political situation in Jordan – the second-largest per capita recipient of U.S. aid – continues to deteriorate. But a discussion of reformulating U.S. assistance there has not even begun.

What would Romney actually do about Jordan, though? Here, the tensions in Romney’s foreign policy approach become all too obvious. In his speech, Romney spoke of standing by our “friends,” but what about our friends – the leaders of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait – who have actually become more repressive in the wake of the same Arab Spring that Romney claims to support? Instead of urging Gulf countries to take reform seriously, Romney pledged to “deepen our cooperation with our partners in the Gulf.”

It is also remarkable that Romney managed to run through an entire speech on the Middle East without mentioning the word “Islamist” even once. Neoconservatives within the Republican Party prioritize democracy promotion but, like the Tea Party faction of the party, they also fear the effect Islamists will have on U.S. interests, including Israel’s security (I discuss intra-Republican differences in this recent Brookings paper). The problem is that democratic openings inevitably benefit Islamist parties. Again, the tensions here seem irreconcilable, which is probably why Romney avoided addressing them.

It was President George W. Bush who once said that “America’s vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one.” Unfortunately, they are not, and won’t be anytime soon. Sometimes, difficult choices have to be made, but Romney does not appear willing to make them. But, then again, neither does Obama. The Arab revolts have, in some ways, closed the gap between interests and ideals (as in Libya and Syria), yet, at the same time, they have made the policy contradictions all the more obvious (as in Bahrain). Whatever else might be said about it, Romney’s speech did us the service of highlighting those contradictions. Instead of doubling down on President Obama’s flawed Middle East record, Obama’s supporters (and, if he wins, Obama himself) should engage with the substance of Republican critiques and outline a vision for re-thinking and re-orienting U.S. policy in the region. Otherwise, the contradictions – which have damaged U.S. credibility in the region for decades – will persist. And so too will the consequences.

Romney Offers Clear Choices. But Are They Sustainable?
Justin Vaïsse, Director of Research, Center on the United States and Europe, and Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy

Contrary to the strategy he followed in the first presidential debate last Thursday, Mitt Romney did not try to strike a more moderate tone in his foreign policy speech on Monday. Instead, he maintained a hawkish, neoconservative line. He thus confirmed the two campaign choices he made in the summer of 2011 – but opened himself to questions about the economics of his assertiveness.

The first choice is to ignore the growing number of Republicans and Independents who are tired of foreign interventions (see here and here) and are not convinced that defense spending should be increased. This was not always the case. In June 2011 for example, Romney said it was time to “bring our troops home” from Afghanistan “as soon as we possibly can.” This rhetoric was replaced by a much more hawkish stance, especially in his speech at The Citadel a year ago, where he started talking about “a new American century,” insisting soon afterwards that it was “not time for America to cut and run” from Afghanistan.

In his speech of Monday, Romney acknowledged the existence of this anti-interventionist strain (“I know many Americans are asking whether our country today—with our ailing economy, and our massive debt, and after 11 years at war—is still capable of leading”), but only to unambiguously reassert his preference for an internationalist and hawkish posture. In purely electoral terms, it means that he expects more votes from his attacks on President Obama’s perceived weakness and lack of leadership than he fears losing them from anti-interventionist Republicans and Independents, or from his association with the neoconservatives.

That is the second choice Mitt Romney made in the summer of 2011. He adopted a foreign policy line which checks all the boxes of neoconservatism, the school of thought associated with the administration of George W. Bush and the 2003 Iraq war. That foreign policy tradition, which dates back to the 1970s, is based on five pillars (internationalism, primacy, unilateralism, militarism and democracy), which were all present in one form or another in Romney’s speech on Monday, most notably in sentences like “if America does not lead, others will—others who do not share our interests and our values—and the world will grow darker” or “our friends and allies across the globe do not want less American leadership. They want more.”

