The five year-old war in Yemen is intensifying. The country is splitting apart as the pandemic ravages the poorest country in the Middle East. The war is a burden on the Saudi economy, dooming hopes of diversification. Iran is the winner in the quagmire.

The Saudis staged air strikes on Sana’a and other cities in the north under the control of the Zaydi Shiite Houthi rebels last week. At least 40 air attacks hit the capital. Another target was Saada, the home of the Houthis’ leadership. The Saudis say they are trying to kill the top Houthi officials.

The attacks follow the firing of missiles and drones at Riyadh and other Saudi cities and towns. The Saudis claim to have shot down the missiles. The Houthis claim they hit the Saudi Ministry of Defense.

The escalation in the fighting marks the failure of months of efforts to arrange a ceasefire, including the Saudi public call for a unilateral ceasefire. The Saudis are well aware that the war costs them a fortune, at a time when global oil demand is sharply down and Saudi revenue is low. Saudi oil is selling for around $40 a barrel, less than half what the kingdom needs to break even. The details of the multiple efforts at arranging a ceasefire are unknown, but certainly the Houthis don’t feel much compulsion to quit while they are winning on the ground. The war rallies many Yemenis against the hated foreign Saudis.

Due to the pandemic, the Saudis closed the annual hajj pilgrimage to Mecca for most foreigners, another major economic setback. The virus is surging in the kingdom, as well in neighboring Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. The Saudis have surpassed 200,000 cases, with some in the royal family.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the architect of the reckless Saudi war, has announced plans to diversify the economy and build a new city in the northwest of the country. Those plans are stalling due to the weak economy.

In southern Yemen, separatists have taken control of the port city of Aden and the strategic island of Socotra, throwing out the supporters of the Saudi-based government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. Other parts of the south are in the hands of local militias. Putting Yemen back together increasingly looks impossible.

The war has cost an estimated 100,000 lives. Eighty percent of Yemenis need humanitarian assistance from the outside. Now the coronavirus is wreaking havoc on the malnourished populace. The head of the United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Yemen says “the crisis is of cataclysmic proportions,” and is getting worse as aid funds dry up due to the global economic depression.

The Houthis are in denial about the pandemic, citing absurdly low numbers of infection and deaths. They also tax humanitarian assistance and divert aid to themselves. But they retain exclusive control of virtually all of the north.

Iran has been providing assistance to the Houthis, especially for their missile and drones, since before the war began. The aid is relatively cheap. The Iranians are getting valuable combat experience in the capabilities of their missiles and drones in Yemen. The experience will undoubtedly help Iran’s allies, like Hezbollah, improve their capabilities.

Tehran has bogged down its regional rival Saudi Arabia in an expensive debacle in Yemen, with apparently no way out. The war costs to the Iranians, in contrast, are minimal. The Saudis will be tarred by the humanitarian catastrophe they have helped create for years to come, and the crown prince’s reputation is toxic. Iran has a host of problems — the virus, mysterious explosions, and others — but in Yemen it’s a winner.

       

The deadly clash this week between India and China in the Himalayas is the worst crisis in their border quarrel since 1967. It may escalate to the worst since the 1962 Sino-Indian War, which almost brought the United States to war with China. The COVID-19 pandemic makes the current situation worse, it’s hard to be cool-headed in the midst of a humanitarian disaster on both sides of the disputed border. Pakistan is also a very interested player, watching the game play out just as it did in 1962 and hoping its rival India will be humiliated.

At least 20 Indian soldiers died in the clashes in the Ladakh region adjoining Kashmir on June 15. The Chinese have not provided any casualty figures. The fighting was primitive: No firearms apparently were used, just sticks and stones. Two states armed with nuclear weapons had a fist fight, with fatal consequences and an unpredictable outcome.

Two states armed with nuclear weapons had a fist fight, with fatal consequences and an unpredictable outcome.

The remote region where the clash is occurring is strategically important to both countries because it is close to where India, China, and Pakistan meet. In 1962, India was badly defeated by the Chinese, losing the Aksai Chin region of Ladakh in a matter of days. Unlike in other border zones where the Chinese whipped the Indians, China did not withdraw from its gains. China took almost 15,000 square miles of what had been India in Aksai Chin, and has kept it ever since. It maintains claims to even more of Ladakh — hence the ongoing dispute.

For decades, both sides have built up their transportation infrastructure to get troops and supplies to the Himalayan front line. A newly upgraded road, built by the Indians, appears to be at the center of the latest tension.

Both India and China have highly nationalistic governments in office. Both are very sensitive to any perceived slight. Prime Minister Narendra Modi now looks like the loser, not an image he is comfortable with. But he also knows that the Indian military is not ready to take on China. Just as in 1962, India today is militarily weaker than China.

In October and November 1962, Mao Zedong sent Chinese troops into the disputed territory along the border in Ladakh and into what was then called the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) of India. The Indians were routed. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had no choice but to ask for help from Washington and London. President John F. Kennedy immediately ordered an airlift of weapons and supplies to India. The Royal Air Force joined in the airlift to rush equipment to India. A massive global operation was underway to help India.

It was not enough. A second Chinese offensive in November crushed the Indians in the NEFA and appeared to be driving to the Bay of Bengal. Nehru asked Kennedy for 350 United States Air Force jets and 10,000 crewmen to deploy to India to join the war and bomb China. The request was conveyed in an urgent letter which has only been declassified within the last few years. Before JFK answered the extraordinary request, Mao announced a unilateral ceasefire and pulled back his invaders in the north east, but they did not pull back in Ladakh.

