Author

Steven Pifer

Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Center on the United States and Europe

Director - Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative

Putin and nukes

Mr. Putin likes to talk publicly every now and then about Russia’s nuclear weapons. Two years ago, he reminded a summer youth camp audience that Russia was a nuclear superpower—as if anyone needed reminding. With a nuclear arsenal believed to number some 4,500 weapons, Russia matches the size of the U.S. arsenal and has 15 times as many nuclear weapons as any third country. Kremlin propaganda outlets such as RT and Sputnik regularly post articles crowing about new Russian strategic weapons developments to make sure no one forgets.

Sometimes, Mr. Putin’s comments are more than a little odd. In a 2015 television documentary, he said he was prepared to put nuclear forces on alert as the Russian military seized Crimea. That was strange because Ukraine had no nuclear arms. It gave them up in the 1990s, in large part because Moscow promised to respect Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity. Kiev even kept its Crimean-based troops in garrison, not challenging the invading Russian forces. As for the West, no country moved to intervene. So why would Mr. Putin think of a nuclear alert?

Last year, the Russian ambassador in Copenhagen threatened that Russia would target nuclear-armed missiles against Denmark. Ambassadors usually don’t say such things. Such talk apparently filtered down from the top.

This loose chatter about nuclear weapons becomes more worrisome against the backdrop of Russia’s “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine, which suggests a lower threshold for using nuclear arms in a conventional conflict. While much of Moscow’s strategic nuclear modernization program offers little reason for concern—the Russians are replacing old stuff with new stuff, just as the United States will be doing in the 2020s—Russia’s continued attachment to large numbers of tactical nuclear arms worries countries in its neighborhood.

In contrast, American leaders speak in a different way about nuclear weapons. Barack Obama usually refers to them in the context of cutting weapons numbers and reducing their role in U.S. security policy. He does not appear to see much need to remind the world that the United States has lots of nuclear bombs. It is difficult to believe that Mr. Obama would use nuclear weapons unless they were first used against the United States or an American ally. You could probably say that about every U.S. president since Dwight Eisenhower.

Then there is Mr. Trump

Mr. Trump appears to have a different view. On his August 3 MSNBC morning show, Joe Scarborough said: “Several months ago, a foreign policy expert on the international level went to advise Donald Trump. And three times [Trump] asked about the use of nuclear weapons. Three times he asked at one point, if we had them, why can’t we use them.”

Mr. Trump’s campaign promptly denied that he had said any such thing. That would be reassuring…except that Mr. Trump has publicly said something very similar. In a March town hall, MSNBC’s Chris Matthews observed that most people don’t want to hear about possible nuclear weapons use, especially from American presidents. Mr. Trump responded: “Then why are we making them? Why do we make them?”

U.S. nuclear weapons are in fact used—in a way—on a daily basis. Their existence serves as a deterrent against aggression. (One can debate how safe nuclear deterrence is, but that is another question.) If ever a nuclear weapon were used, however, the whole game would change, and a Pandora’s box would open, full of all kinds of bad, nasty, and unpredictable things. Responsible leaders understandably don’t want to go there.

In another March interview, Mr. Trump declined to exclude the option of using tactical nuclear arms against ISIS. Huh? What would he do? Incinerate an ISIS-occupied city in Syria or Iraq, killing thousands of innocent civilians, to get the ISIS fighters there?

Mr. Trump’s remarks make clear that he does not understand much about nuclear strategy. He also does not understand the weapons themselves. The foundation for U.S. nuclear deterrence is the strategic triad: submarine-launched ballistic missiles, silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and long-range bombers. When the question came up at Republican debate last year, Mr. Trump’s confused answer suggested that he had no clue what the triad is.

The Kremlin might want to consider this

By all appearances, Mr. Trump is Moscow’s favored candidate in the November election. The Russian president speaks of Mr. Trump in very positive terms. Some analysts believe that Russian intelligence was behind the recent leak of DNC e-mails to Wikileaks. The Russia media has embraced Mr. Trump as its favorite for the White House in 2017. And why not? Mr. Trump speaks highly of Mr. Putin, wants to tear up America’s trade pacts, would weaken U.S. alliances, particularly NATO, and appears ready to recognize Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. If you’re sitting in the Kremlin, what’s not to like?

The Kremlin leadership, however, might consider this: Does it really want someone with Mr. Trump’s irresponsible attitude toward all things nuclear holding the U.S. launch codes?

And while it’s at it, the Kremlin leadership also might consider its own nuclear pronouncements.

      

 

 

But opponents have had to scale back their criticism, in large part because the JCPOA, at least so far, has delivered on its principal goal—blocking Iran’s path to nuclear weapons for an extended period of time. No one can dispute that Tehran has sharply reduced its capacity to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons and would need at least a year to rebuild enough capacity to produce a single bomb.

Iran’s positive compliance record has not given opponents much ammunition. The IAEA found Iran in compliance in its two quarterly reports issued in 2016. True, Iran temporarily exceeded the agreed ceiling on heavy water but quickly rectified the infraction, which most observers attributed to the practical difficulty of ensuring that production overages are exported in a timely way rather than to an intention to circumvent the limit. Critics have also pounced on a German report that Iran’s illicit attempts to procure nuclear and missile items continued in 2015. But Tehran’s requirement to import all nuclear items for its permitted civil nuclear program through the JCPOA’s procurement channel—and stop procuring items outside the channel—did not kick in until January 2016, and neither Washington nor Berlin has information that illicit efforts continued after that time.

Murky missile issue

Iran’s ballistic missile tests present a more complicated compliance issue. Due to a compromise reached in the negotiations, missile activities are not covered in the JCPOA and Security Council resolution 2231 simply ”calls upon” but does not legally require Iran to cease those activities (as did the U.N. Security Council resolutions replaced by 2231). As a result, Iranians argue they are not legally bound to cease missile testing, and Russia and China essentially support their argument. 

The administration and Congress are right to oppose Iran’s provocative and destabilizing missile activities. But they are not on strong legal or political grounds to treat the issue as a compliance violation. Rather than invoking the Iran nuclear deal, Washington and its partners will need to counter Iran’s missile programs with other policy tools, including interdictions of procurement attempts, Missile Technology Control Regime restrictions, U.S. diplomatic efforts with suppliers, missile defenses, and sanctions.

An uncertain path ahead

So, from the standpoint of Iran implementing and complying with its nuclear commitments, the JCPOA has operated well for its first year. But challenges to the smooth operation and even the longevity of the deal are already apparent.

A real threat to the JCPOA is that Iran will blame the slow recovery of its economy on U.S. failure to conscientiously fulfill its sanctions relief commitments and, using that as a pretext, will curtail or even end its own implementation of the deal. Iranians are understandably frustrated that the benefits of sanctions relief have not materialized as quickly as expected. But international banks and businesses have been reluctant to engage Iran not because they have been discouraged by the United States but because they have their own business-related reasons to be cautious, including the inadequate regulatory standards of Iran’s financial system, low oil prices in an oil-dependent economy, and fear of running afoul of remaining U.S. sanctions. In an effort to ensure that Iran will reap the economic rewards it deserves, the Obama administration has bent over backwards to inform foreign governments, banks, and businesses of what sanctions relief measures entitle them to do, but Iranian officials continue to complain that it is not doing enough.