Romney’s positioning is thus very clear, but he opens himself to criticism on various counts. First, given Obama’s image on national security, which is unusually strong for a Democratic candidate thanks to the Bin Laden raid and his decisive use of drones, it might not be the best electoral strategy to use the traditional line of attack of Democrats as weak and insufficiently patriotic. Second, it is hard for Romney to present himself as more assertive than Obama without crossing the fine line between hawkishness and adventurism. Whether on Syria, Iran, Afghanistan or China, Romney outlines policies that are actually not very different from the President’s; you have to believe the rhetoric in order to detect the existence of a real gap.

Lastly, there might be cause for skepticism about the fiscal and diplomatic sustainability of his foreign policy. Even without buying into the current wave of declinism, it is hard to deny that America’s power relative to that of other countries has indeed decreased, and a posture of uncompromising hawkishness (Iran), toughness (Russia, China), or conditionality (Egypt; foreign aid) vis-à-vis the rest of the world –what James Traub dubbed the “more enemies, fewer friends doctrine” – might not be the most effective way to fulfill America’s objectives. This is all the more true that America’s resources will necessarily be strained in the next four years, and that the issue of the debt will loom large.

This leads to the most serious questions about Romney’s speech. Although he has found it difficult, because the Middle East has a way to always force itself back to the agenda, President Obama has tried to redistribute American diplomatic and military assets away from that region and towards emerging powers, especially in the Asia-Pacific, where the stakes are highest in the long term. More generally, he has tried to rebalance U.S. foreign policy towards global and economic issues and away from land wars and counter-terrorism. In his speech of Monday, the Romney outlined a world which closely resembled the one George W. Bush inhabited, as if frozen in time circa 2005. He didn’t really talk about China and the Asia-Pacific region, and mentioned economics only when talking about free trade. One only needs to read Robert Zoellick’s excellent analysis “The Currency of Power” to be convinced of the imperious necessity to integrate economics into any foreign policy strategy. Such integration was thoroughly lacking in Romney’s speech. But since he picked Zoellick to head his national security transition team, perhaps that dimension will eventually be added, if he reaches the White House?

Governor Romney’s Approach to the Middle East
Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy 

Governor Romney’s foreign policy speech at VMI is a timely and constructive contribution to the presidential campaign. He has delivered a thoughtful critique of the Obama record in the Middle East and provided some specific policy proposals. Importantly, Gov. Romney stated his commitment to a two state solution of the Israel-Palestine conflict, an issue his previous statements had left confused at best. Romney gave no road map for how to secure a peace agreement but he acknowledged the need to do so.

Romney also rightly assessed the threat still posed by al Qaeda. It has been bloodied in Pakistan by the 300 drone strikes since Obama’s inauguration and the death of Osama bin Laden but it is not defeated. The chaos across the Arab world has opened the door for al Qaeda’s comeback from Yemen to Mali. It is indeed clear now it had a role in the Benghazi attack on the 11th anniversary of 911. Aside from calls to leadership, however, we don’t have much answer to how a Romney administration will fight al Qaeda differently. Standing by Israel, stopping Iran’s nuclear ambitions and keeping close ties to Saudi Arabia may be good policies in their own right but don’t really address the al Qaeda challenge. Drones indeed are not a strategy, as the VMI speech notes, but what is the strategy to fight al Qaeda?

The governor was helpfully a little more clear on Afghanistan but here he also left room for more to come. He appears to accept the 2014 date for transition to Afghan leadership but seems to open the door to a reappraisal if battlefield conditions warrant. That is smart, we need flexibility. Does he mean he will keep more troops longer if his generals say they are needed? The even harder problem is how to deal with Pakistan which backs the Taliban and harbors its leaders but which has gotten $25 billion in aid from two administrations since 911, one Republican and one Democrat. How can we defeat the Taliban if Pakistan insists on backing them? Is Romney still opposed to talks with the Taliban as he stated last spring?

The VMI speech is a good start to what needs to be a far more vigorous and detailed debate in the next month. Both candidates need to be much sharper on the challenges ahead. The war in Afghanistan is eleven years old today but a successful outcome is still elusive. The Arab awakening is changing the politics of an entire region more decisively than any event in its recent history. The debate is critical. The time for vague soundbites is over.