Kennedy also had to deal with Pakistan, which was eager to grab more of Indian-controlled Kashmir for itself. Kennedy made clear to the Pakistani leadership that he would regard any Pakistani involvement as an act of war. Karachi backed down. Of course, Kennedy handled the crisis in South Asia at the same time he was dealing with the Cuban missile crisis and the very real threat of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Multi-tasking at its best.

Today, Pakistan’s relationship with China is far more extensive than in 1962. The two have exchanged nuclear secrets. China has invested tens of billions of dollars in building infrastructure to link western China to the Arabian Sea through Pakistani territory, especially at the port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea.

The Pakistani army is watching the latest flair up in Ladakh closely. The Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) hosted a very unusual meeting of the Pakistani high command at its headquarters in Rawalpindi after the news of the frontier clash came out. Pakistan has clashed with Modi’s India several times, including in deadly dogfights in the air.

The pandemic has hit all three countries hard. The virus is only making decisionmaking harder for all responsible leaders around the world. So far, none of the three leaderships has handled the pandemic very well.

There are many differences in the balance of power between 1962 and today, both regionally and in terms of global power balances. But the events of 1962 are very much on the minds of the leaders in China, India, and Pakistan. The past haunts the present, but history does not repeat. 2020 is not 1962. Neither Beijing, New Delhi, nor Islamabad had nuclear weapons in 1962. The risks of escalating the confrontation are immensely more dangerous today. All the players know that they have to avoid the worst. It’s too bad that the United States has a president who is certainly no JFK. 

       

Contrary to the Trump administration’s peace plan with the Taliban, al-Qaida is more embedded in the Afghan Taliban than ever. The Taliban have not renounced their alliance with al-Qaida. The maintenance of the alliance also raises disturbing questions about Pakistan’s role in sponsoring the Taliban war against the United States and NATO.

The United States and its allies intervened in Afghanistan 19 years ago because the Taliban, led by Mullah Omar, would not hand over Osama bin Laden to face justice for the 9/11 attacks. Al-Qaida was a state within the state of Afghanistan, with its own license plates and airport entrances, as well as control of numerous camps and training bases.

Under the so-called peace agreement signed with the Taliban by the Trump administration (but not by the government in Kabul), the Taliban is supposed to guarantee that the territory it controls is not used for international terrorism against the U.S. and its allies. To do so, presumably the Taliban would shut down the al-Qaida infrastructure in their territory.

The United Nations issued a report this month on the state of the Taliban and their relationship with al-Qaida. The U.N. monitors who prepared the report have a well-deserved reputation for excellent scholarship on the war and the Taliban.

They report that “al-Qaida has been operating covertly in Afghanistan while still maintaining close relations with the Taliban.” Indeed al-Qaida is “quietly gaining strength in Afghanistan while continuing to operate with the Taliban under their protection.” The terrorist group is active in 12 Afghan provinces, mostly along the border with Pakistan.

According to the U.N., the senior leadership of al-Qaida and the Taliban meet regularly. The U.N. is aware of at least six such meetings in the last year. One included Hamza bin Laden before his death. The Emir of al-Qaida, Ayman al-Zawahri met with senior leaders of the Taliban from the Haqqani network in February, a very rare report of the most-wanted man in the world holding an audience, apparently in Pakistan.

A joint U.S.-Afghan military operation last September killed the leader of al-Qaida’s India cell and its courier to Zawahri in Helmand province. They were being sheltered by the Taliban, which also lost fighters killed in the operation.

The U.N. estimates that al-Qaida has around 500 armed operatives in Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are “deep personal ties (including through marriage)” between the two groups that date back decades. The reports bottom line is that the “Taliban appear to have strengthened their relationship with al-Qaida rather than the opposite.” The notion of a break in their relationship is “mere fiction,” in the words of one U.N. member state.

Other terrorist groups are also embedded with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Lashkar e Taibi and Jaish Muhammad are two Pakistan-based groups that target India. They have over 1,000 fighters in Afghanistan, co-located with the Taliban. Both have long-standing ties to the Pakistani intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Central Asian and Uighur terror groups are also present with the Taliban.

The U.N. report does not address Pakistan’s own role with the Taliban. Pakistan has been the Taliban’s base and sanctuary since 2001 and was its key supporter before 9/11. It has never broken ties. Mullah Omar passed away in Pakistan. The groups senior leadership are based in Quetta. The Haqqani network is especially close to the ISI.

The report does say the Taliban have no problems “with respect to recruitment, funding, weapons or ammunition,” an implicit indication of the extent of Pakistani support. They also fund raise in the Gulf states. Omar’s successor was a frequent visitor to Abu Dhabi and Bahrain. The Taliban is also deeply involved in drug trafficking.

A decade ago, I prepared a report for the new Obama-Biden administration on Afghanistan and Pakistan. The U.N. report is hauntingly familiar in its conclusions. The good news is that al-Qaida has been severely degraded in the last 10 years. Osama bin Laden was brought to justice hiding in Abbottabad, the home of Pakistan’s military academy. The bad news is the Taliban is still in bed with al-Qaida, and Pakistan is still the Taliban’s sponsor.