[W]e can say the nuclear deal is off to a promising start…[s]till, it is already clear that the path ahead will not always be smooth.

Legislation proposed in Congress could also threaten the nuclear deal. Many proponents of new sanctions legislation genuinely seek to reinforce the deal—for example, by renewing the Iran Sanctions Act without attaching poison pills. But for some other members of Congress, the bills are designed to undercut the JCPOA. In a July 11 statement of policy, the administration threatened to veto three House bills, stating that they “would undermine the ability of the United States to meet our JCPOA commitments by reimposing certain secondary economic and financial sanctions lifted on ‘Implementation Day’ of the JCPOA.” For now, the administration is in a position to block new legislation that it believes would scuttle the nuclear deal.

But developments outside the JCPOA, especially Iran’s regional behavior and its crackdown on dissent at home, could weaken support for the JCPOA within the United States and give proponents of deal-killing legislation a boost. So far, however, there are no clear indications that the JCPOA has contributed either to more moderate or more provocative behavior. Indeed, consistent with statements by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, there have been few changes in Iran’s behavior toward its neighbors in the last year.

A potential wildcard for the future of the JCPOA is upcoming governing transitions in both Washington and Tehran. There will be more continuity in policy toward Iran and the JCPOA if Hillary Clinton becomes president, although she is likely to take a harder line than her predecessor. Donald Trump now says he will re-negotiate rather than scrap the deal, but in practice that could produce the same result because a better deal will not prove negotiable. With President Hassan Rouhani up for re-election next year and the health of the Supreme Leader questionable, Iran’s future policy toward the JCPOA cannot be confidently predicted.

A final verdict on the JCPOA is many years away, not just because of the challenges mentioned above but also because of the crucial uncertainly regarding what Iran will do when key restrictions on its ability to produce weapons-grade nuclear materials expire after 15 years. However, we can say the nuclear deal is off to a promising start, as even some of its early critics now concede. Still, it is already clear that the path ahead will not always be smooth, the longevity of the deal cannot be taken for granted, and keeping it on track will require constant focus in Washington and other interested capitals. 

       

 

 

The U.S. strategic triad consists of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers. This mix gives the Pentagon the ability to hold at risk things that a potential adversary values. The inherent ability to destroy those things provides the basis for deterrence.

ICBMs can hold at risk targets 6,000 miles away. As they are based on mobile ballistic missile submarines, SLBMs can reach targets anywhere on earth. The same is true for weapons carried by the B-2 and B-52 and, in the future, the B-21. With aerial refueling, U.S. strategic bombers have global reach.

So the question arises: What unique target set could the LRSO hold at risk that cannot be threatened by ICBMs, SLBMs, or gravity bombs delivered by stealthy strategic bombers? At a recent panel discussion on the LRSO, the best answer to this question was “certain things”—but the proponent could not articulate what those “things” were. That explains much of the questioning about the LRSO. No one seems able to offer a plausible explanation for what the LRSO could do that other strategic nuclear systems cannot.

The weapon’s justification often seems to boil down to: The Pentagon is replacing other strategic systems because they are old, so it should replace the old nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) as well. Does that logic hold?

The Air Force developed nuclear-armed ALCMs in the 1970s because the B-52 presented a big target on radar screens. Concern grew that the B-52 could not penetrate Soviet air defenses. A B-52 armed with ALCMs could launch its missiles from well beyond the reach of those air defenses.

Today, however, the Air Force has the stealthy B-2 bomber. It is in the process of procuring 80 to 100 B-21 bombers, which reportedly will incorporate stealth and advanced electronic warfare capabilities. The Department of Energy is already well along in the program to modernize the B61 nuclear gravity bomb. The modernized bomb will be highly accurate and have a variable yield. B-2 and B-21 bombers that can penetrate advanced air defenses and deliver B61 bombs against targets make the LRSO redundant.

Some suggest the LRSO hedges against a compromise of the B-21’s stealth. If that argument has merit, Congress ought to reexamine the wisdom of spending $60 to $80 billion—or perhaps $100 billion—on the bomber. Converted KC-46s (military refueling variants of the Boeing 767) with LRSOs would offer a far cheaper option. The Pentagon, however, seems to believe the B-21 will be capable of defeating advanced air defenses.

That being so, the case for the LRSO is weak. It will cost taxpayers $20 to $30 billion. True, that is a relatively small cost compared to what the Pentagon will pay to replace the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines or build the B-21. But it is not chump change.

Some LRSO proponents cite the relatively “small” cost to argue that the defense budget can afford it. Current Pentagon officials, however, say they have no idea how to pay for everything they want for strategic modernization. Given the rising cost of mandatory spending such as social security and Medicare, and the pressure to hold down the deficit, the budget problem will not become easier in the 2020s, when the “bow-wave” of strategic modernization spending arrives. The Air Force will likely find itself having to choose between B-21s, KC-46 tankers, F-35 fighters, and the LRSO. It also wants to buy a new ICBM then. It is hard to see how all of that will be affordable.

Funding the LRSO now contributes to a budget time-bomb that the current administration and Congress will leave to their successors. The LRSO seems a redundant weapon without a mission. Shelving the program would defuse part of that time-bomb.

       

 

 

The Deep Cuts Commission, a trilateral German-Russian-U.S. Track II effort, published its latest report on June 20. Entitled “Back from the Brink: Toward Restraint and Dialogue in Relations between Russia and the West,” the report examines measures that the United States, NATO, and Russia might take to reduce tension and the risk of military miscalculation. It also offers ideas for resolving differences between the West and Russia on issues such as compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and restoring momentum to the arms control process.

It proposes several concrete means of encouraging restraint and dialogue, including: discussions on mutual restraint measures; reviving dialogue on joint nuclear risk reduction; taking advantage of existing confidence and security-building measures, such as the Open Skies Treaty; supplementing diplomatic dialogues on the INF treaty by convening a special commission to address technical questions; addressing nuclear-armed cruise missile proliferation by bolstering Missile Technology Control Regime restrictions; and exercising restraint in nuclear modernization.

The Deep Cuts Commission is a Track II effort composed of German, Russian, and American experts that seeks to develop ideas for overcoming the current challenges and obstacles to deep reductions in nuclear arms. Brookings Senior Fellow Steven Pifer is a member of the commission.

      

 

 

Einhorn described the incentives and capabilities of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates for acquiring nuclear weapons. He argued that, while both Saudi Arabia and the UAE a) consider Iran a direct military threat, b) have concerns about the U.S. commitment to the security of the region, and c) have sufficient financial resources, they recognize that they have no choice but to rely on the United States for their security and are unwilling to jeopardize that relationship by seeking nuclear weapons. Einhorn also said that both Egypt and Turkey do not view Iran as a direct military threat and are more preoccupied with instability on their borders and internal security, concerns that cannot be addressed by possession of a nuclear weapons capability.