A Good Speech for America, Regardless Who Wins
Michael E. O’Hanlon, Director of Research, Foreign Policy at Brookings, The Sydney Stein, Jr. Chair, and Senior Fellow, 21st Century Defense Initiative, Foreign Policy at Brookings

While I did not agree with everything Governor Romney said in his foreign policy speech at VMI today, and while I have particular differences of opinion with the Governor over the necessity of his proposed defense spending levels, he delivered a good speech on balance. However, the Governor’s critiques of President Obama’s handling of the attack on the U.S. consulate in Libya and the Iranian elections of 2009, as well as the Administration’s “pivot” towards Asia in recent years, were not compelling. Romney’s promise not to show flexibility towards Russia on missile defense was too categorical as well, but one must expect differences of opinion during a presidential campaign.

That said, the speech was still effective in many ways, because Romney conveyed a sense of sustained American engagement with the world that is welcome at a time when our domestic economic situation could easily produce a “Come home, America” mentality among the voting public. Instead, Romney talked about being patient in Afghanistan, and doing more to help the Libyan revolution in language that echoed that of nation-building advocates of the past. Romney also spoke of helping the Syrian opposition a bit more – without dragging the United States into war – and consolidating aid programs under a single leader in the U.S. government, which would make these programs more effective and would support certain Middle East countries in their efforts to make their revolutions succeed on terms that overlap with American interests.

These ideas generally make sense to me individually, and taken together they suggest ongoing American leadership in the world, regardless of who wins the election. I don’t know which party the speech will help most on November 6, but on balance I think it is a speech—and a type of foreign policy debate—that is good for the country either way.

What Romney Would Mean for Europe
Centre for European Reform, October/November 2012
Clara M. O’Donnell, Nonresident Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe, Foreign Policy

As the U.S. elections approach, Mitt Romney’s sometimes bellicose rhetoric on national security is raising European eyebrows. But many in Washington believe that if the Republican contender were to become president, U.S. policies might not differ much from the last four years. Despite Romney’s strong criticism of Barack Obama, some of the challenger’s views on foreign policy issues are similar to the president’s. And the points on which they disagree may matter little: U.S. presidents rarely implement their more outlandish campaign pledges. In any case, Congress will continue to set limits on U.S. policy on issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and nuclear arms control, whoever the president. But, if Mitt Romney genuinely believes much of his foreign policy rhetoric, a Republican victory in November could mean difficult times for transatlantic relations.

The former governor has, for example, identified Russia as America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” He considers Obama’s ‘reset’ with Moscow to have been a failure. He opposed ratification of the New START treaty on strategic weapons reductions because it supposedly allows Russia to expand its nuclear arsenal – Romney has notably warned that the treaty, unprecedentedly, allows Russia to mount intercontinental ballistic missiles on bombers. The Republican candidate has also strongly criticised Obama’s miss

      

 

 

The current presidential campaign will be the eleventh U.S. presidential election since Richard Nixon began America’s opening to the People’s Republic of China. It is the sixth election in which an elected incumbent seeks a second term. On one of those six occasions (1972), China policy arguably worked to the advantage of the incumbent; twice (1984 and 2004) it figured little or not at all in the contest; and in three instances (1980, 1992, and 2000), the challenger tried to make a case that the incumbent had not stood up for American interests and values against Beijing.

It is not yet clear how Barack Obama’s policy toward China will feature in the 2012 campaign. There has been no huge China controversy under Obama thus far, as there was under Jimmy Carter and George H. W. Bush. However, China’s revival as a great power poses greater challenges for the United States than ever before.

Chinese leaders and analysts have developed a certain confidence about American presidential elections. They have concluded that even if a challenger adopts an anti-China stance during the campaign and then wins, he will moderate his position once he takes office and learns the complexity of

issues that infuse the relationship and takes account of interest groups that favor constructive ties. In short, the quadrennial struggle for the American presidency has only temporary consequences for U.S. policy toward China. Therefore Beijing need not overreact to campaign rhetoric, because given sufficient time, all will be well.