The question is: Will the Trump administration ignore the facts about the Taliban and al-Qaida and proceed with the withdrawal of American troops and other personnel from Afghanistan, as outlined in the plan signed with the Taliban? Instead, it should re-evaluate the engagement with the Taliban, perhaps suspending it until they take action to address the al-Qaida threat. The next administration will need to do a thorough review of policy fully engaging with the Kabul government.

       

The war in Yemen refuses to wind down, despite the extension of a Saudi unilateral cease-fire for a month and extensive efforts by the United Nations to arrange a nationwide truce. The takeover of the southern port city of Aden last weekend by southern separatists will exacerbate the already chaotic crisis in the poorest country in the world. The United States needs to get much more involved to avert the worst.

Aden was the capital of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) from 1968 to 1990. The PDRY emerged from a vicious war against the British colonial regime in the late 1960s backed by Egypt and Russia, a miniature Arabian Vietnam for London. The only communist state in the Arab world, the PDRY went bankrupt when the Soviet Union collapsed and very reluctantly merged with the northern Republic of Yemen, run by Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Since the current war began five years ago, Aden has been the nominal capital of the Saudi-backed government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, although he remains in Riyadh. The separatist movement in the south has been pressing for independence as the war has turned into a quagmire.

The Southern Transitional Council (STC) has enjoyed the support of the United Arab Emirates. Abu Dhabi has sought to reduce its role in the war against the Houthis but retains considerable interest in Aden. Last November the Emiratis and Saudis worked out a compromise between the STC and the Hadi government to paper over their differences. The Riyadh agreement has now collapsed, a humiliating blow to the kingdom. The UAE has not endorsed the separatists’ takeover of Aden.

The Saudis retain some degree of control and influence in parts of the south — and especially the east, including Mahra and Hadrawmuat provinces as well as Socotra island. The separatists are likely to seek to expand their control outside Aden, making conflict likely.

Adding another confrontation to Yemen’s already confused politics is not going to help secure a comprehensive cease-fire or end to the Saudi blockade. It will encourage the Houthis to believe that the war is going their way and that the Hadi government is falling apart.

The Houthis have been winning on the battlefield in the north this year. They are closing in on the government’s last major stronghold in Marib. There are reports that the rebels are considering a major attack across the border, striking the Saudi city of Najran. It’s not clear that they have the capability for such an offensive, but it would be a major humiliation for the kingdom, especially for Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman, who is the architect of the Saudi war.

Lurking behind the fighting is the world worst humanitarian catastrophe. The Trump administration has cut aid to Yemen, citing Houthi interference in aid distribution. Already overwhelmed, the aid agencies are stretched thin. The pandemic is hovering over the country. Disaster looms.

Washington needs to urgently put its considerable weight behind the U.N. The Saudis need to lift the blockade completely and without conditions, withdraw all troops from Yemen, and facilitate the opening of Yemen ports and airfields. Washington should also coordinate a massive global relief effort to get medicine and food to those in risk. It should open a direct dialogue with the Houthis, and perhaps another with the STC.

       

Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of a unilateral cease-fire in Yemen reflects the kingdom’s dire economic and social crisis caused by the pandemic and the fall in oil prices. It’s not clear if the Houthis will accept the cease-fire, but it is certain that Yemen is completely unprepared for the outbreak of the virus in the poorest country in the world.

The Saudis announced a unilateral cease-fire last week after months of United Nations-brokered talks and direct contacts between the parties failed to produce a durable truce and a political settlement. The Houthis want a complete lifting of the blockade of Yemen, the “siege,” as they call it. They are right to do so: The country urgently needs to import food and medicine. Roughly 80% of the population — 24 million people — are dependent on humanitarian assistance, and two-thirds are malnourished. Children are especially vulnerable.

The Saudi air strikes have targeted hospitals and other civilian sites for five years, according to a new study in the United Kingdom. One-third of all the air strikes have hit civilian targets including hospitals and schools. Only half the country’s hospitals and medical installations are operating because of the bombing and the siege.

The Houthis are no angels. They have taxed humanitarian assistance from the outside, repressed journalists, and fired missiles at civilian targets in Saudi Arabia. The answer is not to reduce aid, as the Trump administration is doing, but to end the blockade and open the country to outside help and the media. The United States should engage directly with the Houthis.

Saudi Arabia is facing its own humanitarian crisis now, due to the pandemic. The country is effectively shut down indefinitely, with curfews in Riyadh and other cities. The pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina is closed, and the annual hajj scheduled for July is already suspended. Religious tourism is a major source of income for the country, especially the Hejaz region. The Saudis have the worst case of the virus in the six Gulf states. The royal family has been hit hard, and the governor of Riyadh is in the hospital with the disease.

The dramatic contraction in global economic activity has produced an unprecedented drop in demand for oil and energy. The Saudis need oil prices at $85 per barrel to balance their budget — it’s barely a quarter of that now. Last week, the Saudis reluctantly agreed with Russia and other producers to cut supply, but it is unlikely that oil prices will recover. The Saudis have no choice but to draw down reserves, which have already fallen considerably since King Salman ascended the throne and recklessly started the war in Yemen. Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman’s “Saudi Vision 2030” is now a mirage.

The combination of the virus and the collapse of oil prices is producing the worst economic crisis in the kingdom since the Great Depression of the 1930s. It urgently needs to stop the hemorrhage of resources into the quagmire in Yemen.

The Saudis’ rival Iran is suffering from the virus more than any country in the region and has badly mismanaged its response to the pandemic. It has a vested interest in the war continuing in Yemen and draining the resources of the Saudis.