Nephew outlined policy recommendations, including measures to ensure strict implementation of the JCPOA, greater intelligence sharing and security cooperation with Middle East allies, and means of fostering IAEA-supervised regional arrangements that would encourage peaceful nuclear energy development and limit potentially destabilizing nuclear activities. Nephew also asserted that some elements of the JCPOA, such as online monitoring of nuclear facilities, could be applied to other nuclear energy programs in the region to enhance transparency. 

Derek Chollet of the German Marshall Fund argued the United States must deter Iran and reassure U.S. allies by maintaining a robust military presence in the region, planning a range of U.S. responses to destabilizing Iranian activities, and ensuring that U.S. forces have the weapons systems and personnel required for scenarios involving Iran. He suggested that the United States and its Middle East allies continue regular summit meetings on security and broader partnership issues, and possibly formalize security cooperation by establishing a dedicated regional security framework. 

Emirati Ambassador to the United States Yousef Al Otaiba emphasized that, to many of the countries in the region, Iran poses a threat wider than just its nuclear activities. He suggested that the JCPOA will be judged on the degree to which the United States and its allies address Iran’s destabilizing behavior outside of the nuclear file, such as Tehran’s support for Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as its ballistic missile activities. Al Otaiba said that, though he has seen some efforts by the Obama administration to push Iran on its regional behavior, it has sent a mixed message overall, with senior U.S. officials also encouraging European banks to invest in Iran. The ambassador asserted that rigorous enforcement of the JCPOA will be critical to convincing Iran not to eventually proceed to build nuclear weapons.

On Saudi Arabia, Einhorn noted that although the Obama administration supported the Saudi military campaign in Yemen, there was a risk that the Kingdom would overreact to its regional security challenges. He suggested that the United States pursue a dual-track approach: counter provocative Iranian behavior and defend the security interests of its regional partners, while at the same time seeking a resolution of regional disputes and encouraging Saudi Arabia and Iran to find ways of reducing tensions between them.

On the possibility that Iran would rapidly scale up its enrichment program, Einhorn acknowledged that while Tehran can legally do so under the JCPOA in 10 to 15 years, it will not have a strong civil nuclear rationale since it will be able to acquire nuclear fuel from Russia and other suppliers. Furthermore, Iran’s progress in centrifuge research and development may not be as rapid as Iran currently anticipates. Moreover, even if Iran elects to ramp up its enrichment program down the line, the JCPOA and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will bar it from pursuing nuclear weapons, and monitoring arrangements still in place will provide warning and enable the United States to intervene and prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons.

On reaching a regional accommodation that includes Iran, Al Otaiba indicated that the UAE would have much to gain, especially economically, from a better relationship with Tehran. He said the UAE and others in the region would like to try to engage with Iran to reduce tensions—but Iran, for its part, seems unwilling.

On prospects for a U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement, Einhorn said that progress on such an agreement has stalled due to Saudi reluctance to formally renounce enrichment, something the United States has so far insisted on. He suggested that Washington should be prepared to relax the so-called “gold standard” (i.e., a formal renunciation of on enrichment and reprocessing) and instead accept an approach that would still discourage Saudi fuel cycle programs, such as giving Riyadh the right to pursue enrichment but allowing the United States to cease its nuclear cooperation if the Kingdom exercised that right. On the UAE’s civil nuclear program, Al Otaiba affirmed that the Emiratis continue to value the “gold standard” barring enrichment which is enshrined in the U.S.-UAE civil nuclear agreement, and have no plans to change their position on enrichment.

      

 

 

The Iran nuclear deal could open a possibility for reconsidering the SM-3 deployment plans. To get there, however, the Kremlin should offer something in the arms control field of interest to Washington and NATO.

Moscow’s concerns

The now operational Romania site houses twenty-four SM-3 missile interceptors capable of engaging intermediate-range ballistic missile warheads plus a SPY-1D radar. It is oriented toward possible threats from the Middle East, particularly from Iran. The same will be true with the Poland base, to be completed in 2018. It will also house twenty-four SM-3 missile interceptors, supplementing those in Romania, and its own radar. 

Iran thus far appears to be abiding by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding its nuclear weapons program. Following the JCPOA’s conclusion, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed that the deal eliminated the requirement for U.S. missile defenses in Europe. When doing so, he misquoted a statement by President Barack Obama regarding the U.S. approach for defending NATO against ballistic missile attack.

Lavrov asserted—incorrectly—that Obama had said that a halt to Iran’s nuclear program would obviate the need for U.S. missile defenses in Europe. In fact, the president conditioned such a change on Iran ending its ballistic missile program as well as its nuclear program. The ballistic missile program continues.

An opportunity?

That said, an Iranian ballistic missile with a conventional warhead poses a far lesser threat than a missile with a nuclear warhead. The development of longer-range Iranian ballistic missiles, moreover, is advancing slower than anticipated. U.S. intelligence estimates for years suggested that by 2015 Iran could have an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the United States, more than 9,000 kilometers (5,500 miles) away. Today, Iranian ballistic missiles can reach targets in southeastern Europe 2,000 kilometers (1,200 miles) distant—no small achievement, but far short of intercontinental range.

The Russians have voiced particular concern about the U.S. missile defense site in Poland. Polish-based interceptors would add to the capability of the Romanian site to defend against Iranian missiles. But they could defend against little else now. Despite Moscow’s assertions, the SM-3 interceptors have no capability against Russia’s ICBM force, as they lack the velocity to engage ICBM warheads and would have to chase Russian ICBMs flying polar routes toward the United States. Russia is prohibited by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty from having intermediate-range ballistic missiles (the U.S. government charges that Russia has violated the treaty, but that stems from testing an intermediate-range cruise missile). If Russia deploys short-range Iskandr ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad, the SM-3s in Poland could offer some capability against them, but other systems might defend against that threat. 

The SM-3 installation in Poland thus might not have much of a mission, which raises the question of whether it will prove worth the expense. Building and equipping the site in Romania cost $800 million.

Deal or no deal? (Or more complaining?)

If Moscow truly worries about the Polish SM-3 site, it could prompt a reconsideration of that plan. The Russians could indicate that Moscow would be prepared to give on something of interest to NATO in return for the United States and NATO forgoing the SM-3 deployment in Poland. That “something” could be a dialogue on non-strategic nuclear weapons or some different proposal.

The Kremlin should not expect the administration on its own to offer to adjust the planned SM-3 deployment. Doing so would provoke an angry outcry from Republicans on Capitol Hill, many of whom regard support for missile defense as a near theological issue. Doing so could also raise unease in Central Europe absent a Russian quid.

The Kremlin should not expect the administration on its own to offer to adjust the planned SM-3 deployment. Doing so would provoke an angry outcry from Republicans on Capitol Hill, many of whom regard support for missile defense as a near theological issue.