This year may prove the Chinese logic correct once again. If Barack Obama wins a second term, he will likely continue what from Beijing’s perspective have been balanced and positive relations. And whatever the Republican challengers say during the campaign, the Chinese likely believe it will mean little or nothing in the long run. China has survived such hiccups in the past when it was relatively weak, and it can certainly survive another, in part because it is much stronger today than it was even in 2008.

Then again, the next president may not revert to type. Kenneth Lieberthal and Jonathan Pollack demonstrate that conflicts of interest are becoming more prominent in the U.S.-China relationship, and the areas for cooperation are shrinking. The growth of China’s economic, diplomatic, and military power has called into question the four-decade-old assumption that the bilateral relationship produces mutual benefit. Those who argue that Chinese prosperity has come at the expense of America’s and that Beijing will challenge the U.S. role in East Asia get a wider response than ever before. In 2012 both Obama and his opponent may well “run against” China.

Lieberthal and Pollack properly pay attention to the tendency in both Beijing and Washington to read malign intentions into the actions of the other. Mutual mistrust then makes it harder to forge areas of bilateral cooperation and manage points of difference, which both capitals say they wish to do. Lieberthal and Pollack are correct that the new leaderships in each country (China is having its own transition in 2012–13) should place a high priority on reducing this mutual mistrust. This is true whether or not the American political elite take their advice to get the domestic house in order. And the Chinese and American governments have both acknowledged publicly that strategic mistrust is a problem, though each targets different issues. For China, it is Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang; for the United States, it is potential conflict in new security domains: maritime, cyber, and space. Mistrust can stem from different sources, and some present deeper problems than do others.

First and simplest are cases of pure misunderstanding. One side takes an action that the other concludes has malign intent when in fact none exists. China believes it has not been able to complete the unification of Taiwan because of U.S. obstruction, while Washington believes China has not given Taiwan an offer that its people feel is worth considering. Second are cases in which one party commits or intends to act in a way that is not harmful to the other but has problems in implementing its course of action, and is then thought to have negative motives. China’s periodic and failed pledges to protect the intellectual property of American companies fall in this category. So does the case of the Rumsfeld Pentagon’s unwillingness in the early 2000s to carry out President George W. Bush’s instruction to resume military-to-military exchanges. Third, at times the two sides may legitimately share the same objective but differ on how to achieve it and thus may conclude that actually it is the objectives that differ. Differences between Washington and Beijing over North Korea and Iran have had this character. Finally, in some instances the United States and China really do have conflicting goals. The People’s Liberation Army is building capabilities to extend China’s strategic perimeter away from the east and southern coast. That is a traditional area for patrol and surveillance by the U.S. Navy and Air Force, which Washington believes contributes to regional stability.

These distinctions have several implications for U.S. policy on China. First of all, how to reduce mistrust depends on its source. Dialogue is useful for rectifying simple misunderstandings and may help to improve implementation and align means and ends. In fact, the United States and China already have a lot of dialogue. Such mechanisms may be less useful when goals are in conflict. In that case, the best option may be to establish conflict management and risk reduction mechanisms.

Reducing mistrust does obviously depend on leaders forging common understandings. But if they have problems ensuring appropriate implementation, it may only reinforce mistrust.

Domestic factors besides implementation difficulties also have an impact. Analytic agencies in each country can misperceive the motives of the other. Leaders in each may shy away from correcting negative public opinion about the other. Experts in each government who have a benign view of the motives of the other may have too little power to shape policy. Some agencies in each government, particularly the militaries, may see a value in feeding uncertainty and mistrust in the other.

The optimistic vision for U.S.-China relations in the next administration is that the two countries, along with other major powers, can cooperate to tackle the major challenges to the international system. That will have the positive side effect of encouraging each to have a benign view of the other’s intentions. But that vision will be difficult to realize in the existing climate of mistrust. It will be even more difficult if China believes that the United States needs China more than China needs America, and vice versa. If the next administrations in both Washington and Beijing wish to reduce mistrust, as they should, they will have to be smart in the way they go about it.