Yemen has just reported its first case of the virus in the eastern province of Hadrawmuat. The area is fragmented, with the Saudis in control of some places, al-Qaida in others, and local militias elsewhere. The International Rescue Committee has said that an outbreak of the virus in Yemen will be a “nightmare scenario.” The toll could be catastrophic for a nation that already has the worst humanitarian crisis in the world.

The Saudis are suing for peace. They have no realistic alternative to giving most of Yemen to the Houthis with the specter of an Iranian proxy on their southern border.

       

On Saturday night, March 28, two missiles were fired at the Saudi capital of Riyadh. They were intercepted by Saudi defenses, but two Saudis were injured in the falling debris. Another missile was fired at the city of Jazan. This is the first attack on the Saudi capital since last September’s devastating attacks by Iran on the Abqaiq oil refinery center.

The Houthis in Yemen took credit for the attack. They said Zulfiqar missiles were used, a reference to the sword of Ali, the hero of Shiite Muslims. A day earlier, the Houthis used drones to attack Saudi border towns close to Yemen. The Saudis have responded with air strikes in Sana’a and Hodeida in Houthi-controlled northern Yemen.

The United Nations has been trying to leverage the coronavirus pandemic as a means to get a ceasefire in Yemen so it can concentrate the country’s slim resources to fight the virus. All the internal parties — including the government of President Mansour Hadi and the Houthis, as well as the Saudis and Iranians — have praised the U.N. initiative. No formal agreement went into effect, but the Houthis have not fired a missile at the Saudi capital in a year. Since the September strikes by Iran, the air and missile war has deescalated.

Yemen has not yet reported a COVID-19 outbreak, but its primitive health care system is in no condition to deal with an epidemic. The Saudis have systematically targeted the health infrastructure of the country over the last four years. When the virus arrives, an already catastrophic humanitarian disaster will get worse. Millions of Yemenis, especially children, are seriously malnourished and very vulnerable.

So why are the Houthis attacking Riyadh now? Information on the war in Yemen, and especially about the Houthis, has always been hard to get, and the global pandemic has grabbed the media’s attention.

Part of the reason, probably, is that the Houthis are winning. Since January, they have made significant advances on the ground, especially in Jawf province along the Saudi border. They are now poised to attack the city of Marib, the last stronghold of the Hadi loyalists in the north. The most militant Houthis are probably reluctant to forego this advantage on the ground.

Iran is involved in Houthi decisionmaking. Tehran undoubtedly wants the Saudi kingdom to remain bogged down in the Yemeni morass. Iranian-backed militias are also stepping up rocket attacks against U.S. positions in Iraq, and Iran is mounting a well-orchestrated campaign to undercut U.S. sanctions. And they’re doing it while entrenching their position in Iraq and the Gulf vis-à-vis the United States. COVID-19 may take as many Iranian lives as the 8-year war with Iraq in the 1980s, but at least at the end of this crisis, Iran is poised to land in a stronger strategic position.

Saudi Arabia and Iran have been engaged in proxy wars with each other for 40 years, since the Iranian revolution. Yemen is now among the victims of that conflict. Ironically Riyadh is now under fire, not Tehran.

       

Saudi Arabia is facing serious challenges from the coronavirus, testing a leadership that has been impulsive and exclusive. The monarchy has become more remote from even most of the royal family in the last five years. Now the monarchy’s response to the virus has been unprecedented. Attention should be focused particularly on the young man who makes the day-to-day decisions in the Royal Palace.

So far, the kingdom has reported publicly only a small number of confirmed cases of infection, but it’s neighborhood has been badly affected — especially Iran. Close neighbors including Bahrain and Kuwait have reported numerous cases.

The global economic downturn, led by China, has pushed the price of oil down significantly as demand has dropped precipitously. The Saudis are under pressure to cut production to stimulate growth, but that means less revenue for the kingdom. With an expensive war in Yemen that is heating up, as I recently wrote, the economy is stagnant.

More immediately, the king has taken the unprecedented step of shutting the holy cities in Mecca and Medina to pilgrims. At first this was only for foreigners but now the closing is applying to everyone. The kingdom normally encourages pilgrims all year, with often up to one million foreign pilgrims coming every month to make umrah, or the so-called lesser hajj. Late this week, the Saudis reopened the mosques after sterilization for limited visits, but not umrah.

The annual hajj itself brings two and a half million pilgrims from around the Islamic world. This year, the hajj will be in late July and early August. It is a major source of revenue for the kingdom. Already there are mounting questions about whether the hajj will happen this year.

King Salman, like his predecessors, puts much stock in being the custodian of the Holy Mosques. If the annual pilgrimage is canceled, it will have consequences for the legitimacy of the House of Saud, even if it makes public health sense to shut it down this year.

Much attention is focused on Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (commonly known as MBS). We knew virtually nothing about him when his father ascended the throne in 2015, not even his age. He is a deeply controversial figure. At first, MBS was widely lauded as a reformer who was transforming the Wahhabi kingdom into a more moderate country. But over time, the prince has been tainted by his war in Yemen and his role in ordering the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Now we have the first comprehensive biography of the man who could rule his country for the next half-century.

A new book “MBS: The Rise to Power of Mohammed Bin Salman,” by Ben Hubbard, is an excellent account of the life and the background of the most consequential new figure in the Middle East in our time. A veteran reporter, Hubbard made numerous visits to the kingdom to research where the prince came from and how he took power. It’s a frightening picture.