A Russian offer, however, could give Washington and NATO a reason to reexamine the SM-3 plans. To pursue such an approach, it would have to be understood in advance that two conditions would apply:

1. First, there could be no question of Iranian cheating on the JCPOA. Tehran would have to observe the agreement to the letter.
2. Second, if it was decided not to deploy an SM-3 unit in Poland, the United States should deploy a military contingent of equal size in terms of number of personnel. Few Polish officials or military officers, if any, worry about an Iranian ballistic missile attack. What they want is American boots on the ground. Whether that unit operates the SM-3 interceptor or Patriot air defense system, or performs some other military mission, is a secondary consideration in Warsaw. U.S. officials would have to consult in advance with their Polish counterparts but would find them ready to listen.

Russia thus has a plausible way to prompt a NATO reexamination of the SM-3 plan. The longer Moscow holds off on pursuing it, however, the more work will be done at Redzikowo, and the more likely that the Polish site will go ahead to completion.

Will the Kremlin, which has expressed so much anxiety about missile defenses, attempt to deal? Or does it prefer to have something about which to complain and make threats?

      

 

 

Supporters of the JCPOA argued that, by removing the risk of a nuclear-armed Iran, it will reduce incentives for countries of the region to acquire nuclear arms. Opponents of the deal—not just in the United States but also abroad, especially Israel—claimed that the JCPOA would increase those incentives because it would legitimize enrichment in Iran, allow Iran to ramp up its nuclear capacity when key restrictions expire after 10 and 15 years, and boost the Iranian economy and the resources Iran could devote to a weapons program.

I strongly believe the JCPOA will significantly reduce prospects for proliferation in the Middle East (and as my colleague Richard Nephew explains in another post out today, there are things the United States and other powers can do to help reduce that prospect further). But uncertainties about the future of the JCPOA and the region will persist for quite some time—and these uncertainties could motivate regional countries to keep their nuclear options open. They may ask themselves a variety of questions in the years ahead: Will the JCPOA be sustainable over time? Will it unravel over concerns about compliance? Will it withstand challenges by opponents in Tehran and Washington? Will it survive leadership transitions in the United States and Iran? Will Iran ramp up its fissile material production capacities when key restrictions expire? Will it then break out of the JCPOA and seek to build nuclear weapons? Will Iran continue to threaten the security of its neighbors in the years ahead? And will the United States maintain a strong regional military presence and be seen by its partners as a reliable guarantor of their security?

I strongly believe the JCPOA will significantly reduce prospects for proliferation in the Middle East.

Richard and I studied how these and other questions might affect nuclear decision-making in the Middle East. In particular, we evaluated the likelihood that key states will pursue nuclear weapons, or at least enrichment or reprocessing programs that could give them a latent nuclear weapons capability. We focused on four states often regarded as potential candidates to join the nuclear club: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Turkey.

Saudi Arabia

Of the four, Saudi Arabia is the most highly motivated to pursue nuclear weapons. It sees Iran as an implacable foe that is intent on destabilizing its neighbors, achieving regional hegemony, and upending the Kingdom’s internal order. At the same time, the Saudis have lost much confidence in the U.S. commitment to the security of its regional partners. In part as a result, the new Saudi leadership has taken a more assertive, independent role in regional conflicts, especially in Yemen. But despite their reservations about the United States, the Saudis know they have no choice but to rely heavily on Washington for their security—and they know they would place that vital relationship in jeopardy if they pursued nuclear weapons.

The Saudis clearly have sufficient financial resources to make a run at nuclear weapons. But acquiring the necessary human and physical infrastructure to pursue an indigenous nuclear program would take many years.

Given the Kingdom’s difficulty in developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability, speculation has turned to the possibility that it would receive support from a foreign power, usually Pakistan, which received generous financial support from Saudi Arabia in acquiring its own nuclear arsenal. But while rumors abound about a Pakistani commitment to help Saudi Arabia acquire nuclear weapons, the truth is hard to pin down. If such a Saudi-Pakistani agreement was ever reached, it was probably a vague, unwritten assurance long ago between a Pakistani leader and Saudi king, without operational details or the circumstances in which it would be activated. In any event, the Saudis would find it hard to rely on such an assurance today, when Pakistanis are trying to put the legacy of A.Q. Khan behind them and join the international nonproliferation mainstream. 

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE believes Iran poses a severe threat to regional security and has become more aggressive since the completion of the JCPOA. And like the Saudis, the Emiratis have lost considerable confidence in the reliability of the United States as a security guarantor. But also like the Saudis, the Emiratis are reluctant to put their vital security ties to the United States in jeopardy.

[L]ike the Saudis, the Emiratis have lost considerable confidence in the reliability of the United States as a security guarantor.

Moreover, the Emiratis are heavily invested in their ambitious nuclear energy program—with efforts currently underway, with the help of a South Korean-led consortium, to construct four nuclear power reactors—and they know this project would be dead in the water if they opted for nuclear weapons.

The Emiratis have also been a leading regional supporter of nonproliferation. In their bilateral agreement for civil nuclear cooperation with the United States, they formally renounced the acquisition of enrichment or reprocessing capabilities (the so-called “gold standard”), effectively precluding the pursuit of nuclear weapons. After the JCPOA permitted Iran to retain its enrichment program, the UAE, faced with criticism domestically and from some Arab governments for having given up its nuclear “rights,” said it may reconsider its formal renunciation of enrichment. But subsequently, Emirati officials have made clear that their nuclear energy plans have not changed and that they have no intention to pursue enrichment or reprocessing.

Egypt

Egypt is on everyone’s short list of potential nuclear aspirants—in part because of its former role as leader of the Arab world and its flirtation with nuclear weapons in the Gamal Abdel Nasser years. But while Egypt and Iran have often been regional rivals, Egypt does not view Iran as a direct military threat. Instead, Egypt’s main concerns include extremist activities in the Sinai, the fragmentation of Iraq and Syria, disarray in Libya—and the adverse impact of these developments on Egypt’s internal security. The Egyptians recognize that none of these threats can be addressed by the possession of nuclear weapons.

Although Russia is committed to work with Egypt on its first nuclear power reactor, Cairo’s nuclear energy plans have experienced many false starts before, and there is little reason to believe the outcome will be different this time around, especially given the severe economic challenges the Egyptian government currently faces. Moreover, although Egypt trained a substantial number of nuclear scientists in the 1950s and 1960s, its human nuclear infrastructure atrophied when ambitious nuclear energy plans never materialized.

Turkey

Because of its emergence in the last decade as a rising power, its large and growing scientific and industrial basis, and its ambition to be an influential regional player, Turkey is also on everyone’s short list of potential nuclear-armed states. But Turkey has maintained reasonably good relations with Tehran, even during the height of the sanctions campaign against Iran. Although the two countries have taken opposing sides in the Syria civil war, Turkey, like Egypt, does not regard Iran as a direct military threat. Indeed, Ankara sees instability and terrorism emanating from the Syrian conflict as its main security concerns—and nuclear weapons are not viewed as relevant to dealing with those concerns.

Current tensions with Russia over Turkey’s November 2015 shoot-down of a Russian fighter jet are another source of concern in Ankara. But the best means of addressing that concern is to rely on the security guarantee Turkey enjoys as a member of NATO. While Turkish confidence in NATO has waxed and waned in recent decades, most Turks, especially in the military, believe they can count on NATO in a crisis, and they would be reluctant to put their relationship with NATO at risk by pursuing nuclear weapons.