      

 

 

On October 9, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings held a discussion on the global economy and China, the last in a series of forums that have identified and addressed the 12 most critical issues facing the next president. Campaign 2012 Project Director Benjamin Wittes moderated a panel discussion with Brookings experts Kenneth Lieberthal, Jonathan Pollack, Richard Bush, and Joshua Meltzer, who presented recommendations for the next president.

Participants may follow the conversation on Twitter using the hashtag #BIChina.

Download papers from the event:

• Establishing Credibility and Trust, by Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Jonathan Pollack 
• Continue Progress on an Key Trade Relationship, by Joshua Meltzer 
• Thoughts on China and American Elections, by Richard Bush 

Campaign 2012: Twelve Independent Ideas for Improving American Public Policy is an indispensable guide to the key questions facing White House hopefuls in 2012.

      

 

 

For years, the United States was able to ignore democracy and human rights in the Middle East in favor of supporting autocrats who stabilized oil prices, signed treaties with Israel, repressed Islamist groups and, in the past decade, cooperated in antiterrorist actions. During the Bush administration, aside from Iraq, some Arab states tolerated U.S. democracy-promotion activities as long as they did not threaten incumbent regimes. In 2009 and 2010, funding for such activities in some Middle Eastern states was reduced.

But as Shadi Hamid points out, the Arab Spring has blown the lid off this arrangement. Elections in Tunisia and Egypt have shown that the median Tunisian and Egyptian voter is more anti-U.S., more anti-Israeli, and more pro-Islamist than the United States would like. As a result, the Obama administration has had to confront the reality that voters’ preferences, if translated into policy, might threaten regional peace or stability. It is small wonder that the Obama administration was forced into a complicated dance that required rhetorical support for Tunisian, Egyptian, and Libyan citizens while reassuring dictatorships in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and even Bahrain of U.S. backing. Hamid also points out that trying to split the difference did Obama no favors—neither with the Arab public nor with Arab rulers.

How, then, should the next presidential administration support reform in the Middle East? Although the objectives of rebuilding American influence and supporting democratic reform in the region are laudable, one of the principal mechanisms Hamid proposes to accomplish this—a “reform endowment”—may not be the best approach. As he envisions it, a multilateral reform fund would be established to “apportion loans and grants to states or substate actors” that agree to undertake certain democracy-promoting reforms. Putting aside the thorny issue of loans (especially to countries like Egypt that may soon face serious debt sustainability problems), such a fund would raise three concerns.

First, it is unlikely that yet another U.S.-dominated, international institution will find a supportive public in the current Arab political climate. Arab citizens have not forgotten that U.S. financial assistance supported the old regimes. Nor have Arab citizens forgotten the U.S. role in the “austerity” era in the 1980s and 1990s when, amid falling oil prices, most Arab states undertook (albeit incompletely) painful structural economic reforms that slashed subsidies, ended long-term employment guarantees for some, and wound down a number public benefits. These popular resentments are unlikely to subside soon.

Second, it is unclear what added value such a fund would provide. Currently, the functions envisioned for the reform endowment are already performed by institutions such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Open Government Partnership (OGP). Of course, the MCC is not a multilateral institution as the reform endowment would be, but it operates along the same lines. That is, it provides grants based on whether recipients meet certain good-governance thresholds. Meanwhile the OGP—a multilateral body established at Obama’s suggestion, and in which countries seeking membership are required to meet similar criteria as envisioned in the Hamid proposal—is a purely voluntary organization with no capacity to provide loans or grants for good behavior. It is unlikely that the United States would be able to promote Arab democracy more effectively through a new institution than it would through expanding MCC or OGP programs in the Middle East.

Third, it is also unclear whether democracy-promotion activities undertaken by donors actually work as intended. The evidence of the effect of political conditionality on democratization in recipients of official development assistance is mixed at best. Most analysts find no effect of aid on democracy, with or without political conditionality. In one region where political conditionality imposed by donors seems to have made an impact—Eastern Europe—democratization occurred mainly in those countries offered EU membership. The absence of this kind of external inducement in the Arab world makes a similar impact unlikely.