The kingdom has been transformed into a nation gripped by fear. The crown prince has arrested and shaken down the cream of Saudi society; tortured women who spoke in favor of driving, because he can’t bear sharing the publicity of ending the women driving ban; and kidnapped and beat up the prime minister of Lebanon, just to name some of his violent actions. As journalist Jamal Khashoggi wrote before he was killed, the kingdom has changed in dark ways. The virus will only make it all the more dangerous.

MBS is the eldest son of his father’s second and favorite wife. Salman bin Abdul Aziz is one of the last surviving sons of the modern kingdom’s founder, known as Ibn Saud. For a half-century, Salman was governor of Riyadh, the capital which grew from a small desert town to a sprawling metropolis of almost eight million people. Since most of the royal family lives in the capital, Salman has all the dirt on their personal lives. Hubbard explains why MBS became the king’s favorite (because he was unfailingly loyal and available). He also recounts that MBS put his own mother under house arrest for three years, for reasons that remain mysterious.

Among the most disturbing aspects of the prince’s rise to power is that many prominent, self-styled Western experts on the region were entranced with him for years. They bought his slick Vision 2030, thinking it was a real roadmap for change even though it has no political dimension. It’s also unrealistic. The prince said in 2016 that by 2020, the country “will be able to live without oil” as the principle generator of national income.

Many ignored the prince’s signature foreign policy initiative: the war in Yemen. The war is a very much a one-man show ordered by MBS over the better judgement of many other princes, who worried it would become the quagmire it is today, costing the kingdom a fortune. It is also the worst humanitarian catastrophe in the world. Millions of Yemenis, especially children, are suffering from acute malnutrition. If the virus spreads to Yemen, it will be potentially devastating.

One of the best chapters in Hubbard’s book on MBS is about the war in Yemen. It includes exclusive reporting from a rare trip the author made to Sana’a in 2016. Many Yemenis blame America for the war since the planes, the bombs, and the pilots that have destroyed schools and targeted weddings are made in America or trained in America. Two U.S. presidents have given MBS the wherewithal to conduct a war that may border on genocide. The prince’s reckless behavior was on clear display right from the beginning of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen — called Operation Decisive Storm — but many in the West chose to ignore it.

President Trump’s adviser and son-in-law Jared Kushner is MBS’s American enabler in the White House. The Saudis have placed all their eggs in the Trump basket. They are going to face a serious crisis if the Democrats win in November. Former Vice President Biden has said MBS should be regarded as a “pariah” who should be “punished.”

The crown prince’s signature domestic goal is to build a super-modern computerized city along the Saudi coast of the Gulf of Aqaba, near the borders of Egypt, Israel, and Jordan. The NEOM project is central to the crown prince’s plan for the future of the kingdom. But in the Gulf, NEOM is nicknamed by the Saudi-watchers “Never Ever Opening, Man.” It may be a parable for the kingdom’s own future.

       

The agreement signed on February 29 in Doha between American and Taliban negotiators lays out a plan for ending the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, and opens a path for direct intra-Afghan talks on the country’s political future. Brookings experts on Afghanistan, the U.S. mission there, and South Asia more broadly analyze the deal and offer their views on what may come next.

John R. Allen, President of the Brookings Institution: My colleagues here at Brookings have written artfully about the pros and cons of the recent U.S.-Taliban peace deal, and the overall outlook for Afghanistan. I agree with much of their analysis, all of which is rooted in their deep expertise on the issue at hand.

Having led all U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan from 2011-13, I have my own perspective on this agreement, which is grounded in practical, lived experience. As I’ve said publicly, the Taliban are untrustworthy; their doctrine is irreconcilable with modernity and the rights of women; and in practice, they’re incapable of summoning the necessary internal controls and organizational discipline needed to implement a far-flung agreement like this. The so-called “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan” will not only not be honored by the Taliban, it will also not bring peace.

As I write in more detail elsewhere, I have some specific misgivings: that the U.S. committed to a significant number of measurable commitments, but the Taliban did not; that the U.S. and Taliban committed to intra-Afghan talks, but that ongoing violence prevents these from occurring; that there’s very limited capacity for the Taliban to control violence themselves, even if they wanted to; that the current deal obligates the Afghan government to release 5,000 Taliban fighters by March 10, but that in almost every instance, a mass release is immediately followed by an uptick in violence; and most importantly, that the U.S. failed to establish an internationally acceptable minimum standard for the rights of women.

The Taliban know what year it is, and they know the U.S. forces will be coming out ahead of the U.S. presidential election. They’re wagering that this administration, which seeks to point to this agreement in the months ahead as evidence of keeping a campaign promise, will be extremely reluctant to walk away from this agreement or come back in over local violations. They have the U.S. exactly where they’ve wanted us, but to where they couldn’t maneuver previous administrations. The Taliban are many things: drug dealers, violent abusers of women, and terrorists. But there’s one thing they are not: stupid.

Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow in the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and the Center for Middle East Policy: As I write in more depth elsewhere, it is no wonder that the Taliban is hailing this deal as a victory.

The United States secretary of defense has said that the Pentagon has already begun the first stage of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from 12,000 to 8,600. NATO, which was not even dignified with being named in the agreement, is also pulling out. The agreement categorically rules out any residual counterterrorism force or any training for the Afghan military. In short, it abandons the Afghan government’s military and puts the future of counterterrorism in the region in the hands of the Taliban and their Pakistani patrons.