Former nuclear aspirants

For the sake of completeness, our study also looked at regional countries that once actively pursued nuclear weapons but were forced to abandon their programs: Iraq, Libya, and Syria. But we concluded that, given the civil strife tearing those countries apart, none of them was in a position to pursue a sustained, disciplined nuclear weapons effort.

Bottom line

Our study found that the Iran nuclear deal has significantly reduced incentives for countries of the Middle East to reconsider their nuclear options. At least for the foreseeable future, none of them is likely to pursue nuclear weapons or even latent nuclear weapons capabilities—or to succeed if they do. 

Editors’ Note: Bob Einhorn and Richard Nephew spoke about their new report at a recent Brookings event. You can see the video from the event here.

      

 

 

In a report that Bob Einhorn and I released this week, we assessed this risk of a so-called proliferation cascade. We look at four states in particular—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Turkey—and Bob briefly explores each case in another blog post out today. In the paper, we argue that although the likelihood of a proliferation cascade in the Middle East is fairly low, and certainly lower than a number of critics of the Iran deal would have you believe, it is not zero. Given that, here are eight steps that leaders in Washington should take to head off that possibility:

1. Ensure that the JCPOA is rigorously monitored, strictly enforced, and faithfully implemented;
2. Strengthen U.S. intelligence collection on Iranian proliferation-related activities and intelligence-sharing on those activities with key partners;
3. Deter a future Iranian decision to produce nuclear weapons;
4. Seek to incorporate key monitoring and verification provisions of the JCPOA into routine IAEA safeguards as applied elsewhere in the Middle East and in the global nonproliferation regime;
5. Pursue U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with Middle East governments on terms that are realistic and serve U.S. nonproliferation interests;
6. Promote regional arrangements that restrain fuel cycle developments and build confidence in the peaceful use of regional nuclear programs;
7. Strengthen security assurances to U.S. partners in the Middle East; and
8. Promote a stable regional security environment.

Taken together, these steps deal with three core challenges the United States faces in shoring up the nonproliferation regime in the region.

The first is that the central test of nonproliferation in the Middle East will come from how the JCPOA is believed to be meeting its core objective of preventing Iranian nuclear weapons development and Iranian establishment of regional hegemony. It cannot be stressed enough that the decision to pursue nuclear weapons by any state, including those in the region, starts with a sense of vulnerability to core security threats and an inability to address those threats through any other means. The history of nuclear proliferation is one of tit-for-tat armament in the face of overriding security imperatives. Both finished and aborted nuclear programs bear the hallmarks of a security dilemma impelling states to make the political, economic, and security investments into nuclear weapons.

This is no less true for countries across the region than for Iran. To the extent that the overall security environment can be stabilized, there will be less impetus for any Middle Eastern state to develop nuclear weapons. The United States should focus on:

• Fully implementing and enforcing all sides of the JCPOA (nuclear restrictions, transparency, and sanctions relief);
• Creating a strong sense of deterrence toward Iran, manifest most clearly in the passage of a standing Authorization to Use Military Force if Iran is determined to be breaking out toward acquisition of a nuclear weapon;
• Providing security assurances and backing them up with the mechanisms to make them actionable like joint exercises, logistical planning, and cooperation with a range of regional and extra-regional actors; and,
• Working to promote a more stable regional environment by seeking the resolution of simmering conflicts.

But, these latter two factors also point to another resonant theme in our research: the need for the United States to be a player. After decades of involvement in the region, the United States has yet to settle upon the right balance between involvement and remove. Yet, establishing this equilibrium is essential. States in the region need predictability in their affairs with the United States, including knowing the degree to which our assurances will stand the test of time.

States in the region need predictability in their affairs with the United States, including knowing the degree to which our assurances will stand the test of time.

In part for this reason, the United States should not only pursue deeper security relationships, but also civil nuclear cooperation with interested states throughout the region. Such a relationship both ensures a closer link between the United States and its partners and discourages the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology by disincentivizing countries from “going it alone.” In the Middle East, the United States would need to find a formulation that offers some flexibility (such as by building in language that would permit the United States to terminate any nuclear cooperation arrangements in the face of sensitive fuel cycle development by the other side).

The United States should also share intelligence more closely with its partners in the region. This is helpful in the short term, of course, but also helps the United States understand the mindset of and intelligence picture of its regional partners in a broader sense. It also helps leaders in Washington address concerns brought about by unfounded rumors or speculation as to Iran’s intentions or capabilities.

Changing how we do business

Even more important than how the JCPOA was negotiated will be how we transition from its restrictions and transparency mechanisms into a new world in 15 to 20 years. 

The United States seek to incorporate elements of the JCPOA into normal international monitoring practices and should negotiate new arrangements to help govern the future development of nuclear technology in the region. 

To achieve the former, the IAEA will need to make some changes to how it does business. For example, the IAEA determines how best to implement its monitoring mission, contingent on acceptance by the country being inspected. The United States and its partners should work with the IAEA (and other countries with significant nuclear activities) to make some parts of the JCPOA standard operating practice, such as online monitoring of enrichment levels. Other elements of the JCPOA may require agreements at the IAEA and beyond for how nuclear-related activities, including those that could have value for nuclear weaponization, are handled. It might be hard to get agreement, not least because there is clear language in the JCPOA that states that it will not be seen as a precedent for future nuclear nonproliferation efforts. However, it should still be the ambition of the United States to make such steps part of the norm. 

A far more difficult lift would be organizing a regional approach to the nuclear fuel cycle. This is not the same as creating a multilateral fuel cycle, though some elements that approach would be helpful. Rather, the United States should find ways to craft regional agreements or, failing that, moratoria on aspects of the fuel cycle that others in the region would find threatening. It would be easier to negotiate constraints some aspects than others. For example, spent fuel reprocessing is rare in the Middle East, with only Israel having been known to do it to a significant degree. It may therefore be an attractive first place to begin. Enrichment would be altogether more difficult, but it may be possible to convince states in the region to forego the expansion of their enrichment programs beyond their status quo. For Iran, it would continue to possess uranium enrichment but with constraints that limit the utility of this program for weapons production; its incentive would be to avoid creating the rationale for regional competition. For other countries in the region, it would involve holding off on enrichment, but also on the financial and political investment enrichment would involve—as well refraining from creating a security dilemma for Iran that could produce miscalculation in the future.

While some of these recommendations are more challenging (and may prove impossible), others are potentially easier. By taking a multifaceted approach, the United States increases the chances that no further weapons of mass destruction proliferate in the Middle East down the road. 

Editors’ Note: Richard Nephew and Bob Einhorn spoke about their new report at a recent Brookings event. You can see the video from the event here.