One must ask—in an environment where the United States and other donors will continue to be fiscally constrained—whether it may be better to focus greater attention on economic reform and development in Arab states. This is not to say that democracy promotion should be excluded altogether. But it is clear that a strong economic rationale is driving Arab citizens to support democracy. In an Arab Barometer survey of Egyptians conducted in the summer of 2011, for example, almost two-thirds of respondents defined the most important characteristic of democracy as either low inequality or better provision of services. By contrast, only 6 percent consider elections to be essential. More than 80 percent say that “the economy” is Egypt’s greatest challenge. If the economies fail to deliver, democracy will fail.

Accordingly, one must ask whether U.S. financial assistance might be put to better use, both for rebuilding American influence and for underwriting democracy. For example, U.S. assistance to create jobs for those aged eighteen to thirty in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, through financing for vocational schools and active labor-market programs, would not only help a group that has historically borne disproportionate costs of economic adjustment but could also increase support for U.S. policies and influence among youth. U.S. leadership in reviving an expanded Barcelona Process and Union-for-the-Mediterranean initiative—both designed to build political, economic, and social partnerships between the European Union and its southern Mediterranean neighbors—could focus on behind-the-border trade issues such as logistics as well as provide guarantees for U.S. investors, eliminate investment obstacles, and ease technology flows between the United States, European Union, and North Africa.

The Arab Spring represents the most important set of political–economic transitions since the end of communism in Europe. But as Hamid points out, the United States has not found an effective way to channel its support for the reformers in Arab states into financial resources at a time when its influence in the region has waned. Correcting this state of affairs in the next presidential term is important. The question, and core of the debate that should continue, is how best to accomplish this.

      

 

 

On September 25, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings held a discussion on the Arab Awakening, the tenth in a series of forums that identify and address the 12 most critical issues facing the next president. POLITICO Pro defense reporter Stephanie Gaskell moderated a panel discussion where Brookings experts Tamara Cofman Wittes, Shadi Hamid and Raj Desai presented recommendations to the next president.

Participants can follow the conversation on Twitter using hashtag #BIArabAwakening.

Download papers from the event:

• Prioritizing Democracy: How the Next President Should Re-Orient U.S. Policy in the Middle East, by Shadi Hamid 
• Three Key Challenges in Confronting the Arab Awakening, by Tamara Cofman Wittes 
• The Challenge of a Reform Endowment, by Raj M. Desai 

Campaign 2012: Twelve Independent Ideas for Improving American Public Policy is an indispensable guide to the key questions facing White House hopefuls in 2012.

      

 

 

With both presidential campaigns focused almost exclusively on the economy and in the absence of a major attack on the U.S. homeland in recent years, national security has taken a back seat in this year’s presidential campaign. However, the administration and Congress remain sharply at odds over controversial national security policies such as the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. What kinds of counterterrorism policies will effectively secure the safety of the United States and the world?

On September 10th, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings held a discussion on terrorism, the ninth in a series of forums that identify and address the 12 most critical issues facing the next president. White House Reporter Josh Gerstein of POLITICO moderated a panel discussion with Brookings experts Benjamin Wittes, Stephen Grand and Hafez Ghanem, who presented recommendations to the next president.

Participants can follow the conversation on Twitter using hashtag #BITerrorism.

 

Download papers from the event:

• Keeping on Offense: The Next President Should Keep After al Qaeda but Mend Relations with Congress on Terrorism, by Daniel L. Byman and Benjamin Wittes 
• An Opening for a New Narrative in U.S.-Muslim World Relations, by Stephen R. Grand 
• What Focusing on Drones and Detention Misses, by Kevin Watkins and Rebecca Winthrop 

Campaign 2012: Twelve Independent Ideas for Improving American Public Policy is an indispensable guide to the key questions facing White House hopefuls in 2012.