The fundamental flaw in this agreement is that the internationally recognized Afghan government, led by Ashraf Ghani, was not included in the negotiations. By accepting the Taliban demand to exclude the Afghan government, the Trump administration betrayed our ally and elevated the Taliban to our equal. It is worth remembering that at the height of their power in 2000, only three governments — Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates — recognized the Taliban as a legitimate government. Excluding the Afghan government is strikingly reminiscent of the Nixon administration’s deal with North Vietnam in 1973, which excluded the South Vietnam government.

The United States has fumbled the war since its inception. Every American and Afghan is eager to see an end to the war. A political process is to be welcomed. Let’s hope the Doha agreement can be adjusted to get to a comprehensive ceasefire. It is not too late to insist on direct negotiations between Kabul and the Taliban as the prerequisite for future withdrawals of the international coalition in Afghanistan.  A flawed deal is not going to deliver the security that a generation of American troops have fought for along with our partners. Let’s fix it.

Michael O’Hanlon (@MichaelEOhanlon), Director of Research and Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy program: Bruce Riedel is brilliant, devastating, and almost completely convincing in his severe critique of the phase one deal of the U.S.-Taliban peace process.

Still, as I write in more detail elsewhere, there are reasons for hope. Perhaps the phase one deal can be at least a baby step forward — even if the hard work, we can all agree, still remains to be done. As Bruce notes, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper (and also Secretary of State Mike Pompeo) have publicly interpreted the deal to mean that the U.S. departure from Afghanistan is, in their view, conditional rather than not automatic. Admittedly, there is ambiguity on this point in the actual agreement. But perhaps the ambiguity can be used constructively to push the government of Ashraf Ghani to offer real concessions on power-sharing. (By the way, I might suggest making Abdullah Abdullah the lead negotiator for the government and broader Afghan political and civil society in future talks with the Taliban.) Make no mistake: There is no moral equivalence between the Taliban and the other side of the bargaining table. The former have a horrible history of violence, misogyny, barbarity, and self-righteousness. The latter include some corrupt actors but also many good and brave people. All the more reason, however, why Ghani and others on his side may resist real compromise. In that event, stalemate or breakdown of the talks is the predictable result. So we may as well try to make a virtue out of the phase one deal’s weaknesses, and use the uncertainty about our own long-term commitment to Afghanistan to prod both sides to compromise.

Let me be clear that I do not prefer this approach. (Nor do I prefer the terms for the preemptive release of thousands of Taliban prisoners.) However, given the unwillingness of President Trump (like President Obama before him) to commit to the mission over a longer term, this kind of ambiguity may be the best we can hope for right now.

While it is true that the 14-month time horizon for the complete departure of foreign troops is at odds with the second bullet point above, perhaps a U.N. force can help ensure compliance thereafter, by monitoring the behavior of various parties and only approving ongoing foreign assistance in the event the Taliban stick to their deal. Ideally, that time horizon can be stretched out if negotiations hit roadblocks, which they almost inevitably soon will. For one thing is perhaps clear above all others: This process, even if it can somehow be successful (and the odds are admittedly against it), is just beginning, and the hard part is still to come.

Vanda Felbab-Brown (@VFelbabBrown), Senior Fellow in the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence: The deal that the United States and the Taliban signed on Saturday allows the United States to extract itself from a stalled war. For years, the fighting showed no signs of battlefield breakthrough, while the United States held the Afghan security forces and Afghan government on life support.

The Taliban, meanwhile, understands at a more strategic level that its battlefield performance will enhance its negotiating hand, as I describe in more detail in another post. Though hardly 10 feet tall, the Taliban has systematically managed to increase the battlefield operational tempo since 2015. U.S. airpower has limited its ability to take over provincial capitals and inflict even greater casualties to Afghan security forces. That counter is now being reduced and will eventually be removed as U.S. forces start withdrawing.

It won’t be a small task for Taliban leadership to control the battlefield ambitions of its mid-level commanders. And at the same time, the political tensions over the reelection of President Ashraf Ghani, contested by rival Abdullah Abdullah, have only compounded the lack of a unified negotiating front among Afghan politicians vis-à-vis the Taliban and the lack of clarified negotiated positions of the Afghan government, particularly what power and freedoms the government is ready to give up for peace.

However long the process takes and however much fighting occurs before that, the Taliban will likely continue to hold significant, if not dominant power, in Afghanistan. As Taliban-linked interlocutors have told me during field research, the Taliban wants to avoid a civil war and was very keen to avoid an “irresponsible” departure of U.S. forces — in other words, a departure without a deal with the Taliban, since the Taliban believes that would have pushed the country closer to a civil war and impeded intra-Afghan negotiations.

The Taliban maintains that once U.S. troops are out and it is in power, the group can have good relations with the United States and very much wants to maintain the flow of U.S. economic aid. Whatever power (and in whatever form) the Taliban has after the U.S. military departure, U.S. economic aid may ironically be one of the most important mechanisms to shape the Taliban’s behavior toward more inclusion, pluralism, and some respect for women’s and human rights.

Note: The research reported here was funded in part by the Minerva Research Initiative (OUSD(R&E)) and the Army Research Office/Army Research Laboratory via grant #W911-NF-17-1-0569 to George Mason University.  Any errors and opinions are not those of the Department of Defense and are attributable solely to the author(s).