      

 

 

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T
he global nuclear nonproliferation regime has been remarkably resilient, with no new entrants to the nuclear club in the last 25 years. But observers believe that could change and that we may be heading toward a “cascade of proliferation,” especially in the Middle East. The presumed trigger for a possible Middle East nuclear weapons competition is Iran, which has violated nonproliferation obligations, conducted activities relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, and pursued sensitive dual-use nuclear technologies without a persuasive peaceful justification. Tehran’s nuclear program—combined with provocative behavior widely believed to support a goal of establishing regional hegemony—has raised acute concerns among Iran’s neighbors and could prompt some of them to respond by seeking nuclear weapons capabilities of their own.

The Iran nuclear deal

Conscious of the risks that Iran’s nuclear program posed to the international and regional security order, the United States has sought to head off its further development until confidence could be built regarding Iranian intentions. In July 2015, negotiations aimed at preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and heading off a regional nuclear arms competition resulted in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1 countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The JCPOA provides for deep reductions in Iran’s existing uranium enrichment capacity and the re-design of its planned plutonium-production reactor, which together effectively eliminate its capability to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons for at least ten to fifteen years. It also calls for highly intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring measures, many of which are unlimited in duration, capable of providing confidence in Iranian compliance. In exchange, the JCPOA requires the suspension and eventual termination of U.S., European Union (EU), and Security Council nuclear-related sanctions against Iran.

The JCPOA survived contentious reviews in the U.S. Congress and Iranian Majlis (parliament); key nuclear reduction and sanctions relief milestones have been reached; and implementation to date has gone relatively smoothly, although Iran’s return to the global economy has been more halting than Iran’s leaders would have preferred. But despite the promising start, the nuclear deal remains highly controversial in both Tehran and Washington as well as in several Middle East capitals. The potential for Iranian and American critics to undermine the JCPOA—together with the complex compliance issues likely to arise and the uncertainties surrounding leadership transitions in the United States and Iran—raise questions about the long-term sustainability of the deal, questions that will be on the minds of leaders of Middle East countries as they consider how best to ensure their security in the years ahead.

Reactions to the deal in the Middle East

Reactions to the JCPOA in the region have been mixed. Israel, in particular Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has been the most vocally negative, although Israeli officials were consulted during the negotiations and are now working constructively with the United States to promote vigorous enforcement of Iranian compliance. Turkey and Egypt have been generally positive, relieved by the peaceful resolution of the long-standing Iran nuclear issue and—unlike Israel, some Gulf Arab states, and American opponents of the deal—comfortable that the JCPOA permits Iran to retain an enrichment program. Perhaps reluctant to break ranks with their American security partner, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have publicly endorsed the nuclear deal, including at the April 2016 U.S.-GCC summit meeting in Riyadh.

However, despite public expressions of support, several states of the region, especially the Sunni Arabs of the Gulf, have serious reservations about the nuclear agreement. Their concerns fall into three areas:

• The deal will only delay and not prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. Key restrictions on enriched uranium- and plutonium-production expire after 10 and 15 years, permitting Iran to expand its nuclear capacities and greatly reduce the time it would need to produce nuclear weapons, if it chose to do so in the future. While U.S. supporters of the JCPOA believe that Iran can be deterred from seeking nuclear weapons after 15 years, Iran’s rivals, particularly the Saudis and Emiratis, are convinced that Iran remains determined to possess nuclear weapons and will bide its time, use the 15 years to develop more advanced centrifuges and missile delivery systems, and emerge after 15 years with a strengthened economy and in a better position than today to quickly expand its infrastructure and go for nuclear weapons.

• The deal does not impede Iran’s destabilizing regional behavior and will even worsen the problem. Some of Iran’s neighbors accuse Tehran of meddling in the internal affairs of its neighbors, using proxies such as Hezbollah and the Houthis to advance its goals, intervening directly in the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars, and in general seeking to sow instability, undermine rival governments, and become the dominant power in the region. While they recognize that the JCPOA could not be expected to resolve their concerns about Iran’s behavior, they feel the deal could actually exacerbate them—by releasing to Iran tens of billions of dollars in frozen assets, ending Tehran’s international isolation, and strengthening its economic capacity to upgrade its military and expand its regional influence.

• The deal is part of a regional realignment unfavorable to America’s traditional partners. Based significantly on suspicions and distorted perceptions of events and trends, some Middle East governments, especially among the Sunni Arabs, see the JCPOA as an indication that the United States is withdrawing from or at least reducing its military presence in the region. They fear that the U.S. may accept a prominent and even central role for Iran, and shift its allegiance from an exclusive focus on its traditional Arab partners to an approach balanced between those partners and Iran in which Iran would become a U.S. partner in promoting stability and resolving conflicts. Although the Obama Administration has made a major effort to dispel these concerns, they persist to a significant degree.

Will key regional states seek to acquire nuclear weapons?

U.S. supporters of the JCPOA argue that the removal of the near-term risk of a nuclear-armed Iran will sharply reduce the incentive for regional states to acquire their own fissile material production capabilities or nuclear weapons. Opponents claim that, by legitimizing Iran’s enrichment program, permitting Iran to ramp up its nuclear infrastructure after 10-15 years, and facilitating an economic recovery that will enable Iran to greatly boost the resources devoted to its nuclear program, the JCPOA itself will be the catalyst for proliferation in the region.

Whether states in the region eventually opt for nuclear weapons will depend on a range of factors, some related to the JCPOA and some not. Among the key factors will be their perceptions of Iran’s future nuclear capabilities and intentions, their assessment of Iran’s regional behavior, their view of the evolving conventional military balance with Iran, their confidence in the United States as a security partner, their evaluation of how the United States and other countries would react to their pursuit of nuclear weapons or a latent nuclear weapons capability, and, not least, the feasibility—in terms of their technical expertise, physical infrastructure, and financial resources—of succeeding in the effort to acquire fuel cycle facilities or nuclear weapons.

In assessing the probability of proliferation in the Middle East, it is necessary to focus on how these various factors may affect nuclear decision-making in individual countries, especially in the countries often cited as the most likely to go for a latent or actual nuclear weapons capability: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and Turkey.

Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is widely considered to be the most likely regional state to pursue the nuclear option, an impression reinforced by occasional remarks by prominent Saudis that the Kingdom will match whatever nuclear capability Iran attains. The Saudis regard Iran as an implacable foe, not just an external threat determined to achieve regional hegemony but also an existential threat intent on undermining the Saudi monarchy. Moreover, while their concerns about Iran have grown, their confidence in the U.S. commitment to the security of its regional partners has been shaken. They cite what they regard as evidence of Washington’s unreliability, such as not preventing former Egyptian President Mubarak’s ouster, failing to enforce the red line against Syria’s use of chemical weapons, giving lukewarm support to Syrian rebels, and accepting a greater Iranian regional role.

Animated by what they see as a waning U.S. commitment to Gulf security, the Saudis have beefed up their conventional defense capabilities, explored cooperation with Russia and other potential partners, and adopted a more assertive, independent role in regional conflicts, most dramatically in waging their aggressive military campaign in Yemen. Still, senior Saudis maintain that they have no choice but to rely heavily on the United States for their security.