      

 

 

Will the 2012 presidential election follow historical trends and benchmarks, or are more complex dynamics at play this year? For the last “How We’re Doing” Index ahead of Election Day, a team of scholars at the Brookings Institution looked at U.S. economic growth over the past five quarters, which has decelerated while the “fiscal cliff” and the European financial crisis loom. Historically, high unemployment and poor economic growth have doomed incumbents, yet President Obama’s poll numbers remain relatively stable. Will the November election turn on the state of the national economy, or might relatively better economic conditions in key swing states be enough to carry Obama to reelection?Continue reading below chart »

Related Materials:
Past How We’re Doing indexes »

See data sources »

The U.S. economy continues to grow, but at a discouraging pace. U.S. real gross domestic product increased at an anemic 1.5 percent annual rate during the second quarter. While employment conditions strengthened earlier this year, new job growth has averaged about 100,000 positions per month since April. That’s not enough to keep the unemployment rate from rising. The one bright spot has been the recent moderate improvement in the long-depressed housing market. The glut of houses is beginning to subside, leading to more housing construction and higher prices.

The economic outlook is not expected to improve much, if at all, heading into the election. Growth is likely to remain below 2 percent in the third quarter, while the unemployment rate will stay above 8 percent. Concern is growing that Congress won’t act to avert the “fiscal cliff” of tax increases and spending cuts set to take effect in January, which the Congressional Budget Office has predicted would lead the United States into a recession.

The crisis in the euro zone is worsening, and the threat to the global economy escalating. Government bond yields of Italy and Spain have peaked vis-à-vis those of Germany, fueling speculation about the economic and political sustainability of the euro as their common currency. Partly because of continued uncertainty in Europe, the International Monetary Fund has revised growth projections for China and India downward for this year and next. In turn, the outlook for U.S. exports to Europe and the emerging economies is deteriorating. Above all, the dampening effect of the European crisis is likely to delay investment and hiring decisions, further slowing the anemic recovery we have seen so far in the United States.

What does this all mean for the U.S. presidential election?

It’s important to remember that this is not a national campaign but 50 simultaneous state elections – and the outcome for 40 of them can be predicted with some accuracy. This year, election observers shouldn’t obsess over national unemployment figures. The key is to watch economic and political indicators in the 10 states that are closely contested: Ohio, Florida, Pennsylvania, Nevada, Colorado, Iowa, Virginia, North Carolina, New Hampshire and Wisconsin.

Many of the swing states are doing better economically than the country as a whole. Ohio, for example, has a 7.2 percent unemployment rate, more than a point below the national average. And recent polls in several swing states show Obama running ahead of his national polling margins.

The biggest threat to Obama is a late surge for Mitt Romney, which could be precipitated by a collapse in the euro zone and further weakening of the domestic economy. In a bad economy, late-deciding voters often break for a credible challenger, so Obama’s team needs to establish a large lead now, before any further economic weakening. Presidents who fail to set the tone early usually end up losing, as Presidents Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush did.

So, yes, “it’s the economy, stupid.” But this year, it’s an economy that stretches from local indicators in just 10 key states to the threat of national and perhaps global economic weakening. Obama needs to hope that the swing-state economies at least stay stable and that any bad news from abroad waits until after Nov. 6.

Sources:

GDP growth:
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 

Unemployment rate:
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

Percent unemployed for more than 26 weeks:
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

Disposable personal income:
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis

Consumer inflation rate:
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

Dow Jones Industrial Average:
Yahoo! Finance

Consumer sentiment:
Reuters/University of Michigan survey of consumers

Consumer spending:
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis

Months’ supply of new homes:
U.S. Census Bureau

Interest rate on 30-year fixed mortgage:
Freddie Mac

Metro area employment rates:
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

Metro area home price growth:
Case-Shiller Index

U.S. combat fatalities, Afghanistan:
icasualties.org

Civilian fatalities, Iraq:
Brookings Iraq Index

Approval ratings of president and Congress:
Gallup

Percent of Americans “satisfied with the way things are”:
Gallup