Madiha Afzal (@MadihaAfzal), David M. Rubenstein Fellow in the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and the Center for Middle East Policy: The Afghan people have suffered the consequences of war and violence for 40 years, and they deserve peace. But they are unlikely to achieve that long-elusive peace through the U.S.-Taliban deal signed on Saturday, at least as the document currently stands.

With this deal, the Taliban will get an American withdrawal in exchange for promising an absolute minimum in counterterrorism commitments: They have promised to not allow the Taliban or its affiliates, including al-Qaida, to use Afghan soil to attack America or its allies. What about attacks by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an Afghan Taliban affiliate, on Pakistan from Afghan soil? Some of the TTP’s members have sought refuge across the border from Pakistan in Afghanistan. Conversely, what about attacks from Pakistani soil — from breakaway Haqqani network militants — on America or its allies?

As I argued last week, terrorist groups do not function in isolation, and the Taliban’s support for all terrorist groups — those that attack America as well as those that attack local and regional targets — should have been a red line in the deal, with clear mechanisms for enforcement.

Like my colleagues Mike O’Hanlon and Bruce Riedel, I am critical of this deal, and perhaps even less hopeful than them for what this heralds for Afghanistan and its region. In the text of the deal, I was looking for two things. First, I looked for the conditionality of phase one (the U.S.-Taliban deal) on phase two (the intra-Afghan deal) — that is, of conditioning the U.S. troop withdrawal on the success of an intra-Afghan deal. Second, I had hoped to see language on safeguarding gains made in the last 18 years on human, and especially women’s, rights. There is nothing at all on the latter, nor on the former: While there is a timeline for beginning the intra-Afghan peace process, the conditionality of the withdrawal rests only on counterterrorism commitments.

Separately, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper wrote in a Washington Post op-ed that the withdrawal will rest on how the intra-Afghan peace process is proceeding, but there is nothing guaranteeing this in the actual document that the U.S. signed. Whether any annexes to the deal will open significant room for more ambiguity remains to be seen. The language in the deal on sanctions and prisoners, too, favors the Taliban.

Last week I also argued that America needed commitments in the deal on human rights and against all terrorist groups in the region, and that it needed to win the war of narratives against the Taliban. But with President Trump talking to Taliban co-founder Mullah Baradar on the phone for 35 minutes after the Taliban resumed its attacks on Afghan security forces, and the Taliban set to visit the United States, there is no attempt from the U.S. government at owning the narrative. I am afraid that all America is doing with this deal is arranging the terms of its withdrawal — which, I worry, will be perceived in the region more like a surrender.

       

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the signature title of the Taliban, is rightly pleased with the agreement that it signed with the United States in Qatar on February 29. The agreement concedes their long-sought demand for the withdrawal “from Afghanistan of all military forces of the United States, its allies, and Coalition partners, including all non-diplomatic civilian personnel, private security contractors, trainers, advisors, and supporting services personnel within fourteen (14) months.” It is no wonder the Taliban is hailing the deal as a victory.

The United States secretary of defense has said that the Pentagon has already begun the first stage of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from 12,000 to 8,600. NATO, which was not even dignified with being named in the agreement, is also pulling out. The agreement categorically rules out any residual counterterrorism force or any training for the Afghan military. In short, it abandons the Afghan government’s military and puts the future of counterterrorism in the region in the hands of the Taliban and their Pakistani patrons.

It will be extremely difficult for the United States intelligence community to operate in this environment. The lack of any force protection even private contractors will inhibit the business of collecting information in dangerous territory. The challenge of knowing what is happening in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, long a hub of numerous terrorist organizations, will be acute.

The Taliban did not renounce al-Qaida in the agreement, or the 9/11 attacks. Its deputy commander Sirajuddin Haqqani didn’t do so either in his New York Times op-ed. Taliban propaganda has consistently extolled the 9/11 attacks as a victory for the global jihad, a narrative that it will argue is reinforced by the Doha agreement. “Jihad has defeated a superpower again,” the argument goes. The Doha agreement includes no statement about the human rights of Afghans, a glaring omission for Afghan women’s rights.

What the Taliban commits to is to prevent the use of Afghanistan’s territory for terrorist attacks on the United States and “its allies.” The Taliban will prevent training, fundraising, and other assistance for operations against the security of the U.S. and its allies. It’s a hortatory promise. It makes no mention of the Taliban infrastructure in Pakistan where numerous terrorists have long been based. It makes no mention of the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba terrorist network that cooperates with the Taliban and targets India.

The Taliban has already said that the seven-day reduction in violence that preceded the Doha agreement is over and that it is renewing attacks on Afghan targets. It made no promise of a comprehensive ceasefire, which is supposed to be negotiated in intra-Afghan talks that will supposedly begin on March 10 after a major prisoner exchange. The Afghan government has said it is not committed to the release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners in exchange for 1,000 Afghan government prisoners held by the Taliban, presumably in their bases in Pakistan. The Afghan government is hobbled by the outcome of last year’s elections, which has divided the government in two at this crucial juncture.

The fundamental flaw in this agreement is that the internationally recognized Afghan government, led by Ashraf Ghani, was not included in the negotiations. By accepting the Taliban demand to exclude the Afghan government, the Trump administration betrayed our ally and elevated the Taliban to our equal. It is worth remembering that at the height of their power in 2000, only three governments — Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates — recognized the Taliban as a legitimate government. Excluding the Afghan government is strikingly reminiscent of the Nixon administration’s deal with North Vietnam in 1973, which excluded the South Vietnam government.