While confident that they can handle the current conventional military threat from Iran, the Saudis worry about the military implications of a post-sanctions Iranian economic recovery, and they regard a future Iranian nuclear weapons capability as a game-changer. These concerns, together with their uncertainty about the future U.S. role, may motivate the Saudis to consider their own nuclear options.

But while the Saudis appear to be motivated to acquire nuclear weapons, their ability to do so is very much in doubt, at least for the foreseeable future. While they clearly have the necessary financial resources, the Saudis lack the human and physical infrastructure and have had to postpone their ambitious nuclear power plans for eight years while they train the required personnel. Although Riyadh is not willing to formally renounce the acquisition of an enrichment capability, Saudi nuclear energy officials state they have no plans for enrichment and do not anticipate pursuing an enrichment program for at least 25 years.

Given the Kingdom’s difficulty in developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability, speculation has turned to the possibility of the Kingdom receiving support from a foreign power, usually Pakistan, which received generous financial support from Saudi Arabia in acquiring its own nuclear arsenal. But while rumors abound about a Pakistani commitment to help Saudi obtain nuclear weapons, the truth is hard to pin down. Senior Saudis and Pakistanis deny such an understanding exists. If it does exist, it was probably a vague, unwritten assurance long ago between a Pakistani leader and Saudi king, without operational details or the circumstances in which it would be activated. In any event, the Saudis would find it hard to rely on such an assurance now, especially in the wake of Islamabad’s rejection of the Saudi request to take part in the Yemen campaign. Pakistan is highly unlikely to become the Saudis’ nuclear accomplice.

So Saudi Arabia may be motivated to make a run at nuclear weapons, but its prospects for success are very limited.

United Arab Emirates
Like the Saudis, the Emiratis believe Iran poses a severe threat to regional security, has increased its aggressiveness since the completion of the JCPOA, is still trying to export revolution, and will resume its quest for nuclear weapons when JCPOA restrictions expire. Also like Riyadh, Abu Dhabi has lost considerable confidence in the reliability of the United States as a security partner, has explored defense cooperation with other outside powers, and has played an increasingly assertive, independent military role in the region, especially in the Yemen campaign. But like Saudi Arabia, it knows it has no real choice but to rely heavily on the United States for its security.

Moreover, perhaps because of traditionally strong economic ties between the UAE and Iran, the Emiratis take a more pragmatic approach to Tehran than do the Saudis. While the Saudis tend to see the struggle with Iran as irreconcilable, the Emiratis tend to believe that if Iran’s regional designs can be countered and a regional balance established, a modus vivendi with Iran can eventually be achieved.

The ambitious UAE nuclear energy program—including a project well underway by a South Korea-led consortium to build four power reactors—is the best indication that Abu Dhabi has no current intention to pursue an independent nuclear path. In negotiations on a U.S.-UAE civil nuclear agreement required for the project, the Emiratis accepted a legally binding renunciation of enrichment and reprocessing ( the so-called “gold standard”), effectively precluding the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Although the UAE subsequently indicated that it might seek to renegotiate the gold standard in light of the JCPOA’s acceptance of enrichment in Iran, Emirati officials indicate that, while their acceptance of the gold standard received criticism at home and from other Arab governments, the Iran deal has not produced any change in their nuclear energy plans, and they still have no intention to pursue enrichment or reprocessing.

Egypt
Although Egypt flirted with nuclear weapons development in the 1950s and 1960s and failed to report to the IAEA on some sensitive nuclear experiments it carried out between 1990 and 2003, Cairo today appears to lack both the inclination and the wherewithal to make a push for nuclear weapons.

Although Tehran and Cairo have occasionally sparred on regional issues and Iran is actively supporting causes that undermine the interests of Egypt’s main Arab allies and benefactors, Egypt does not see Iran as a direct military threat. Its principal security concern is the turbulent regional security environment—extremist ideology, the fragmentation of Syria and Iraq, and instability in Libya—and its adverse impact on internal security. Unlike the Gulf Arabs, the Egyptians are supportive of the JCPOA and believe a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement could have a positive effect on regional stability.

Although Russia is committed to work with Egypt on its first power reactor, Cairo’s nuclear energy’s plans have experienced many false starts before, and there is little reason to believe the outcome will be different this time around, especially given the severe economic challenges currently faced by the Egyptian government. Moreover, although Egypt trained a substantial number of nuclear scientists in the 1950s and 1960s, its human nuclear infrastructure atrophied when ambitious nuclear energy plans never materialized.

So, given its preoccupation with nearby security challenges and low-tech threats such as insurgencies and terrorism and given its shortage of technical expertise and financial resources, it is unlikely that Egypt will reconsider its current non-nuclear status.

Turkey
Because of its emergence in the last decade as a rising power, its large and growing scientific and industrial base, and its ambition to be an influential regional player, Turkey is usually included on a short list of countries that may decide, in the wake of the Iran nuclear deal, to pursue a latent or actual nuclear weapons capability. But its pursuit of nuclear weapons is highly improbable.

Turkey has maintained reasonably good relations with Iran, and it resisted efforts to restrict its engagement with Tehran even at the height of the global sanctions campaign. Although Turkey and Iran have taken opposing sides in the Syrian war, most Turks do not see Iran as a direct military threat. Instead, Ankara sees instability and terrorism emanating from that conflict and from within Turkey’s borders as their principal security threats, concerns that cannot be addressed by the possession of nuclear weapons.

Tensions with Moscow over Turkey’s shoot-down of a Russian fighter jet in November 2015 are a source of concern in Ankara. But the best means of addressing that concern is reliance on the security guarantees Turkey enjoys as a member of NATO. While Turkish confidence in NATO has waxed and waned in recent decades, most Turks, especially in the military, believe they can count on NATO in a crisis, and would be reluctant to put their NATO ties in jeopardy by pursuing nuclear weapons.

Turkey has plans for nuclear power to meet energy shortages, including by purchasing nuclear reactors from Russian and Japan. Moreover, although Turkish energy officials say they have no current plans for enrichment, they are unwilling to rule it out. Still, especially in light of current political difficulties with Russia, Turkish experts are skeptical that Ankara’s civil nuclear plans will proceed in a timely manner, if at all.

Other cases
Although Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Turkey are most often mentioned as potential aspirants to the nuclear club, three other regional countries merit observation, given their past interest in nuclear weapons: Iraq, Syria, and Libya. But none of them are likely to revive their nuclear weapons ambitions in the foreseeable future.

Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure was decimated by two wars and a decade of sanctions, and it is severely constrained by its conflict with ISIS, its internal political and religious differences, and an economy struggling to grow in the face of low oil prices. Israeli’s destruction of Syria’s al-Kibar reactor in 2007 effectively ended Damascus’s nuclear weapons program. Moreover, consumed by civil war and its survival as a unitary state very much in question, Syria lacks the basic attributes needed to pursue a successful nuclear weapons program, including human and physical infrastructure, financial resources, and a disciplined leadership. With most of the sensitive equipment acquired through Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan’s black market network shipped out of the country in 2004, the absence of sufficient indigenous technical expertise, and the country in a state of disarray, the likelihood of Libya embarking on a renewed nuclear weapons effort in the foreseeable future is remote.