Secretary of Defense Mark Esper has said that the administration will condition its compliance with the Doha agreement on the Taliban’s performance. That is to be hoped for. It’s unclear if the president is so committed. It is probably no accident that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo refrained from personally signing the deal.

The entire approach is only possible, ironically, because of the success of the Obama administration’s so-called AfPak strategy that aimed for the defeat of al-Qaida. With drones and commandos, the Obama administration hunted down Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants relentlessly in Pakistan. Yet bin Laden’s principal deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, is still active in Pakistan. The agreement makes no commitment to his apprehension.

The Doha agreement is also a trap for any Democrat elected president in November. At his or her inauguration in January 2021, they will have to decide whether to adhere to the 14-month time frame for complete withdrawal from Afghanistan or to refuse the time line with three months to get the troops out and extend the “endless war,” a momentous decision.

Polling done by my Brookings colleague Shibley Telhami shows that a plurality of Americans do not want to cut and run from Afghanistan. A plurality also believes that the United States has a moral obligation not to abandon the Afghan people, especially Afghan women, to the dictatorship of the Taliban.

The United States has fumbled the war since its inception. In 2001, bin Laden and Zawahri were allowed to escape to Pakistan. Resources and attention were diverted from finishing the job in Afghanistan by the disastrous invasion of Iraq in 2003. Within five years, al-Qaida was more dangerous than ever before. Only the resolute decision of Barack Obama prevented another 9/11 attack. Don’t expect the Trump team to thank Obama.

Every American and Afghan is eager to see an end to the war. A political process is to be welcomed. Let’s hope the Doha agreement can be adjusted to get to a comprehensive ceasefire. It is not too late to insist on direct negotiations between Kabul and the Taliban as the prerequisite for future withdrawals of the international coalition in Afghanistan. A flawed deal is not going to deliver the security that a generation of American troops have fought for along with our partners. Let’s fix it.

       

After five months of deescalation, the war in Yemen is heading back in the wrong direction. Fighting is escalating on the ground. The Houthi rebels have resumed missile attacks on Saudi Arabia and the Saudis have resumed air strikes on Sana’a. If the war escalates further, there is a danger it will expand and draw in Iran and America more than previously.

The missile attacks on Saudi Arabia’s vital oil infrastructure in Abqaiq last September were the galvanizing event that persuaded Riyadh to start deescalation. The pin-point accuracy of the attacks demonstrated the acute vulnerability of the Saudi economy. Immediately after the strike, the Houthis — who claimed credit for what was actually an Iranian attack — offered to cease missile attacks in Saudi Arabia if Riyadh stopped bombing. Tehran approved the deal. The United Nations mediators used the opening to get a reduction in violence, a prisoner exchange, and medical flights from Sana’a for the people most in need of care.

The Saudis were very alarmed that President Trump said the September attacks were against Saudi Arabia and not the United States. The differentiation made the Saudis lose faith. Despite the presence of American combat troops in the kingdom (Trump returned them last year after they had left in 2003), the United States said it was not going to fight for their defense against Iran. The Democrats were even firmer in opposition to going to war for Saudi Arabia. Senator Bernie Sanders, for one, has called the Saudis “murderous thugs.” It was a wake-up call, and the killing of Qassem Soleimani did not resolve Riyadh’s concerns. They began direct negotiations with the Houthis.

But the talks failed to develop a political framework for a firm ceasefire and a resolution of the civil war, which is at the core of the struggle. Riyadh was unwilling to give up the discredited government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who is in exile in the Saudi capital. Without a political process, the reduction in violence is at risk.

Iran’s influence with the Houthis is growing. The assistance Tehran provides to the Houthis missile program is crucial to its growing capabilities. An Iranian-supplied surface-to-air missile brought down a Saudi Tornado jet a week ago. Spending far less than the Saudis, Iran has every reason to keep its Arab rivals bogged down in a quagmire that costs tens of billions a year. The Houthis give increasing prominence to their association with Iran.

The Iranian commander in Yemen, Abdul Reza Shahli escaped an American assassination attempt on the same day Soleimani was killed. The attack on Shahlai was a dramatic demonstration of a deeper American involvement in the Yemen war than had previously been documented. Despite Congress’ attempts to end U.S. support for the Saudi war, the administration ordered an attempt to kill the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Force commander in Sana’a. Shahlai is a very experienced officer, which is a signal of the importance of the war for Tehran.

The pace of operations is still less than it was six months ago, but the trend is worrisome. The Houthis are not controlled by Iran, but the war is pushing them deeper into the Iranian orbit — precisely the nightmare the Saudis said the war was intended to prevent. The Saudis claim they foiled a Houthi attack on shipping in the Red Sea last week, another sign of escalation.

The Trump administration is not going to press Saudi Arabia to end the war: For instance, the secretary of state made no effort to end the war in his visit to the kingdom last week. The administration believes the war is part of the maximum pressure campaign against Iran, and it has vetoed Congress’ efforts to end U.S. involvement in the war. Congress is going to need to redouble its efforts to shut down the American support for the war.  If the conflict escalates further, the humanitarian consequences will add to the existing catastrophe of malnourished and starving Yemenis. Time is of the essence.