In February 2016, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon stated publicly that “we see signs that countries in the Arab world are preparing to acquire nuclear weapons, that they are not willing to sit quietly with Iran on the brink of a nuclear or atomic bomb.” Ya’alon did not offer any evidence for his statement. It is, of course, possible that Israel has access to information unavailable to the authors (or even to the U.S. government). But the current study has not found indications that any of Iran’s neighbors are making preparations to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, our research and analysis suggest that none of them are likely to pursue nuclear weapons or succeed if they do.

Policies to reduce the likelihood of a proliferation cascade in the Middle East

Still, even if prospects for proliferation seem remote today, predicting future developments with confidence—especially given the unpredictability of the recent past and continued turmoil in region—seems imprudent. Whatever the likelihood that Middle East states may opt to acquire nuclear weapons in the future, it is incumbent on policymakers, especially U.S. policymakers, to do what they can to reduce those prospects further. The following are policies recommended for the Obama administration and future U.S. administrations.

1 Ensure that the JCPOA is rigorously monitored, strictly enforced, and faithfully implemented. Confidence by regional states that the JCPOA is working effectively as a barrier to an Iranian nuclear weapons capability will reinforce their inclination to remain non-nuclear, whereas a JCPOA of uncertain sustainability with a checkered compliance record will increase their incentives to hedge their bets. Effective and sustained implementation will mean not only pressing for strict Iranian compliance but also ensuring that Iran realizes the benefits of sanctions relief that it is entitled to, including by making modest adjustments in sanctions policy if it is found that previously unidentified and unintended technical problems are impeding sanctions relief.

2 Strengthen U.S. intelligence collection on Iranian proliferation-related activities and enhance intelligence-sharing on those activities with key partners. Uncertainty about nuclear developments in Iran will feed concerns about the future and create incentives for regional states to keep their nuclear options open. Washington should increase its investment in national intelligence capabilities to monitor Iran’s nuclear activities and create mechanisms for better sharing such intelligence with regional partners.

3Deter a future Iranian decision to produce nuclear weapons. Incentives for acquiring a latent or actual nuclear weapons capability will increase if regional states believe Iran can successfully break out and produce nuclear weapons. President Obama and his successors should declare that it is U.S. policy to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and that the United States is prepared to use military force, if necessary, to stop Iran from breaking out and producing nuclear weapons. To demonstrate national unity and strengthen the deterrent effect, Congress should adopt a standing Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) in the event the president determines and provides evidence to Congress that Iran is breaking out and moving toward nuclear weapons.

4 Seek to incorporate key JCPOA monitoring provisions into routine IAEA safeguards applied elsewhere in the Middle East and in the global nonproliferation regime. Making some of the innovative features of the JCPOA’s monitoring systems the new normal for IAEA safeguards could enhance confidence that Iran’s neighbors are not pursuing nuclear weapons as well as ensure that Iran will remain bound by them indefinitely. Consideration should be given to widening the application of online enrichment-level monitoring and continuous surveillance of key elements of the enrichment supply chain, such as centrifuge production workshops. Explicitly banning activities related to the development of nuclear weapons, and verification of such a “weaponization” ban, should also be universalized.

5 Pursue civil nuclear cooperation with Middle East governments on terms that are realistic and serve U.S. nonproliferation interests. To avoid continuing deadlock with Middle East countries (particularly Saudi Arabia and Jordan) on bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreements—which would exclude the United States from nuclear commerce in the region and leave the field to nuclear suppliers less interested in discouraging enrichment and reprocessing—the United States should be prepared, if necessary, to relax its insistence on a legally binding renunciation of enrichment and reprocessing, while still pressing for the strongest possible constraints on such capabilities.

6 Promote regional arrangements that restrain fuel cycle developments. Developing region-wide or sub-regional arrangements (involving several states) could head off competitive fuel cycle developments as restrictions on Iran’s programs expire in 2025-2030. Some measures could apply equally to all participants, such as a ban on reprocessing, agreement to rely on foreign-supplied fuel for all power reactors and to ship all spent fuel out of the country, and agreement that all new research and power reactors would be light-water moderated and use uranium fuel enriched to below five percent. Some other measures might not apply equally to all participants, such as agreement by some Arab governments to forgo enrichment and agreement by Iran to postpone the expiration of key JCPOA restrictions or accept limits on its enrichment capacity after 15 years.

7 Strengthen security assurances to U.S. partners in the Middle East. Concerns about the credibility and effectiveness of U.S. commitments to their security are the principal reason that Gulf Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, might decide to pursue latent or actual nuclear weapons capabilities. At the U.S.-GCC summit meetings of May 2015 and April 2016, the United States issued strong statements of support for the security of its Gulf partners. Among other steps, the leaders called for stepping up maritime security cooperation, expediting the implementation of an integrated missile defense early warning system, training Special Operations Forces units from each GCC country, and expanding cooperation on cyber security. Building on those steps, the United States should explore with its GCC partners the development of a more closely integrated regional security framework, with strong operational and institutional ties.

8 Promote a stable regional security environment. In a Middle East less racked by conflict, incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons, both by Iran and other states of the region, would be significantly reduced. The United States should pursue a dual-track approach. On the one hand, it should instill confidence in its partners that the United States is committed to their security, will prevent any country from achieving regional hegemony, and will maintain a formidable military and diplomatic presence in the region. On the other, it should promote the resolution of regional conflicts, especially in Syria and Yemen, and encourage Iran and Saudi Arabia to find ways to tamp down their disputes and eventually reach an accommodation. In the longer run, Washington should encourage the creation of an inclusive regional security forum.

A proliferation cascade? Unlikely, at least for now
By sharply diminishing Iran’s capacity to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons for at least 10-15 years, the JCPOA has reduced incentives for neighboring states to acquire nuclear weapons or at least a hedging fuel cycle capability. But it has not eliminated those incentives.

For years to come, regional states will remain uncertain about several factors affecting their security—how well the JCPOA will deter and detect any Iranian non-compliance; whether the agreement will survive compliance disputes, challenges by opponents, and leadership transitions; and whether Iran will opt for nuclear weapons when key restrictions expire after 15 years. They will also be uncertain about other factors that could motivate them to reconsider their nuclear options, especially Iran’s future behavior in the region and America’s future regional role. These uncertainties will keep concerns about proliferation alive.

But this study suggests that, at least for now, those concerns have been subdued, even if not permanently set to rest. None of the Middle East’s “likely suspects” appears both inclined and able in the foreseeable future to acquire an indigenous nuclear weapons capability.

In the years preceding the JCPOA, it had practically become the conventional wisdom that, given Iran’s nuclear program, several additional nuclear-armed states would inevitably emerge in the Middle East. That conventional wisdom has largely been discredited. But there is a risk that a more complacent conventional wisdom will take its place—that we no longer have to worry about a regional nuclear arms competition.

It will be essential for the United States and other interested countries—pursuing policies along the lines recommended here—to make sure that the earlier predictions of a Middle East proliferation cascade do not yet come to pass.